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Positive, Small, Homogeneous, and Durable:
Political Persuasion in Response to Information
Alexander Edwards Coppock
This dissertation offers a theory of political persuasion rooted in a Bayesian model of in-
formation processing. I support this theory with the results of 20 survey experiments,
conducted variously on convenience samples and nationally-representative surveys. From
these data, I draw four main conclusions. First, when confronted with persuasive mes-
sages, individuals update their views in the direction of information. Second, people change
their minds about political issues in small increments. Third, persuasion in the direction
of information occurs regardless of background characteristics, initial beliefs, or ideologi-
cal position. Finally, these changes in political attitudes are not ephemeral, in most cases
lasting at least 10 days.
These findings stand in contrast to the predictions of the attitude polarization literature,
which posits that the effects of persuasion attempts will be positive for some, but negative
for others. Across these 20 experiments, I was unable to find any evidence of negative effects
(defined as attitude changes away from treatment information) for any subgroup defined
by standard demographics, prior attitudes, or their intersections. Instead, people appear to
update their views in a manner consistent with Bayes’ rule, i.e., as a weighted average of
prior beliefs and new information.
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Preface
The overarching claim of this dissertation is that information designed to persuade can and
does change minds. The persuasive effects of information have four salient features:
1. Effects are nearly uniformly positive: individuals are persuaded in the direction of
evidence.
2. Effects are small : changes in opinion are incremental.
3. Effects are relatively homogeneous: regardless of background, individuals respond to
information by similar degrees.
4. Effects are durable: at a minimum, effects endure for weeks, albeit somewhat dimin-
ished.
These four conclusions are drawn from 20 survey experiments conducted on both conve-
nience and nationally-representative samples. They stand in contrast to theories of “mini-
mal effects” that claim attitudes are largely unmoved by the messages transmitted via the
media. These conclusions are also at odds with theories of motivated reasoning that assert
that individuals only hear what they want to hear.
The evidence assembled in this dissertation leads me to conclude that political persua-
sion is a commonplace occurrence. The political attitudes and beliefs of Americans, as
expressed in public opinion surveys, respond to the introduction of new evidence, argu-
ments, and information. Persuasive effects of a single-shot dose of information, delivered
in a controlled survey environment to willing participants, are small but real. Subjects
update their attitudes and beliefs at the margin. In no cases did I measure an effect that
would turn an ardent Democrat into a staunch Republican. Persuasion, as it unfolded in
the studies detailed here, did not make people re-evaluate their opinions top-to-bottom;
instead, persuasion consisted in the small updates that take a person, say, from a 2 to a
x
2.5 on a 7-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Put another way, the
average effect size in these experiments is 0.21 standard units. A widely-adopted rule of
thumb suggests that small, medium, and large social science effects are approximately 0.2,
0.5, and 0.8 standard units, respectively (Cohen 1992). By this rubric, persuasive effects
are small, or at least they are small relative to the variance in attitudes held by people of
diverse backgrounds and experiences.
I explain these results with a theory of Bayesian reasoning, which posits that people
take a weighted average of their prior opinions and new information. This theory makes
two basic predictions. The first is that people update their opinions in the direction of
evidence. The second is that, under some basic assumptions about how strongly held prior
opinions are, the effects of information are approximately the same for most people. This
basic sameness leads to an optimistic view of the democratic process. Even in the most
contentious of political disputes, we see that persuasion can does occur, on all sides of the
debate.
Research Approach
The classic definition of an attitude given by Allport (1935) holds that “An attitude is a
mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or
dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it
is related.” In this dissertation, no attempt will be made to model, account for, or otherwise
explain this baseline state of readiness. Attitudes are the result of extraordinarily complex
social processes involving family context, religious upbringing, political socialization, edu-
cational attainment, friendship networks, media exposure, occupational experience, and the
interactions among these factors, not to mention individuals’ idiosyncratic application of
personal judgment and reason; untangling this web while successfully distinguishing spuri-
ous correlations from causal relationships is, simply put, too difficult.
Instead, I will focus on persuasion, which refers to the change in attitudes in response
to some treatment. The study of persuasion is particularly well-suited to the experimental
research paradigm. There is a strong match between the research question, “How does opin-
xi
ion change in response to information?” and the research approach of randomly assigning
information to some subjects but not others and then comparing the expressed attitudes of
the treated and the untreated.
Randomized experiments are often described as the “gold standard” of research designs
because of their uniquely strong licensing of causal inferences. Setting aside whether the
analogy to monetary policy is appropriate, the basic point stands: whereas causal infer-
ences drawn from non-experimental research rest on assumptions that are often difficult to
verify, randomized experiments justify their assumptions by design (where possible). The
crucial assumption of the independence of potential outcomes from exposure to informa-
tion is established by a description of the physical random assignment procedure rather
than through a statistical control strategy such as regression or matching. In my experi-
ments, the assumption of non-interference is justified by the design feature that subjects all
participate in private settings where communication with other subjects is impossible; in
non-experimental studies of the persuasive effects of information delivered in the media, the
“subjects” can and do talk to one another about the news, possibly (probably!) affecting
outcomes.
Randomized experiments can also be thought of as a tool for measuring an otherwise
difficult-to-measure quantity: the difference between two mutually-exclusive states of the
world. In one state, everybody is exposed to the persuasive message; in the other state,
nobody is. If we could measure the world in both states, there would be no need for
randomization – we could simply inquire about the differences between the two states.
Thinking of randomization as a measurement tool places special emphasis on the goal of
an experiment: to measure an unobservable but nevertheless real, fixed characteristic of
subjects. We use surveys or administrative data to measure most fixed characteristics
about people, such as their age, political ideology, or policy attitudes. Unfortunately, we
cannot use surveys to directly measure individuals’ response to treatment. For that, we have
to turn to experiments and content ourselves with estimating group-level average treatment
effects, not individual treatment effects.
xii
Outline of Chapters to Follow
Chapter 1 explores the micro foundations of the parallel publics hypothesis (Page and
Shapiro 1992). Republicans and Democrats hold divergent views in many domains, but evi-
dence from repeated cross-sectional surveys suggests that these groups respond to changing
political conditions in a parallel fashion. Evidence from a large set of survey experiments
confirms that the probable mechanism for this parallel movement is that partisans of dif-
ferent stripes update their attitudes by approximately the same amount.
Chapter 2 is the theoretical heart of this project. The Bayesian reasoning hypothesis
suggests that individuals change their attitudes about political beliefs by updating in the
direction of evidence. The principal competitor to this hypothesis is some form of motivated
reasoning. These two theories – motivated reasoning and Bayesian reasoning – make di-
vergent predictions about how individuals should react to counter-attitudinal evidence and
arguments. Under motivated reasoning, counter-attitudinal evidence causes individuals to
hold their prior opinions even more strongly; under Bayesian reasoning, everyone updates
in the direction of evidence, counter-attitudinal or not. Evidence from three survey experi-
ments designed to elicit “attitude polarization” suggests that at minimum, no one updates
away from evidence.
Chapter 3 addresses a potential critique of the evidence presented in Chapter 2 in favor
of the Bayesian reasoning hypotheses: that because subjects are answering survey questions
in a neutral environment, the conditions for backlash and attitude polarization are not met.
In an attempt to assess the causal impact of the “conditions for backlash,” I randomize
whether subjects are in a contentious processing condition before being randomly assigned
to information. The evidence from this experiment is in line with the results of Chapter 2:
regardless of the processing condition, subjects update in the direction of evidence.
The finding that most individuals, regardless of predisposition, update their attitudes
and beliefs in the same direction and by approximately the same amounts has a fascinating
implication for survey experimental methodology: persuasion experiments conducted on
nationally representative samples and convenience samples should arrive at very similar
answers. Chapter 4 demonstrates that this implication is borne out: survey experiments
xiii
originally conducted on probability samples replicate very nicely on non-probability samples.
The explanation offered in this chapter is that treatment effect heterogeneity is low in
persuasion experiments.
Chapter 5 presents the results of an effort to measure the effects of persuasive treatments
over time. The persistence of treatment effects appears to vary from 20% to 60% after 10
days, depending on features of the persuasive messages. Messages that prime existing con-
siderations were found to have relatively fleeting effects, whereas treatments that provided
new information were found to exhibit stronger persistence.
The majority of the empirical claims made in this dissertation rest on a set of 20 survey
experiments. Because the focus of each chapter is usually on summarizing the pattern
of evidence found across experiments, some details of the experiments are omitted in the
main text. Appendix A gathers together the complete descriptions of each study, including
subject pools, randomization procedure, outcome question wordings, and basic results.
The main theoretical antagonist of this dissertation is attitude polarization, the idea that
the effects of an information treatment could be positive for some but negative for others.
This idea was given its first empirical test in the classic Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979)
demonstration. In Appendix B, I present a reanalysis and replication of that original study
to show how errors in design and analysis led those authors to draw incorrect inferences
about the effects of information on attitudes.
xiv
CHAPTER 1. THE MICRO FOUNDATIONS OF PARALLEL PUBLICS
1 The Micro Foundations of Parallel Publics
The parallel publics thesis holds that the opinions of subgroups in society tend to change in
tandem. Although this pattern has been demonstrated by many scholars using time-series
cross-sectional survey evidence, the causal engine driving the parallel publics finding is am-
biguous. Using knowledge of political history, analysts can sometimes offer plausible reasons
for why public opinion changed over time as it did; sometimes no convincing explanation is
forthcoming. In this chapter, I offer evidence in support of the parallel publics thesis that
derives from a different research design: survey experiments conducted on both convenience
and probability samples. Drawing on results from 20 survey experiments, I find highly corre-
lated treatment effects across politically salient subgroups defined by partisanship, education,
and gender. These experiments shed light on a longstanding hypothesized explanation for
the parallel publics finding; namely, that attitudes move in parallel because all segments of
the population are exposed to, receive, and accept the same messages.
1
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The parallel publics thesis, as originally formulated by Page and Shapiro (1992) in The
Rational Public, makes a strong prediction about how public opinion evolves over time:
“Among most groupings of Americans, opinions tend to change (or not change) in about
the same manner: in the same direction and by about the same amount at about the same
time (318).” Page and Shapiro support this conclusion with evidence from an over-time
analysis of thousands of opinion-subgroup dyads. Almost invariably, opinion shifts occur in
tandem.
Table 1.1 collects together 31 studies that use either repeated cross-section or panel
survey designs to test the parallel publics claim.1 Fully 30 of these 31 confirm the basic
claim that the average opinions of subgroups move in parallel. The range of demographic
splits explored by these studies is large, including education (Nincic 1997; Erikson, MacKuen
and Stimson 2002; Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Gillion, Ladd and
Meredith 2015), gender (Nincic and Nincic 2002; Kellstedt, Peterson and Ramirez 2010;
Eichenberg and Stoll 2012; Gillion et al. 2015), partisanship (Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Snyder, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon 2009; Enns and McAvoy
2012; Brooks and Manza 2013; Huxster, Carmichael and Brulle 2015; Morgan and Kang
2015), sophistication (Erikson et al. 2002; Enns and Kellstedt 2008), ideology (Erikson
et al. 2002; Degeorges and Gonthier 2012; Huxster et al. 2015), and race (Nincic and Nincic
2002; Kellstedt 2003). Three of these studies cover a large number of demographic splits
including those just mentioned as well as others like age and religion (Page and Shapiro
1992; DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Gonthier 2015). Some studies document parallel
trends according to geography rather than demographics: (Enns and Koch 2013; Pacheco
2014). While most studies were conducted with American subjects, two studies (Degeorges
and Gonthier 2012; Gonthier 2015) used European samples. In only one of these studies was
1These studies were gathered by searching Google Scholar for the search string “parallel publics” and
were limited to studies that present estimates of opinion over time by subgroup. Some studies (Mayer 2004;
Taydas, Kentmen and Olson 2012, e.g.,) use cross-sectional design with no over time component, typically
exploring the “impact” of some covariate on opinion in different subgroups. These were excluded on the
grounds that the research designs were ill-suited to uncovering the causal effect of the covariate on opinion,
rendering the question of parallel effects difficult to interpret.
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any evidence of contrary motion uncovered: Brooks and Manza (2013) found that support
for government regulation increased over time for Democrats but decreased over time for
Republicans, though the robustness of this finding depends on the time frame examined.
The remaining studies all found clear evidence in favor of parallel publics. The range of
topics covered is too wide to list here, but they are indicated in the last column of Table 1.1.
These opinion items cover nearly every major issue area that has been of interest to political
and other social scientists over the past 30 years. The parallel publics pattern uncovered
by Page and Shapiro in 1992 has been replicated across enough contexts, places, and times
to earn the description “empirical regularity.”
Why do opinions move in parallel? Page and Shapiro explain their findings with a
conjecture that the root cause is “centralization of the mass media – all segments of the
population receive essentially the same information at the same time.” Whether or not this
hypothesis is true is difficult to demonstrate with survey data. First, it is unclear whether
all segments of the population do in fact receive similar messages. Some groups report
relatively low media exposure while others follow the news minute-by-minute. Second,
the media have become dramatically decentralized in recent years, but there has been no
corresponding decrease in the validity of the parallel publics description of American politics
(as evidenced by the studies in Table 1.1), so it may not be that media centralization per se
is the cause (or was for the period studied by Page and Shapiro). Finally, the time-series
cross-sectional design used by many scholars to demonstrate parallel trends in public opinion
is limited in its ability to draw inferences about the causes of opinion shifts. We would like
attribute changes in public opinion to changes in the information environment generated by
the media. Unfortunately, the independent variable in these studies is time. While it is true
that the information environment changes as a function of time, so too does every other
possible explanation: the economy, long-term demographic change, international tensions,
among many others.
The approach I will take in this chapter is to control the information environment
to which individuals are exposed in a series of survey experiments. By randomly assigning
information to some subjects but not others, I am able to measure the impact of information
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Table 1.1: 31 Studies of Parallel Publics
Study Demographic Split Opinion Item
Page and Shapiro (1992) Gender, Race, Education,
Occupation, Income, Religion, Age,
Partisanship, Region, and
Community
169 repeated opinion questions
Bartels (1994) Political Information Defense spending
DiMaggio et al. (1996) Age, Education, Gender, Race,
Religion, Ideology, and
Partisanship
Sexuality, Racial attitudes, Aid to
minorities, Feelings toward poor, Gender
roles, Crime and Justice, Abortion,
Divorce law, Sex education
Nincic (1997) Education Internationalism
Erikson et al. (2002) Education, Sophistication, Ideology Policy mood
Green et al. (2002) Partisanship Presidential approval
Nincic and Nincic (2002) Gender, Race Alienation
Kellstedt (2003) Race Busing
Enns (2007) Education Defense and welfare spending
Enns and Kellstedt (2008) Education, Sophistication Policy mood
Soroka and Wlezien (2008) Income, Education, Partisanship Defense spending, Foreign aid, Education
spending, Health spending, Welfare
spending, Cities, Crime, Environment,
Taxes
Ura and Ellis (2008) Income Policy liberalism
Snyder et al. (2009) Partisanship Military power, the UN, International
terrorism
Kelly and Enns (2010) Income Policy Mood
Kellstedt et al. (2010) Gender Policy liberalism
Enns and Wlezien (2011) Income, Education, Partisanship,
Race
Welfare, Taxes, Mood, Policy liberalism
Wlezien and Soroka (2011) Income Welfare, heath, education, environment
and crime spending
Ellis and Ura (2011) Education, Income Scope of government, Cultural
preferences
Degeorges and Gonthier (2012) Ideology Economic liberalism
Eichenberg and Stoll (2012) Gender Defense spending
Enns and McAvoy (2012) Partisanship Economy ratings
Hopkins (2012) Income Economy ratings
Enns and Koch (2013) U.S. State Policy mood
Brooks and Manza (2013)1 Partisanship Government regulation
Johnson and Kellstedt (2014) Newspaper reading, TV watching Policy mood
Pacheco (2014) U.S. State Partisanship, Ideology, Education
spending, Welfare spending, Death
penalty, Abortion, Presidential approval,
Consumer sentiment
Gillion et al. (2015) Education, Gender Partisanship




Huxster et al. (2015) Partisanship, Ideology Climate change
Morgan and Kang (2015) Partisanship Healthcare spending
The present study Partisanship, Gender, Education Death penalty, Gun control, Welfare,
Racial attitudes, Presidential approval
1 Brooks and Manza (2013) is unique among these studies in finding evidence of contrary motion.
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on attitudes, subgroup by subgroup. If the Page and Shapiro explanation of parallel publics
is correct, then the experimental estimates of the effects of information treatments should
be approximately the same among different groups of people.
Two alternative theories of information processing stand in contrast to parallel publics.
These theories make predictions about treatment effect heterogeneity. They predict that in-
formation, or certain types of information, will be especially effective (or ineffective) among
particular subgroups. The first of these is, broadly, the theory of motivated reasoning. The
term motivated reasoning encompasses a large body of work, not all of which is mutually
consistent (Kunda 1990). The portions of motivated reasoning that are relevant here are
the interrelated concepts of perceptual bias, biased assimilation, disconfirmation bias, and
attitude polarization. Within political science, the notion of perceptual bias can be traced
back at least as far as the American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960),
which claimed that “Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the
individual tends to see what is favorable to [his or her] partisan orientation (p. 133).” Pre-
sumably, by “tends to see,” these authors meant that individuals receive, accept, and hence
are influenced by only messages that are good for their partisan group. Stated in terms of
causal effects, the perceptual screen argument predicts no effect of negative information for
Democrats among Democrats, but positive effects of positive information.
Within psychology, the first demonstration of this sort of biased assimilation of in-
formation is due to Lord et al. (1979). That study claimed that proponents of capital
punishment became more pro-death penalty in response to mixed information, while the
opposite occurred among opponents of capital punishment. In my estimation, the empirical
foundations of Lord et al. (1979) are weak; the authors mistake the correlation between
subjects’ background characteristics and their post-information responses for the causal ef-
fect of information. For much more detail on this study and how exactly the authors draw
incorrect inferences from their data, see Chapter 2 and Appendix B, for a reanalysis of the
original study and a replication and extension conducted in 2014. Regardless of whether
the conclusions of Lord et al. (1979) are correct, that study has inspired a long tradition
seeking to explain the “attitude polarization” effect. Common explanations include biased
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assimilation, in which counter-attitudinal information is simply discounted, similar to the
“perceptual screen” argument of Campbell et al. (1960). Another possible mechanism is
disconfirmation bias (Edwards and Smith 1996; Taber, Cann and Kucsova 2009) by which
individuals actively seek out counterarguments to counter-attitudinal information, thereby
reinforcing their original positions. Another way of describing attitude polarization is that
information may have “backlash” effects among some segments of the population. If this
theory were true, we should see negative effects (relative to the direction of the infor-
mation) among those for whom the information is counter-attitudinal and positive effects
among those for whom the information is pro-attitudinal.
The second body of theory that differs from the parallel publics view of information
processing focuses on political knowledge as a major moderator of framing and information
effects. Althaus (2003) predicts that those with high political information will be “less
prone (p. 167)” to question wording effects.2 This view holds that doses of new political
information should have smaller effects among the knowledgeable, both because they already
have access to the relevant information and the have more stable (read: less influencable)
opinions generally.
Both strands of theory are well-represented in Zaller’s 1992 Receive-Accept-Sample
(RAS) model of political information processing and attitude change. In this model, survey
responses are the product of sampling (the “S” in RAS) from a set of considerations held
in the mind of the survey respondent. If the preponderance of considerations are liberal,
the survey response will tend to be liberal. Importantly, in this model, the survey response
2In some respects, Althaus (2003) is an extended argument against the notion that collectively (but
possibly rationally) ignorant public opinions represent true policy preferences well. Althaus defines an
“information effect” differently from how I am using it here. I am using the term to refer to the causal effect
of information on opinions, whereas Althaus is using information effect to describe the simulated difference
in average opinion that would obtain if uninformed people held the same views as informed people who are
otherwise similar to them on other observable background characteristics. In essence, Althaus is confirming
that the informed and uninformed hold different policy views. I do not contest this point, but do note that
this some (possibly large) portion of this difference is likely to reflect unmeasured or unobservable differences
between the informed and uninformed rather than the causal effect of information.
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is the result of a stochastic process, which can explain instability in survey responses. The
process of attitude change in response to a persuasive message depends on the extent to
which subjects receive and subsequently accept the message. Messages that are not received
cannot be persuasive, nor can messages that are not accepted.
From this model, Zaller derives two axioms that are of special importance here. The
first is the reception axiom, which states that “The greater a person’s level of cognitive
engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend
– in a word, to receive – political messages concerning that issue.” This level of cognitive
engagement (referred to as “political awareness” throughout Zaller 1992) is proxied for with
tests of political knowledge (p. 43) and sometimes education (Price and Zaller 1993). Zaller
predicts that as political awareness increases, so too should reception. Therefore, holding
the acceptance of the message constant (which may not be possible), people who are more
politically aware should be more persuadable than the politically unaware. If this axiom
holds, we should not see parallel updating. We should see no updating among the politically
unaware, but evidence of opinion change only among the politically aware. Althaus (2003)
also suggests that political knowledge should moderate persuasion, but offers the opposite
prediction.
The second axiom holds that, “People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with
their political predispositions. . . .” (p.44) This axiom concerns the “acceptance” process in
the RAS model. I am interpreting “resist” to mean that people do not update their attitudes
in reponse to counter-attitudinal information, i.e., that under this theory, we should see
small to zero effects of counter-attitudinal information but positive effects of pro-attitudinal
information. With these two axioms, Zaller’s theory combines both the “political knowledge
matters” and the “perceptual bias” critiques of parallel publics (Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon
2008).
Figure 1.1 displays the joint distribution of treatment effects under four theories of in-
formation effects. Hypothetical (average) repsonses to treatments are plotted for two sub-
groups of the population, one on the vertical axis and the other on the horizontal. Suppose
that these subgroups divide the population according to some demographic characteristic.
7
CHAPTER 1. THE MICRO FOUNDATIONS OF PARALLEL PUBLICS
This characteristic could be partisanship, gender, race, education, or any other division. In
order to keep things general, imagine that the group on the horizontal axis are “pessimists”
and those on the vertical axis are “optimists”.
Each point represents a pair of treatment effects that describe how optimists and pes-
simists respond to a particular persuasion treatment. The treatments themselves are signed
in the sense that negatively signed treatments “should” engender negative treatment effects
and positively signed treatments “should” cause positive treatment effects. I place “should”
in quotation marks because the sign of the effects cause by these treatments is precisely
where these theories differ.
The top left panel describes the responses under the theory of parallel updating. Both
pessimists and optimists are moved in positive directions by positive treatments and in
negative directions by negative treatments. The treatment effects are highly correlated
across groups. The negative treatments that cause large (in magnitude) negative shifts
for pessimists also cause equivalently large changes for optimists. In short, under parallel
updating, everyone moves in response to treatment by approximately the same amount and
in the same direction.
Contrast this pattern with the effects in the lower left hand panel, labeled “Resistance”
Under this theory, individuals are responsive to messages they agree with, but resist mes-
sages they disagree with (predicted by Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992) Optimists respond
to positive messages but not to negative ones; the reverse holds for pessimists. This the-
ory produces a backwards “L” shape: Optimists move in a positive direction or not at all;
pessimists move in a negative direction, or not at all. If this theory were true at the micro
level, we would be unlikely to see parallel updating at the macro level. Instead, we would
see different groups moving in response to different stimuli at different times.
Continuing in a counterclockwise direction, consider the lower right hand panel labeled
“Backlash.” This panel represents the theory of information processing that posits that
counterattitudinal information is not only resisted, it actually causes a polarization of opin-
ions (predicted by Lord et al. 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006). When confronted with negative
information, an optimist has a positive treatment effect; when confronted with postive in-
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formation, a pessimist has a negative treatment effect. In this world, people never update
their views in a direction that is contrary to their prior beliefs. Pessimists always update
in a negative direction and optimists always update in a positive direction. A distinctive
feature of the backlash prediction is the negative correlation of treatment effects across
subgroups.
Thus far, I have been using positive and negative to stand in for the usual dimensions
of political conflict. Optimists and Pessimists are analogous to groups that may find them-
selves (on average) on different sides of some political conflicts: conservatives and liberals,
Republicans and Democrats, the rich and the poor, blacks and whites, the educated and
the uneducated, and so on.
In the panel labeled “Failure to Receive,” imagine that the analogy is not to groups
on either side of a political conflict, but instead to groups that differ in their attentiveness
in Zaller’s sense of propensity to receive political messages. The attentive group, which
is plotted on the vertical axis, receives all messages and responds in the correct direction
for each treatment. The inattentive group, by contrast, never changes its views, because it
never receives the message. This panel also corresponds to the prediction of Althaus (2003),
but with the axes switched: larger effects are predicted for the inattentive because their
political opinions are more malleable.
These four examples are highly stylized versions of each theory, and one might imagine
that the truth is some mixture. Fix the point (0, 1) at zero degrees and the point (0, -1) at
180 degrees. Under parallel updating, the effects of the positive treatments (the triangular
points) run from the origin to the 45 degree mark; the effects of the negative treatments
(the circular points) fall along a line from the origin to the 225 degree mark. For any dose
of motivating reasoning from none at all to resistance through backlash, imagine sweeping
the segment of triangular points from 45 degrees over to 315 degrees while sweeping the
circular points from 225 degrees to 315 degrees. Any mixture of parallel updating and
motivating reasoning can be depicted as “folding” these two segments from fully open in
parallel updating to fully closed under motivated backlash.
Similarly, any mixture of parallel updating and differential receptivity can be described
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as a progressively steepening slope. The slope is 1 in the upper left hand panel and infinite
in the upper right hand panel; slopes in between these values could represent different levels
of receptivity in the inattentive group.


























































Direction of Information a aNegative Positive
If the micro foundations of the parallel publics finding lie in the parallel responses to the
same information, then when we conduct randomized experiments to measure the responses
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of different subgroups to persuasion, the pattern of results should look like the upper-left
hand panel of Figure 1.1. If, however, the results look like any of the other three patterns,
then we will have to reconsider the roots of the parallel publics trends.
Before proceeding to new evidence on parallel publics, a brief digression on the impor-
tance of measurement for this discussion. Disagreements about just what the “parallel”
in parallel publics means have cropped up from time to time since the publication of The
Rational Public. For example, in summarizing their finding that the policy liberalism of
men and women appears to move together, Kellstedt et al. (2010) write: “Scholars who
argue for parallel movement assume that sub-aggregate publics move in response to the
same stimuli, in the same direction, and by the same magnitude. Although we find the first
two assertions to be true – men and women both move in the same direction to changes in
public policy – the third requirement for parallel opinion movement is challenged by these
results.”
Unfortunately, arguments on either side of this third requirement depend crucially on
the underlying scale of the outcome. Effects that are homogeneous in one scale (e.g., dollars)
would be heterogeneous in another scale (e.g., log-dollars). Ding, Feller and Miratrix (2015)
provide a cogent discussion of this problem (p. 4) and a proof of a theorem by G.E.H. Reuter
that shows if the CDFs for the treated and untreated units do not cross, there exists some
monotone transformation of the outcome that renders the treatment effects constant. By
the same token, most demonstrations of “parallel” movement can be shown to not be parallel
by some monotone transformation of the outcome (an exception would be if the untreated
and treatment outcomes were identical for all units, in which case the movements would be
parallel regardelss of transformation).
As an illustration of this problem, consider two groups A and B. A moves from 5% to 10%
support while B moves from 50% to 55%. In percentage points, these shifts are homogeneous.
However, in percentage terms, the former shift is much larger: 100% = 10%−5%5% versus
10% = 55%−50%50% . Other transformations are possible: If 5% support in a group is taken
to mean that all members of that group have a 0.05 probability of support, then we can
express the same average support with a probit transformation, −1.64 = Φ−1(0.05), where
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Φ−1 indicates the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In
probits, the change from 5% to 10% would be 0.36 = Φ−1(0.10) − Φ−1(0.05), whereas the
change from 50% to 55% would be much smaller, at 0.13 = Φ−1(0.55) − Φ−1(0.050). The
appropriate outcome scale will differ from domain to domain. One situation in which scaling
is not an issue arises when groups A and B have very similar baseline outcomes. In such a
case, changes relative to baseline can be directly compared, regardless of scale.
An agnostic approach to this problem is to fall back on the “weak form” of the parallel
publics, which holds that among most groupings of Americans, we do not observe contrary
motion. People update either not at all or in the same direction as others. The weak form
of parallel publics is satisfied if the conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) do not
have opposite signs: (CATE|A ≥ 0∧CATE|B ≥ 0)∨ (CATE|A ≤ 0∧CATE|B ≤ 0). The
only pattern that is not consistent with the weak form is contrary motion: (CATE|A >
0 ∧ CATE|B < 0) ∨ (CATE|A < 0 ∧ CATE|B > 0).
In the remainder of this chapter, I will first present a brief update to the macro level
trends to confirm that the parallel publics finding holds through 2016. I will then proceed to
the micro-level evidence of parallel updating I have found in a set of 20 survey experiments
in which I randomly exposed some subjects to information but not others. I show that
when all segments of the population receive the same information, they update their views
in parallel. As a preview of the results to come, I find that the pattern of results strongly
resembles the pattern predicted by the parallel publics theory in the upper-left hand panel
of Figure 1.1.
1.1 Time-Series Cross-Sectional Evidence
Among other sources, Page and Shapiro drew on the General Social Survey (GSS) from
1972 though 1983. Figure 1.2 updates some their findings using the GSS from 1972 to
2014. It plots the parallel movements of Republican and Democratic average opinion on
four items: the death penalty, gun control, welfare spending, and spending to improve the
condition of blacks. All four items have been largely stable for the past 40 years and the
little movement we do see has largely been in parallel.
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The top panel displays the proportion favoring the death penalty for those convicted of
committing murder. Republican respondents have held steady over the past four decades
at approximately 80% support. Democrats are consistently lower, hovering around the 60%
mark, with a decline to approximately 50% over the past 15 years. While it is clear that
the gap between partisans has widened on this issue, we do not see evidence of contrary
motion. The second panel shows a similar story for the proportion favoring requiring police
permits before gun purchases: from a baseline of approximately 75%, both Republicans
and Democrats increased their support slightly in the 1990s. In recent years, Republicans’
support has dropped off slightly, while Democratic support for the policy has remained
constant. The third panel shows attitudes toward welfare spending. We see very little over-
time movement, but small shifts of 2 to 5 percentage points appear to move in tandem.
The final panel shows how, for many years now, 50% of Democrats respond that we are
spending too little to improve the conditions of blacks, while the comparable figure among
Republicans is 25%.
The parallel publics thesis extends to other, more obviously partisan opinions. Green
et al. (2002) showed that while Democrats, Independents, and Republicans have vastly dif-
ferent baseline levels of presidential approval, corresponding quite plainly with the party of
the current presidential office-holder, changes in presidential approval take place in parallel.
Green et al. (2002) conducted their analysis for Harry Truman through Ronald Reagan us-
ing the presidential approval series from the Gallup organization. Figure 1.3 updates their
analysis from Bill Clinton through Barack Obama.
These graphs are remarkable for their within-president consistency. Support for Bill
Clinton rose for all three groups over the course of his presidency; support declined over the
course of George W. Bush’s term, and has stayed essentially stable for Barack Obama’s time
in office. Some of the changes have obvious causes: the spikes in approval after 9/11 and the
invasion of Iraq; the gentle rise in Obama’s approval among Democrats and Independents
during the 2012 campaign. Other changes, such as the long decline in Bush’s approval likely
have many causes. These graphs also conform to the “weak form” of the parallel publics
thesis. Clearly, these partisan groupings change their approval of the president in the same
13
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direction as one another, but not obviously by the same amount. For example, one might
conclude that, following 9/11, Republicans’ approval of the President did not move much,
at least not as much as that of Independents or Democrats. A critic of this reading might
point out that Republicans were constrained by the scale, and that a change from 88%
support to near universal support (98%) is at least as impressive as Democrats’ jump from
30 to 81.
1.2 Experimental Evidence
The remainder of this chapter will explore the micro foundations of parallel publics, specif-
ically the hypothesis that people of varied backgrounds and political views all update their
views in the same direction when exposed to new information. As discussed above, ob-
servational survey evidence cannot establish this relationship conclusively, for two reasons.
First, researchers are not in control of who sees what kind of information, so there is no
guarantee that different subgroups see the same information. Second, because the repeated
cross-sectional design relies on the passage of time to reveal changes in opinions, we cannot
be sure if it is information itself, rather than some other factor that information happens
to be correlated with, that is changing minds.
The survey experimental research design will help on both counts. The researcher is
in control of the information seen by subjects; there is no worry that some subgroups will
be exposed to different information. Further, because information treatments are allocated
at random before outcomes are collected, direct causal inferences can be drawn. If the
distribution of outcomes differs across the randomly-formed groups, we can attribute those
differences to the information treatment itself.
To test the claim that subgroups tend to respond to information in parallel, I will draw
on a set of 20 survey experiments I conducted between May 2014 and August 2015. Fifteen
of the experiments are replications of other scholars’ designs, 12 of which were conducted on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and three of which were conducted on nationally-representative
samples obtained by the survey firm GfK. With collaborators, I designed the remaining five
experiments and conducted them with subjects on Mechanical Turk.
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These experiments cover a wide range of topics: capital punishment, the minimum
wage, global warming, gun control, tax preferences, the Patriot Act, home foreclosures,
immigration, free trade, crime, health care, economic policy, terrorism, public financing
of elections, mental illness, infrastructure, and veterans’ assistance. Taken together, these
topics cover the majority of the contentious political issues discussed at a national level in
the last decade. Notable exceptions include same-sex marriage and abortion, though I have
no theoretical reason to expect different results for those issues.
The treatments in these experiments are, in one way or another, persuasion treatments,
covering a wide array of persuasion strategies: descriptions of scientific evidence in graphs
and text, video clips, newspaper stories, small pieces of factual information, op-eds, excerpts
from speeches, or small changes in question wording.
Full descriptions of all 20 experiments are given in Appendix A, including the number
of subjects, the precise treatments, outcome items (along with any transformations), and
summaries of basic results. Except where noted, I use Ordinary Least Squares without
any controls for pre-treatment covariates to obtain average treatment effects relative to a
control, baseline, or placebo condition, depending on the experiment. In three experiments
(Studies 1, 2, and 3), a baseline survey was conducted in advance of the experiment, so in
those cases I include a pre-treatment measure of the outcome as a covariate.
1.2.1 Results 1: Parallel Treatment Effects by Subgroup
I will summarize the relationship between treatment effects across subgroups with Pearson
correlation coefficients. Because treatment effects are measured with error, the raw correla-
tions will be attenuated by measurement error. I will disattenuate the correlations using the
standard formula: ρx′y′ =
ρxy√
ρxxρyy
, where ρxx and ρyy refer to the reliabilities of x and y. I
will estimate these reliabilities using the same simulation method employed in Coppock and
Green (2015): obtain the correlation between two draws from normal distributions implied
by the coefficient vector and corresponding vector of standard errors and square it, repeat
this operation 10,000 times, then take the average reliability. Sometimes this method re-
turns a disattenuated correlation coefficient above 1, which is obviously incorrect. In such
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cases, it is sufficient to infer that the true correlation is very high.
Figure 1.4 presents striking evidence of parallel updating in persuasion survey exper-
iments according to three different demographic splits: partisanship (Republican versus
Democrat), gender (men versus women), and education (college or higher versus some col-
lege or lower). For each subgroup pair in the figure, the left panel plots the baseline levels
of the outcome variables and the right panel plots the treatment effects. All outcomes are
standardized, so a baseline level of 0 indicates the sample mean in the control group.
The top row of Figure 1.4 presents estimates by partisanship, with Republicans on
the vertical axis and Democrats on the horizontal axis. The baseline levels of opinion are
very negatively correlated (p < 0.001). The raw correlation is -0.72; when correcting for
measurement error the correlation is -0.77. This is unsurprising: adherents of the major
parties, on average, hold opposing views on most political issues.3 Turning now to the right
panel of the top row, we see that Democratic and Republican responses to treatment are
strongly and positively correlated (raw: 0.86, corrected: > 1.00). This positive correlation is
strong evidence that partisans update their views in parallel. The finding that Republicans
and Democrats update their views in the same direction by very similar amounts directly
contradicts the “perceptual screen” theory as well as the theory that these groups would
be differentially receptive to information, depending on whether subjects agree with its
direction.
The second row of Figure 1.4 shows the estimates by gender. The attitudes of men
and women on these issues are weakly correlated (raw: 0.31, corrected: 0.42) at baseline.
Nevertheless, the effects of persuasive treatments are very similar for both groups. The
correlation is estimated to be very high (raw: 0.90, corrected: > 1.00), stronger than the
already very strong correlation observed for Republicans and Democrats. This analysis
shows that the pattern of parallel updating does not depend on any particular correlation
structure in baseline attitudes: whether baseline attitudes are positively, negatively, or not
3Their views are opposing in the sense that when Democrats hold above average views, Republicans
tend to hold below average views; it does often happen that Republicans and Democrats “agree” in the
sense that a majority of both groups supports an issue, but one group supports it more strongly.
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at all correlated, treatment effects are very similar.
Finally, the third row of Figure 1.4 shows the effects for education. Those with a college
education or higher are plotted on the vertical axis and those with some college or less
are on the horizontal axis. If we assume that education is a reasonable proxy for political
attentiveness (Price and Zaller 1993), then this analysis tests Zaller’s notion that the more
politically attentive will experience higher treatment effects. While baseline attitudes by
eduction are only weakly correlated (raw: 0.29, corrected: 0.41), we do not observe any
differences in the ways individuals respond to information by educational attainment. In
fact, the correlation across this demographic split is higher than it was for either party or
gender. Raw, the correlation is 0.95 and exceeds 1.00 when disattenuated.
In figure 1.1, I presented the implications of four different theories of how members of
two groups would respond to information. The second column of panels in Figure 1.4 are
very similar to the “Parallel Publics” panel. I find no support for the three alternative
theories in this set of experiments.
1.2.2 Results 2: Parallel Treatment Effects with BART
The previous section presented the results of an analysis of many experiments. In this
section, I will turn to an analysis of a single experiment where treatment effect heterogeneity
should, in principle, be possible. Chong and Druckman (2010) conducted an experiment
that tested the effects of pro and con information on attitudes toward the Patriot Act;
I replicated their experiment on Mechanical Turk. Subjects assigned to the “Strong Pro”
condition saw six pieces of information that emphasized the national security benefits of the
law. Those in the “Strong Con” condition saw six pieces of information that emphasized
the threats to civil liberties. Considering the highly polarized nature of the debate over
the Patriot Act, we might expect that, in contrast to the homogeneous effects predicted by
the parallel publics theory, the effects of treatment would be heterogeneous. We saw in the
previous analysis that effects did not differ by party, gender or education. The concern is
that the subgroup averages masked the true differences in responses that may have occurred
along some other dimension.
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CHAPTER 1. THE MICRO FOUNDATIONS OF PARALLEL PUBLICS
In my replication, the average difference in outcomes according to the type of informa-
tion seen was large: 1.07 scale points on a seven point scale of support for the Patriot Act.
(Robust SE: 0.10). The goal of the remainder of this analysis is to test whether any sub-
groups defined by age, gender, race, education, partisanship, ideology, “need-to-evaluate,”
the randomly-assigned “processing condition” (See Appendix A, Study 7 for a description
of this feature of the original experiment), or their interactions, experienced much larger or
smaller treatment effects. These covariates were chosen because they cover the vast major-
ity of the demographics that are of concern to social scientists, as evidenced by the large
overlap with the demographics listed in Table 1.1.
The multidimensional space described by these covariates and their intersections is vast.
One unreliable approach to searching for heterogeneous effects is to engage in “fishing”
(Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra and van der Windt 2013) by iteratively including inter-
action terms until a “statistically significant” interaction effect appears. This data-dredging
procedure can lead to incorrect inferences because the nominal p-values do not reflect the
multiplicity of tests conducted. One approach to this problem is to specify ex ante which
treatment-by-covariate interactions are of theoretical interest in a pre-analysis plan. A sec-
ond approach is to model all treatment effect interactions at once, but defend against false
discovery by slightly shrinking all interaction effects toward zero. This second approach is
handled nicely by a relatively new statistical method, Bayesian Additive Regression Trees
(BART, Chipman, George and McCulloch (2007, 2010)). For further explanation of the
BART algorithm and its uses for causal inference in the social sciences see Hill (2011) and
Green and Kern (2012), as well as Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
For now, it is sufficient to understand that BART, just like any other statistical model,
makes a prediction for both the potential outcomes for each unit. The difference between
these predictions is the model’s estimate of the causal effect of being in the “Pro” con-
dition versus the “Con” for that particular unit. Figure 1.5 plots the averages of the
BART-estimated individual-level treatment effects according to the demographic divisions
described by each covariate. The estimates are remarkably stable across all demographic
groupings: the conditional average treatment effects are all very close to the overall aver-
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age of 1.07 scale points. This graph shows that there do not appear to be any significant
interactions according to these demographic variables.
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Another advantage of BART is that we are not limited to exploring heterogeneity ac-
cording to the covariates we provide directly: BART automatically searches for treatment
effect interactions that occur according to the intersection of covariates. If, for example,
treatment effects were especially low for young Democratic women, the BART-estimated
response surface would flexibly accommodate this four-way interaction. Figure 1.6 provides
evidence that no such interactions are likely. The BART-estimated potential outcomes for
each unit are plotted on the vertical axis. The triangular points refer to the estimated
potential outcome under the “Strong Pro” treatment while the circular points refer to each
unit’s estimated potential outcome under the “Strong Con” treatment; the difference be-
tween them is the estimated treatment effect. The points are arrayed on the horizontal
axis according to the average of the two estimated potential outcomes in order to better
emphasize the decidedly parallel estimated effects.
Figure 1.6: BART Estimated Potential Outcomes in Study 7: Patriot Act
Estimated 'Strong Pro' 
 Potential Outcomes
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The pattern in Figure 1.6 appears highly linear, but nothing in the BART model requires
linearity; both the pro and con response surfaces were flexibly modeled. These results
indicate that any differences in treatment response according to the measured covariates
or their interactions are small to negligible. One caveat to this analysis is that there may
still remain unmeasured dimensions along which subjects and their treatment responses
differ. If this unmeasured dimension is uncorrelated with the measured covariates, then
BART would not recover evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity. While I am certain
that many unmeasured covariates affect baseline opinions regarding the Patriot Act, I find
it implausible that these dimensions could be so wholly uncorrelated with the measured
covariates explored here that substantial interactions exist, but are not even slightly evident
in the figures above.
The BART analysis is strongly in line with both the cross-experiment evidence and the
evidence from time series cross-sectional surveys: opinion shifts occur in parallel, even for
a highly contentious issue such as the Patriot Act.
1.3 Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that homogeneous change in opinions in
response to information remains a viable explanation for the parallel publics finding. De-
spite low or even strongly negative correlations in baseline outcomes, treatment effects in 20
survey experiments were shown to be very similar across politically-important demographic
splits: Republicans and Democrats, men and women, and the better and less-well educated.
In one experiment, I used a recently developed statistical method (BART) to show evidence
of treatment effect homogeneity across the whole of the observed covariate space. Expo-
sure to information does change minds, and it changes minds by similar amounts for the
subdivisions of the population that social scientists tend to measure.
These results provide strong evidence in favor of Page and Shapiro’s conjecture that
the explanation for parallel updating is due to mass exposure to political information via
the media. When people are exposed to information, they change their views in parallel,
regardless of background characteristics. In the next two chapters, I develop a theory of
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Bayesian information processing that undergirds this pattern of uniform updating.
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2 Back to Bayes
A large body of theory suggests that when individuals are exposed to counter-attitudinal
evidence or arguments, their preexisting opinions and beliefs are reinforced, resulting in a
phenomenon known as attitude polarization. Drawing on evidence from three well-powered
randomized experiments designed to induce polarization, I find no such effect. To explain
these results, I develop and extend a theory of Bayesian learning that, under reasonable
assumptions, rules out attitude polarization. People, instead, update their prior beliefs in
accordance with the evidence presented in a more or less uniform fashion. I further show,
through an exact replication of the original Lord et al. (1979) study, that the seeming dis-
crepancy between these results and those in the literature are driven by differences in exper-
imental design. Using this insight, I reinterpret previous findings and argue that Bayesian
reasoning remains the best available model of opinion change in light of evidence.
This chapter draws on joint work with Andrew Guess.
27
CHAPTER 2. BACK TO BAYES
For several decades, the attitude polarization literature has presented a challenge for
believers in evidence-based decision-making. Instead of prompting a reconsideration of
long-held views, counter-attitudinal evidence may actually strengthen preexisting beliefs,
resulting in polarization. How can agreement, even when the evidence is relatively clear,
ever be achieved?
A tendency to follow “directional” goals in evaluating information (Kruglanski and
Webster 1996) would seem to fly in the face of normative standards of cognition which
posit a rational weighing of evidence against previous knowledge. The most straightforward
model of this type invokes Bayes’ rule, which provides a simple, mathematically coherent
mechanism for updating one’s prior beliefs in light of new evidence. The predictions of this
model are subtle, leading to occasional disagreements about the expected pattern of evidence
under various conditions (Gerber and Green 1999; Bartels 2002; Bullock 2009). Most clearly,
however, it rules out polarization, defined here as a circumstance in which information has
a positive effect for some but a negative effect for others. Bayesian reasoning posits that if
two people receive the same information and have compatible beliefs about the likelihood
of observing it, then they must update their views in the same direction, although not
necessarily by the same amount. This is the case even if their prior beliefs are completely
at odds.
Contrary to this model, some authors theorize that people work – consciously or not
– to protect their worldviews via a series of complementary belief-preserving mechanisms
(Kunda 1990). Examples include the prior attitude effect, the tendency to perceive evidence
and arguments that support one’s views as stronger and more persuasive than those that
challenge them; disconfirmation bias, in which people exert effort to counter-argue vigor-
ously against evidence that is not congruent with their beliefs; and various forms of selective
exposure and selective attention to congenial information, sometimes referred to as confir-
mation bias (Taber and Lodge 2006). The cumulative effect of these “biased assimilation”
mechanisms, as predicted in the literature, is attitude polarization: people exposed to the
same information may respond by strengthening their preexisting views.
The canonical explication and demonstration of these mechanisms is Lord et al. (1979),
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in which both pro- and anti-death penalty college students were exposed to mixed scientific
evidence on the effectiveness of capital punishment on crime deterrence. To their surprise,
the authors found that the subjects did not moderate their views; rather, those who initially
supported the punishment became more pro-capital punishment on average by the end of the
study, and those who opposed it became less so. Moreover, biased assimilation appeared
to be the culprit: the participants were more skeptical of the parts of the evidence that
challenged their beliefs than those that supported them.
Since then, a substantial literature in psychology (Miller, McHoskey, Bane and Dowd
1993; Kuhn and Lao 1996), political science (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lau
and Redlawsk 2006; Taber et al. 2009; Nyhan and Reifler 2010), and other fields such as
public health (Strickland, Taber and Lodge 2011; Nyhan, Reifler, Richey and Freed 2014)
have sought to replicate, extend, and further delineate the mechanisms for this provocative
hypothesis. A well-known early criticism of the Lord et al. results focused on the authors’
use of a self-reported measure of attitude change rather than a more direct measurement of
the difference between pre- and post-treatment attitudes (Miller et al. 1993). In my view,
the more fundamental methodological issue is that the treatments in Lord et al. (1979)
were not allocated on a random basis. Without randomizing the content of the information
itself, it is difficult to adjudicate between the competing predictions of attitude polarization
and Bayesian updating. The concern is that the “effect” of mixed information is actually a
reflection of pre-existing differences among subjects.
In this chapter, I will provide evidence that calls into question the consensus on attitude
polarization. Across three studies designed to induce differential treatment responses and
covering different issue areas and types of stimuli, subjects update their beliefs roughly in
parallel, regardless of predisposition. Given the large, diverse subject pools and broad set
of issues, it is unlikely that these findings are due to the particularities of the experimental
context. More fundamentally, these results indicate that several well-known results taken
as evidence of attitude polarization are likely to be artifacts of inadequate research design.
These conclusions do not call into question the ample evidence for “biased assimila-
tion” processes. For example, the prior attitude effect is perfectly consistent with Bayesian
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reasoning. The relevant insight is that prior beliefs can change in response to evidence
even as they color interpretations of that evidence. As Gerber and Green (1999, p. 199)
argue in their review of studies on perceptual bias, “although it is not inconsistent with
Bayesian learning for observers to comment that contrary information is unconvincing, in
the simple version of Bayesian learning, we do not expect critics of new information to be
altogether unmoved by it.” This paper proceeds as follows. First, I present an overview
of the Bayesian learning hypothesis and its predictions under different assumptions about
the likelihood of observing evidence. Next, I outline my overall research approach for three
separate studies and clarify how it can adjudicate between competing models of attitude
change. Employing standard linear models, I present the experimental results from each
study in turn, including evidence (where available) that the effects persist over one week
later. I further explore the results in Section 7 with a relatively new method in political
science, Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART), that enables omnibus modeling of
treatment effect heterogeneity. The following section examines several well-known results
in the attitude polarization literature and re-interprets them in light of these experiments.
I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.
2.1 Bayesian Learning
The Bayesian learning hypothesis may be traced at least as far back as de Finetti (1937),
who appears to have been the first to explicitly invoke Bayes’ rule as a model of human
cognition.1 The main thrust of that work is that although individuals make subjective prob-
ability judgments, they nevertheless respond to new information in the manner suggested
by “objective” laws of probability:
Observation cannot confirm or refute an opinion, which is and cannot be other
than an opinion and thus neither true nor false; observation can only give us
information which is capable of influencing our opinion. The meaning of this
statement is very precise: it means that to the probability of a fact conditioned
1See, however, Ramsey (1931) for a formulation that comes close.
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on this information – a probability very distinct from that of the same fact
not conditioned on anything else – we can indeed attribute a different value.
(Reproduced in Kyburg and Smokler 1964, p. 154, emphasis in original.)
The hypothesis developed alongside the introduction of Bayesian statistical methods
to the social sciences (Edwards, Lindman and Savage 1963). Bayesian statisticians were
arguing that Bayes’ rule offered a sensible method for the integration of research findings,
leading to the normative claim that scientists and humans generally should incorporate
new evidence according to the cool calculus of conditional probability. It was then a short
step from advocating this normative position to testing the positive claim that Bayes’ rule
provides a fair description of human cognition.
A long series of demonstrations (Edwards and Phillips 1964; Peterson and Miller 1965;
Phillips and Edwards 1966) showed that humans perform poorly compared to (a specific
version of) the Bayesian ideal. In the prototypical experiment, subjects are shown two urns,
one with majority blue balls and the other with majority red balls. They are told that they
will be given a series of draws from a randomly selected urn and will have to estimate the
probability that the draws come from the majority blue urn. Bayes’ rule (with a binomial
likelihood function) dictates how much subjects “should” update their priors; subjects are
consistently too conservative and fail to update their beliefs far enough.
Within political science, the Bayesian models of cognition have been most frequently
applied to models of partisan evaluation and choice. Zechman (1979) and Achen (1992) pro-
pose statistical models of party identification based on a Bayesian model in which individuals
update their impressions of the political parties based on new evidence. Gerber and Green
(1999) argue that so-called “perceptual bias” can be explained in Bayesian terms: parti-
sans accord negative evidence for their candidates less weight not because they irrationally
disregard discordant information, but because it conflicts with their priors. Partisans are
nevertheless moved by “bad news,” as evidenced by the parallel public opinion movements
by partisans on both sides in response to changing political and economic conditions (see
Chapter 1 of this dissertation). Bartels (2002) disagrees, arguing that a lack of convergence
(i.e., parallel motion) indicates partisan bias. Bullock (2009) shows that the prediction of
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convergence requires an assumption that the underlying parameter (in this case, the “true”
value of the parties) is not changing.
To this critique of Bartels (2002), I would add that the convergence prediction requires
that information and opinions be in the same scale. Suppose that the opinion item in
question is support for a Democratic candidate; Democratic partisans support the candidate
at 85%, Republicans at 25%. Gerber and Green note than in response to information,
support for the candidate fluctuates in parallel. Bartels views this parallel fluctuation as
evidence of partisan bias, because in his view, Bayesian Democrats and Republicans should
converge over time. This is only true if “evidence” could indicate that the proper level of
support is somewhere between 85% and 25%, in which case Democrats should flag in their
support, whereas Republicans should become more supportive. Information, however, is
usually not measured in the same scale as opinions: it comes as good or bad news for a
candidate, not a target level of support.
Any Bayesian framework involves five quantities: a prior, new evidence, a likelihood
function, a posterior, and an objective function. Bayes’ rule itself is an accounting identity
that relates the first four of these. In the discrete case, with two possible states of the world
A and ¬A, the formulation is: P (A|B) = P (B|A)·P (A)P (B) . The prior is P (A), the new evidence
is B, the likelihood function is hidden in P (B|A) and P (B), and the posterior is P (A|B).
The objective function is not part of Bayes’ rule – it describes what an individual decides or
does as a result of the update. In the experiments presented below, the objective function
describes how a subject responds to a survey item.
As noted by many scholars (e.g., Taber et al. 2009, p. 138), Bayes’ rule on its own
does not provide a prescription for how a “rational” person should update. As a result,
“violations” of Bayesian rationality are difficult to demonstrate because we often lack the
requisite information. For example, a typical persuasion experiment will measure prior
attitudes P (A), intervene with some evidence B, and then measure posterior attitudes
P (A|B). In order to determine whether the update P (A|B)−P (A) moved in the “correct”
direction – toward the evidence – we need either to measure or impose assumptions on the
remaining terms in Bayes’ rule: P (B|A) and P (B). In other words, we need a likelihood
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function describing how individuals read or interpret the new evidence B. This function
would describe whether, for example, we expect to observe domestic discontent more often
when a leader is weak or when a leader is strong.
The Bayesian framework can flexibly accommodate individual differences on two dimen-
sions: the prior and the likelihood function. Within political science, we often categorize
individuals according to their imputed priors: Democrats presumably have a stronger prior
belief that liberal policies will be effective than do Republicans. How might likelihood func-
tions differ across individuals? For the simplest case in which A and B are both binary,
a likelihood function is fully described by two numbers: P (B|A) and P (B|¬A). Suppose
that we believe that B is evidence in favor of the proposition that A is true: any likelihood
function in which P (B|A) ≥ P (B|¬A) would generate updates in the “correct” direction,
i.e. P (A|B) − P (A) > 0. This restriction on the likelihood function follows the mono-
tone likelihood ratio property (MLRP, Dixit and Weibull 2007, Karlin and Rubin 1956). If
this restriction does not hold, individuals are not necessarily less Bayesian; they may just
interpret evidence differently from others.2
The treatments used in the experiments described below operate by adding new consid-
erations (and possibly changing the weights attached to pre-existing considerations). Some
of the outcome questions measure “beliefs,” by which I mean the content of some consider-
ation. Others measure “attitudes,” which are the weighted average of considerations. The
distinction between attitudes and beliefs is important to maintain. I do, however, recognize
that the “belief” survey questions may also (inadvertently) measure what should rightly
be considered an attitude. In these experiments, subjects are given evidence in favor of
some proposition (e.g., capital punishment decreases crime) and are then asked to report
relevant political attitudes (e.g., support for capital punishment), not the probability that
the proposition is true. I assume a monotonic relationship between the probability that the
2Benôıt and Dubra (2014) advance a theory of rational attitude polarization in which fully Bayesian
individuals can encounter the same evidence yet update in opposite directions. Their model accomplishes
this by allowing individuals to have access to different “auxiliary information” which essentially colors how
the new evidence is interpreted. Put simply, individuals in their models have different likelihood functions,
some of which follow the MLRP and some of which do not.
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proposition is true and survey measures of political attitudes (e.g., the higher the posterior
probability that capital punishment decreases crime, the higher the support for the pol-
icy). This is reasonable if the treatments add or adjust the weights attached to individual
considerations comprising an attitude.
A Bayesian theory of information processing makes specific predictions about how much
different individuals should update their views in light of evidence. Those with more strongly
held prior beliefs should update less than those with weak priors. Those with more discrim-
inating likelihood functions should update more than whose likelihood functions are less
finely tuned. Unfortunately, we lack the tools to measure the strength of individuals’ priors
and the quality of their likelihood functions (Kahan 2015). In view of these difficulties, I
will make directional predictions, using the portions of the Bayesian framework that do not
rely on such unmeasured subject attributes.
What, then, constitutes evidence against this “directional Bayes” theory in favor of the
theory of attitude polarization? If we accept that subjects’ likelihood functions all follow
the MLRP (or, in non-Bayesian terms, subjects all agree that the evidence is “good for”
the same proposition, even if they counter-argue, thereby making other evidence against
the proposition more salient) and we grant the mild restriction that subjects’ objective
functions are monotonic, then we would have strong evidence against Bayesian reasoning if
some subjects updated in one direction but others updated in a different direction. If all
subjects update in the same direction, we have strong evidence against a key prediction of
the attitude polarization hypothesis: namely, positive effects for some, but negative effects
for others.
2.2 Research Approach
The three experiments presented in this chapter share some salient design features, described
together here for convenience.
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2.2.1 Design and Measurement
All three studies employ a between-subjects experimental design. Studies 1 and 2 were
conducted in three waves. First, respondents were invited to complete a survey that collects
pre-treatment covariates. A subset of those who completed the responses was then selected
for the second wave, which contained the experimental treatments. The main outcomes
of interest were recorded in this second wave (T2). Finally, to measure the persistence
of effects, subjects were recontacted approximately 10 days later to collect a new set of
outcome measures (T3). Study 3 did not feature a third wave of measurement. To address
the above-mentioned measurement critiques of Lord et al. (1979), I use direct measures of
post-treatment attitudes and beliefs rather than subjective self-reports (although both were
collected in Study 1 in order to replicate earlier findings, as discussed below).
2.2.2 Subject Recruitment
Instead of engaging laboratory subjects, I conducted these studies on Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace for modular “human intelligence tasks.” In
recent years, social scientists have recognized its utility as a tool for recruiting subjects
(e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 2011). While opt-in samples collected via MTurk
should not be considered representative of the U.S. population, they have been shown to
outperform laboratory-based convenience samples in ensuring adequate variation across so-
ciodemographic and political characteristics of interest (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012a).
Typically, MTurk samples tend to skew younger, less wealthy, better educated, more male,
whiter, and more liberal than the population as whole. I opted for this approach in order to
boost the representativeness relative to student populations (Sears 1986; Clifford and Jerit
2014), and to better ensure generalizability of results via similarity of subjects, treatments,
contexts, and outcome measures across domains (Coppock and Green 2015). The utility
of this sample for drawing inferences about the causal effects of information treatments
depends on treatment effect heterogeneity. If the treatment effects for these subjects are
substantially different from the effects for others, then MTurk is a poor guide to effects
more generally. The evidence to date on this question suggests that estimates obtained
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from MTurk samples match national samples well (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman and Freese
(2015), Chapter 4 of this dissertation).
In Appendix B, I present an exact replication, using the original study materials, of
the Lord et al. (1979) study. The results closely match the direction and significance
of the original, and in the case of biased assimilation the point estimates are virtually
identical. It is therefore unlikely that the overall findings are driven by any qualitative
differences between the Mechanical Turk subject pool and those drawn from undergraduate
populations.
2.3 Study 1: Capital Punishment
Study 1 embeds a replication of the original (Lord et al. 1979) demonstration within a
larger multi-arm experiment. In that study, subjects were presented sequentially with
apparent scientific evidence both challenging and affirming the notion that the death penalty
deters crime. Subjects’ attitudes about capital punishment and beliefs about its deterrent
efficacy were subsequently measured. Subjects in the original study were exposed to a
“mixed evidence” condition.3 To this single condition, various combinations of pro-capital
punishment, anti-capital punishment, and inconclusive evidence were added. I made minor
updates to the text (changing the publication date of the fictitious research articles from
1977 to 2012, for example) and to the graphical and tabular display of the fabricated data
using modern statistical software.
The results of the replication study are presented in full in Appendix B. To summarize:
following the analytic strategy of the original authors, I recover nearly identical point esti-
mates of the “effect” of mixed evidence on self-reported attitude changes. This similarity is
remarkable considering the probable differences between the Mechanical Turk sample and
late-1970s Stanford undergraduates. This estimate of the effect of mixed evidence is (almost
surely) biased because it compares subjects according to their pre-existing differences, not
3Authors who performed an earlier replication of the original design (Kuhn and Lao 1996) generously
shared the original experimental materials, so I was able to use the identical wordings of the study summaries
and descriptions.
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according to a random assignment.
2.3.1 Subjects
I initially recruited 1,659 subjects via Mechanical Turk. Subjects were paid $0.25 for their
participation in this portion of the experiment. The pre-survey designed for screening sub-
jects gathered a series of pre-treatment covariates (age, race, gender, and political ideology)
and two items concerning capital punishment: attitude toward the death penalty and belief
in its deterrent effect.
From the pool of 1,659, 933 subjects’ pre-survey responses indicated clear and consistent
support or opposition to capital punishment. These subjects were invited to participate in
the main survey. Among these, proponents were defined as subjects whose answers to
the pre-treatment attitude and belief questions were between 5 and 7 on a 7-point scale.
Opponents were defined as subjects whose answers to these questions were between 1 and 3.
In total, 683 subjects participated in the main survey (287 proponents and 396 opponents).
Of those, 628 completed the 10-day follow-up, for a recontact rate of 92%. Subjects were
paid $1.00 to complete the main survey and an additional $1.00 to complete the follow-up.
The two main dependent variables measured subjects’ attitudes and beliefs about cap-
ital punishment. The Attitude question asked, “Which view of capital punishment best
summarizes your own?” The response options ranged from 1 (I am very much against capi-
tal punishment) to 7 (I am very much in favor of capital punishment). The Belief question
asked, “Does capital punishment reduce crime? Please select the view that best summarizes
your own.” Responses ranged from 1 (I am very certain that capital punishment does not
reduce crime) to 7 (I am very certain that capital punishment reduces crime).
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2.3.2 Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six conditions,4 as shown in Table 2.1 below. All
subjects were presented with two research reports on the relationship between crime rates
and capital punishment that varied in their findings: Pro reports presented findings that
capital punishment appears to decrease crime rates, Con reports showed that it appears
to increase crime rates, and Null reports showed that no conclusive pattern could be dis-
cerned from the data. The reports used one of two methodologies:5 either cross-sectional (a
comparison of 10 pairs of neighboring states, with and without capital punishment) or time-
series (a comparison of the crime rates before and after the adoption of capital punishment
in 14 states).
The statistical models will operationalize the “information content” of the pair of reports
seen by subjects in a linear fashion. The information content of two Pro reports is coded
as 2, one Pro and one Null as 1, and so on. In order to allow the coefficient on information
content to vary depending on whether the information is pro- or counter-attitudinal, I will
split the information content variable into positive information and negative information,
as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 also presents the mean and standard deviation of both outcome variables by
treatment group. These means provide a first indication that the treatments had average
effects in the correct direction.
We can also use the standard deviations reported in the table to perform a test of
whether the treatments polarized opinion. If the treatments were polarizing, the standard
deviation in the successively more pro or more con treatment groups should be larger, but
we do not observe this pattern. Formal statistical tests also reveal that the treatment
4Following the original Lord et al. (1979) procedure, in treatment conditions 1, 3, and 6, the order of
the reports’ methodology (time series or cross-sectional) was randomized, resulting in two orderings per
condition. In treatment conditions 2, 4, and 5, both the order of the methodology and the order of the
content were randomized, resulting in four orderings per condition. In total, subjects could be randomized
into 18 possible presentations. This design was maintained in order to preserve comparability with the
original study, but I average over the order and methodology margins to focus on the effects of information.
5The experimental materials are available in Appendix D.
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groups do not differ with respect to the standard deviations of the outcomes. Relative to
the Null Null condition, the differences-in-standard-deviations across groups are generally
not statistically significant at the 5% level, according to a randomization inference test
conducted under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit. The only exception is
the difference-in-standard-deviations between the Null Null and Pro Null conditions for the
support dependent variable, which has a p-value of 0.04. This inference does not survive
common multiple comparisons corrections, including the Bonferonni, Holm, and Benjamini-
Hochberg corrections. I conclude from these tests that the treatments do not polarize
opinion in the sense of increasing its variance.
Table 2.1: Study 1 (Capital Punishment) : Treatment Conditions





Mean SD Mean SD
Con Con 117 0 2 3.521 2.074 3.274 1.649
(0.191) (0.075) (0.157) (0.089)
Con Null 116 0 1 3.147 2.115 3.112 1.576
(0.200) (0.089) (0.148) (0.085)
Null Null 112 0 0 3.179 2.063 3.134 1.562
(0.195) (0.089) (0.147) (0.084)
Pro Con 118 0 0 3.593 2.265 3.686 1.748
(0.210) (0.072) (0.163) (0.089)
Pro Null 121 1 0 3.620 2.285 3.810 1.665
(0.207) (0.071) (0.151) (0.086)
Pro Pro 102 2 0 3.686 2.225 4.127 1.609
(0.226) (0.072) (0.165) (0.097)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Subjects were exposed to both of their randomly assigned research reports – one time
series and one cross-sectional within each treatment condition – according to the following
procedure:
1. Subjects were first presented with a “Study Summary” page in which the report’s find-
ings and methodology were briefly presented. Subjects then answered two questions
about how their attitudes toward the death penalty and beliefs about its deterrent
efficacy had changed as a result of reading the summary.
2. Subjects were then shown a series of three pages that provided further details on
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the methodology, results, and criticisms of the report. The research findings were
presented in both tabular and graphical form.
3. After reading the report details and criticism, subjects answered a series of five ques-
tions (including a short essay) that probed their evaluations of the study’s quality and
persuasiveness.
4. Subjects then answered the attitude and belief change questions a second time.
Subjects completed steps one through four for both the first and second research reports.
After reading and responding to the first and second reports, subjects were asked two endline
Attitude and Belief questions, identical to the pre-treatment questions.
2.3.3 Analytic Strategy
The relatively complicated design described above can support many alternative analytic
strategies. Each report is associated with seven intermediate dependent variables in addition
to the two endline dependent variables. Subjects could have been assigned to eighteen
different combinations of research reports. Reducing this complexity requires averaging
over some conditions and making choices about which dependent variables to present. I
present here my preferred analysis, though alternatives are offered in Appendix A.
I will focus on the separate effects of positive and negative information on subjects’
T2 responses to the attitude and belief questions. Because the Null Null and Pro Con
conditions are both scored 0 on both the positive information and negative information
scales, I include an intercept shift for the Null Null condition, as shown in Equation 2.1:
Yi = β0 + β1(POSi) + β2(NEGi) + β3(Conditioni = Null Null) + εi (2.1)
Under Bayesian reasoning, β1 is hypothesized to be positive for all subjects and β2 to
be negative for all subjects. Under attitude polarization, β1 is hypothesized to be positive
for proponents, but negative for opponents, whereas β2 is hypothesized to be positive for
proponents and negative for opponents. That is, under attitude polarization, proponents
always update in the positive direction regardless of the sign of the information; the opposite
is predicted for opponents. β3 represents the difference in average outcomes for subjects
in the Null Null condition as compared with the Pro Con condition. Neither theory has a
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strong prediction as to the sign of this coefficient; presumably it should be close to zero for all
subjects. I will estimate Equation 2.1 via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) among proponents
and opponents separately, allowing for an easy comparison of β̂1 and β̂2 across subject
types. In addition, I will estimate Equation 2.1 with and without a vector of covariates Xi.
Included in this vector of covariates are subjects’ T1 responses to the attitude and belief
questions. Including initial attitudes and beliefs as right-hand-side regressors is preferred
to the differencing procedure implied by the “direct” measurement technique for attitude
change, as it usually produces tighter estimates.6
2.3.4 Results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present estimates of the effects of information on attitudes and beliefs
about capital punishment. Focusing on the covariate-adjusted models, I estimate that a unit
increase in positive information causes an average increase in support for capital punishment
of 0.015 scale points among proponents and 0.068 scale points among opponents, neither of
which is statistically significant. Negative information has a strong negative effect among
proponents (-0.326, p < 0.01), and a weakly negative effect among opponents (-0.042,
p = 0.43). These estimates imply that moving from the Con Con condition to the Pro Pro
condition would cause proponents to move 2 · 0.015 + 2 · 0.326 = 0.682 scale points and
opponents to move 2 · 0.068 + 2 · 0.042 = 0.220 scale points. While the treatment effects
do appear to differ by subject type (p < 0.05), we do not observe the “incorrectly” signed
treatment effects predicted by attitude polarization.
Turning to Table 2.3, we observe that the effects of the information treatments on
belief in the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment are nearly identical for proponents
and opponents. For both groups, moving from Con Con to Pro Pro results in an entire
scale point’s worth of movement. This analysis shows clear evidence that subjects, when
presented with information, update in a manner that is consistent with Bayesian reasoning,
by making small but perceptible changes in the direction of the information. The attitude
polarization hypothesis is roundly rejected by these data.
6See Gerber and Green (2012, pp. 96-102) for a fuller discussion of these two estimators.
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Table 2.2: Effects of Information on Support for Capital Punishment
Dependent Variable: T2 Attitude Toward Capitial Punishment
Among Proponents Among Opponents
Positive Information (0 to 2) 0.048 0.015 0.108 0.068
(0.097) (0.085) (0.093) (0.064)
Negative Information (0 to 2) −0.267∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.042
(0.102) (0.082) (0.078) (0.054)
Condition: Null Null −0.229 −0.194 −0.004 −0.068
(0.196) (0.157) (0.138) (0.104)
Constant 5.863 0.435 1.765 0.657
(0.125) (0.563) (0.100) (0.233)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 287 287 396 396
R2 0.044 0.410 0.006 0.473
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Null Null condition is coded 0.
Covariates include T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
Table 2.3: Effects of Information on Belief in Deterrent Efficacy
Dependent Variable: T2 Belief in Deterrent Effect
Among Proponents Among Opponents
Positive Information (0 to 2) 0.146 0.118 0.348∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.101) (0.105) (0.091)
Negative Information (0 to 2) −0.347∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.164 −0.207∗∗
(0.110) (0.095) (0.100) (0.088)
Condition: Null Null −0.322 −0.284 −0.275∗ −0.302∗∗
(0.205) (0.186) (0.162) (0.145)
Constant 5.078 1.695 2.472 1.441
(0.143) (0.679) (0.115) (0.329)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 287 287 396 396
R2 0.084 0.255 0.090 0.341
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Null Null condition is coded 0.
Covariates include T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
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2.3.4.1 Persistence of Effects
As detailed in Appendix A and Chapter 4, I also measured the persistence of these effects
10 days after treatment. Put briefly, the effects on both dependent variables barely declined
at all.
2.4 Study 2: Minimum Wage
One possible objection to the results from Study 1 is that the conditions for attitude po-
larization were not met. Specifically, the issue of capital punishment cuts across party
lines and socioeconomic groups, so perhaps subjects are less inclined to “argue back” in
the face of counter-attitudinal evidence. Study 2 addresses this concern by focusing on the
minimum wage, a highly contentious issue area that divides the political parties and other
demographic groups. The design of Study 2 is similar in spirit to Study 1, but instead of
presenting treatments as figures with accompanying text, the treatments in this study were
short web videos in favor and against raising the minimum wage.
2.4.1 Subjects
A large number (2,979) survey respondents on MTurk were recruited to participate in a
pre-treatment survey measuring demographic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity,
education, partisan affiliation, and ideological leaning) as well as baseline attitudes toward
the minimum wage and global warming (the focus of Study 3). From this large pool of
survey respondents, 1,500 were invited to take part in the main survey testing the effect of
videos on attitudes toward the minimum wage. Invitations to take part in the main survey
were offered on a random basis, though more slots were offered to younger respondents and
those with stronger views (pro or con) about the minimum wage. Of the 1,500 recruited to
the main survey, 1,170 participated. Rates of payment were identical to Study 1: $0.25 for
the pre-survey and $1.00 each for the main survey and the follow-up.
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2.4.2 Procedure
Subjects were exposed to two videos on the subject of the minimum wage. Two of the
videos were in favor of minimum wage increases, one presented by John Green, a popular
video blogger, and the other presented by Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary of Labor
and established left-leaning public intellectual. On the “con” side of the debate, one video
was presented by an actor, and the other by economics professor Antony Davies. Finally,
two videos were included as placebos, addressing mundane requirements of state minimum
wage laws. Links to all six videos are available in Appendix A, as well as screenshots and
transcripts that convey the production quality and mood of the videos.
Subjects were randomized into one of thirteen conditions: placebo, or one of the twelve
possible orderings of the four persuasive videos. Subjects answered intermediate questions
relating to how well-made and persuasive they found each video, then at the end of the
survey, they answered two questions which serve as our main dependent variables. The
Favor question asked, “The federal minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour. Do you
favor or oppose raising the federal minimum wage?” The response options ranged from
1 (Very much opposed to raising the federal minimum wage) to 7 (Very much in favor of
raising the federal minimum wage). The Amount question asked, “What do you think the
federal minimum wage should be? Please enter an amount between $0.00 and $25.00 in the
text box below.”
2.4.3 Analysis
As in Study 1, I order the treatment conditions according to the amount of pro-minimum
wage video content. The information content of the Con Con conditions is scored -1, the
Pro Con and Placebo conditions 0, and the Pro Pro conditions 1, as shown in Table 2.4.
I will model responses as in Equation 2.1 and estimate separate regressions for opponents,
moderates, and proponents. Opponents are defined as subjects whose pre-treatment Fa-
vor response was 4 or lower and whose Amount response was below the median response
($10.00). Those with Favor responses of 4 or higher and Amount responses above the
median are defined as proponents. All others are defined as moderates.
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Table 2.4 presents the means and standard deviations by experimental group. Here
again, we see an indication that the treatments had average effects in their intended direc-
tions. The means of the Con Young / Con Old condition are lower than the means of the
mixed conditions, which are themselves lower than the means of the Pro Young / Pro Old
conditions. These differences are all statistically significant. Turning to the differences-in-
standard-deviations, formal tests under the sharp null of no effect lend some support to the
hypothesis that the treatments lead to increases in the polarization of opinion – the differ-
ences between the placebo condition and the Pro Old, Con Old condition are statistically
significant for both dependent variables at the p < 0.01 level. However, while increases in
the standard deviations of outcomes would be a consequence of attitude polarization, these
increases could also result from one group having larger treatment effects than another, but
with both effects still positive.






Mean SD Mean SD
Placebo 93 0 0 5.344 1.638 9.234 2.771
(0.170) (0.125) (0.288) (0.332)
Con Young / Con Old 162 0 1 4.765 1.837 8.671 2.651
(0.144) (0.081) (0.208) (0.254)
Pro Old / Con Old 165 0 0 4.988 2.089 9.993 4.282
(0.160) (0.093) (0.323) (0.291)
Pro Old / Con Young 195 0 0 4.872 1.934 9.851 3.320
(0.142) (0.077) (0.244) (0.245)
Pro Young / Con Old 169 0 0 5.012 1.902 9.303 3.031
(0.147) (0.084) (0.240) (0.267)
Pro Young / Con Young 192 0 0 5.177 1.640 9.379 2.938
(0.115) (0.087) (0.209) (0.333)
Pro Young / Pro Old 194 1 0 5.593 1.671 10.926 3.897
(0.116) (0.105) (0.280) (0.297)
According to attitude polarization, the effects of both positive and negative information
should be negative for opponents, positive for proponents, and either positive or negative
for moderates. According to Bayesian reasoning, the effect of positive information should
be positive and the effect of negative information should be negative for all three subject
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types.
2.4.4 Results
The results of Study 2 are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Again focusing on the covariate-
adjusted estimates, the video treatments had powerful effects for all three subject types.
Positive information had positive and statistically significant effects on subjects’ preferred
minimum wage amount; negative information had strongly negative effects.
A similar pattern of response is evident in Table 2.6. All coefficients have the sign
predicted by “directional Bayes.” With the exception of negative information among oppo-
nents, all these coefficients are statistically significant.
Table 2.5: Effects of Information on Preferred Minimum Wage Amount
Dependent Variable: T2 Amount
Among Opponents Among Moderates Among Proponents
Pos. Info (0 to 1) 0.434 0.601∗ 1.878∗∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.333) (0.366) (0.295) (0.364) (0.294)
Neg. Info (0 to 1) −0.611 −0.696∗∗ −0.831∗∗∗ −0.927∗∗∗ −1.929∗∗∗ −1.699∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.308) (0.185) (0.195) (0.314) (0.300)
Condition: Placebo −0.115 −0.605∗∗ −0.353 −0.463∗ −0.790∗ −0.493∗∗
(0.525) (0.252) (0.271) (0.248) (0.416) (0.236)
Constant 6.891 2.493 9.365 5.636 11.991 1.309
(0.212) (0.863) (0.097) (2.657) (0.185) (1.190)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 343 343 356 356 471 471
R2 0.008 0.664 0.187 0.326 0.100 0.443
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Placebo condition is coded 0.
Covariates include T1 Amount, T1 Favor, age, gender, ideology, party ID, and education.
2.4.4.1 Persistence of Effects
In this study, too, the estimated effects persisted 10 days later. While the treatment effects
diminish somewhat, they retain somewhere between 50% and 90% of their original strength.
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Table 2.6: Effects of Information on Favoring Minimum Wage Raise
Dependent Variable: T2 Favor
Among Opponents Among Moderates Among Proponents
Pos. Info (0 to 1) 0.860∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.215) (0.164) (0.140) (0.088) (0.073)
Neg. Info (0 to 1) −0.017 −0.130 −0.626∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.186) (0.212) (0.215) (0.183) (0.163)
Condition: Placebo 0.699∗∗ 0.338 0.277 0.198 0.008 0.067
(0.275) (0.248) (0.238) (0.215) (0.194) (0.166)
Constant 2.968 1.722 5.344 3.107 6.343 2.662
(0.114) (0.531) (0.081) (1.221) (0.053) (0.527)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 343 343 356 356 471 471
R2 0.045 0.467 0.068 0.181 0.060 0.329
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Placebo condition is coded 0.
Covariates include T1 Amount, T1 Favor, age, gender, ideology, party ID, and education.
2.5 Study 3: Global Warming
Study 3 examines Bayesian reasoning in the context of global warming, a hotly contested
issue area characterized by invective from both sides. For a number of reasons, this subject
ought to be a fertile ground for attitude polarization. First, it is a salient political issue
with clear partisan implications. Second, it involves complex considerations about risk,
the reliability of projections into the future, the motives of industry players, and the costs
of collective action. And third, the “facts on the ground” are themselves changing, from
periodically issued reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
to directly observable weather patterns.
With these difficulties in mind, I sought treatments with the clearest possible presen-
tation of the current scientific evidence: graphical summaries of various projection models’
performance in predicting both past and future warming trends. These graphs are based on
actual figures included in the technical summary of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report.7
In order to capture the complexity of the issue, I included dependent variables covering
7See http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_TS_FINAL.pdf, page 64.
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beliefs about the causes of climate change, the perceived threat of global warming, and
whether sacrifices will be necessary to reduce its effects (designed to tap into subjects’
assessment of relative costs and benefits as well as risk perceptions).
2.5.1 Subjects
Subjects were drawn from the same pre-treatment survey used in Study 2, which measured
baseline attitudes toward global warming. Of the 2,000 invited subjects, 1,690 responded.
These 1,690 comprise the experimental sample.
2.5.2 Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to be presented with one of two versions of the IPCC
graph.8 First, all subjects were given an introductory note about predicting future warm-
ing trends by “training statistical models on historical data, then running those models
forward.” The graph, which plots simulations from 138 different models, shows both their
performance with actual data from the past and their projections into the future. For the
Warming treatment, respondents were then told, “There is a great deal of agreement be-
tween the models and the observed temperature. This agreement means that we can have
greater confidence in the models’ projections into the future. The Earth is warming, and
the models predict that the warming trends will continue into the future.”
For the Warming Hiatus treatment, the line plotting past temperature changes is
brought partially forward into the “projected” side of the graph to show that the sim-
ulations generally seem to be overstating the warming trend. Subjects assigned to this
treatment are then told, “To the left of the dotted line, the models and the observed tem-
perature agree. But to the right of the dotted line, the actual levels of warming clearly
disagree with the predictions of the models. This disagreement means we cannot be confi-
dent of the models’ projections into the future. The shaded region describes the updated
projections based on more recent data.”
After some intermediate questions asking about generic political preferences, subjects
8See Appendix A for reproductions of the treatment materials.
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responded to questions measuring the main outcome variables. The Cause question asked,
“Some people believe that increases in the Earth’s temperature over the last century are due
to the effects of pollution from human activities. Others believe that temperature increases
are due to natural changes in the environment. Which comes closer to your view?” The
response options were “Temperature increases are mainly due to the effects of pollution
from human activities,” “... due to natural changes in the environment,” “... due to both
human activities and natural changes,” and “I do not believe the Earth’s temperature has
risen.” The Threat question asked, “Do you believe global warming will pose a serious
threat to your way of life in your lifetime?” Respondents answered yes or no.
2.5.3 Analysis
All subjects in the experimental sample were exposed to one of two treatments, Warming
(coded 0) or Warming Hiatus (coded 1). I recoded the Cause question to equal 1 if the
respondent said that temperature increases were due to natural changes in the environ-
ment or both human activities and natural changes in the environment – this new variable
is called Natural Cause. Similarly, the Not a Threat variable is the reverse-coded version
of the Threat question. Because this experiment only involves two conditions, I estimate
treatment effects with the difference-in-means (or regression-adjusted difference-in-means),
as in Equation 2.2. Under attitude polarization, β1 is hypothesized to be positive for global
warming “skeptics” and negative among global warming “believers.” Skeptic/Believer sta-
tus was measured with pre-treatment versions of the dependent variable questions. Under
Bayesian reasoning, β1 should be nonnegative for all subjects.
Yi = β0 + β1(Hiatusi) + εi (2.2)
2.5.4 Results
Table 2.7 shows that the effects of the Warming Hiatus treatment were strongest among
moderates, causing a 15.8-percentage-point increase in belief that the Earth is warming, at
least in part due to natural causes. Among climate change believers, this effect was 13.3
percentage points. The group hypothesized by the attitude polarization theory to have
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the largest average treatment effect – climate skeptics – in fact had the smallest, at 5.7
percentage points. This small coefficient may be in part due to a ceiling effect, as 85% of
skeptics in the control group believe global warming is due to natural causes.
Table 2.7: Effects of Information on Belief that Global Warming is due to Natural Causes
Dependent Variable: T2 Natural Cause
Among Skeptics Among Moderates Among Believers
Treatment: Hiatus 0.053∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.034)
Constant 0.850∗∗ 0.901 0.574∗∗ 0.584 0.395∗∗ 0.692
(0.028) (0.113) (0.030) (0.137) (0.025) (0.112)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 354 354 495 495 773 773
R2 0.007 0.120 0.030 0.131 0.013 0.120
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Covariates: T1 Natural Cause, T1 Not a Threat, age, gender, ideology, party ID, education.
Table 2.8 shows that the treatments had minimal effects on the belief that global warm-
ing is not a threat. While all the average treatment effects are estimated to be positive,
none is statistically significant. When pooled, the average effect for the entire sample is
estimated to 0.016, with a standard error of 0.019. It appears that subjects changed their
minds as to the probable cause of global warming, but not with respect to how dangerous
it is to their way of life. This finding is puzzling, given that the evidence presented to
subjects in the Warming Hiatus condition showed that temperatures had not risen as much
as projected – evidence that speaks not to the causes of global warming, but rather its
extent. This pattern cannot be explained by a ceiling effect, at least among moderates and
believers: baseline belief that global warming is not a threat was 47.4 and 27.9 percent,
respectively. One possible (admittedly post-hoc) explanation is that treated subjects might
have interpreted the revised projections as evidence of the uncertainty attending to climate
science – just because it is difficult to know how much warming will happen and why does
not mean that global warming is not dangerous.
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Table 2.8: Effects of Information on Belief that Global Warming is not a Threat
Dependent Variable: T2 Not a Threat
Among Skeptics Among Moderates Among Believers
Treatment: Hiatus 0.004 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.027
(0.030) (0.030) (0.045) (0.039) (0.033) (0.028)
Constant 0.910 0.815 0.474 0.750 0.278 0.859
(0.022) (0.094) (0.030) (0.126) (0.023) (0.092)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 354 354 495 495 773 773
R2 0.0001 0.156 0.001 0.288 0.001 0.280
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Covariates: T1 Natural Cause, T1 Not a Threat, age, gender, ideology, party ID, education.
2.6 Exploring Treatment Effect Heterogeneity with BART
The difference between attitude polarization and Bayesian reasoning comes down to diver-
gent predictions about treatment effect heterogeneity. Under attitude polarization, treat-
ment effects are hypothesized to be positive for some subgroups but negative for others.
Under Bayesian reasoning, treatment effects are hypothesized to be strictly non-negative
for all subgroups. In the analyses presented above, I explored treatment effect heterogene-
ity according to pre-treatment measures of support for the issue area. While this choice
was theoretically motivated, it is only one of a multitude of pre-treatment covariates that
could be used to check for differences in responses to treatment. The Bayesian reasoning
hypothesis is a strong one: non-negative treatment effects for all subgroups.
In order to fully evaluate this hypothesis, a method that takes a comprehensive approach
to detecting differential treatment effects is required. Bayesian Additive Regression Trees
(BART) is a recent advance in statistical learning (Chipman et al. 2007, 2010) that has been
recommended by social scientists (Hill 2011; Green and Kern 2012) as a method for flexibly
and automatically detecting treatment effect heterogeneity. BART is a sum-of-trees model
that makes robust predictions of the conditional mean of the outcome variable without
overfitting. A principal benefit of using BART over other machine learning algorithms is
that it is robust to the choice of tuning parameters; I use the default settings in the dbarts
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package for R, version 0.8-5.
I implemented the procedure recommended by Hill (2011), first fitting the model to the
observed data, then using the model to make predictions about the outcome that each unit
would express under each treatment condition. In Studies 1 and 2, I focused on the differ-
ence between the Pro Pro and Con Con conditions. These differences can be thought of as
an estimate of the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) for each unique covariate
profile. There are 494 unique covariate profiles among the 683 subjects in Study 1, 909
among the 1,170 subjects in Study 2, and 815 among the 1,690 subjects in Study 3. A
fully saturated OLS model with all possible treatment-by-covariate interactions would also
produce estimates for each covariate profile, but these estimates would be extremely noisy,
and moreover, there might not be variation on the treatment indicator within each cell. In
essence, the BART procedure partially pools across cells to achieve greater precision. Esti-
mates of uncertainty are obtained by repeatedly drawing from the posterior and generating
95% credible intervals.
Standard statistical methods such as OLS have the advantage of providing relatively
simple data summaries. The average effect of treatment can be summarized as the coefficient
on the treatment indicator and heterogeneity can be characterized by the coefficients on
interaction terms. BART models, by contrast, cannot easily be summarized by a series of
coefficients. In order to understand the heterogeneity discovered by BART, it is best to
inspect the model graphically. In the graphs that follow, I plot both estimated potential
outcomes for each unit in the sample along with a 95% credible interval on the vertical axes.
On the horizontal axes, I sort the units according to the average of their estimated potential
outcomes. That is, if a unit is estimated to express a relatively low outcome regardless of
treatment condition, that unit is plotted further to the left. This choice allows for a quick
grasp of the general pattern: do the response surfaces generally move in parallel, do they
cross, or do they diverge?
Figure 2.1 presents the BART-estimated potential outcomes for both dependent vari-
ables in all three studies. The first row shows estimates of treatment on the Support and
Belief outcomes. The blue, circular points represents the model’s best guess for the outcome
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that each unit would express in the “Pro Pro” condition, whereas the red, triangular points
represent the estimate of the outcome under the “Con Con” condition. The difference be-
tween these points is the estimated treatment effect for that unit. For Support, the average
difference between the circular and triangular points is approximately 0.35. The difference
is slightly larger for those who have generally higher support for capital punishment and
slightly smaller for those who generally oppose it. For Belief, the average difference is about
0.92, and is approximately equal to this value, regardless of background characteristic.
The second row presents the output of the BART model for the Amount and Favor
dependent variables in the minimum wage experiment. Turning first to the left panel,
the blue, circular points represent the estimated preferred minimum wage for each subject
under the “Pro Pro” condition, while the red, triangular points represent the estimated
outcomes if subjects had seen both “Con” videos. For those subjects generally opposed to
the minimum wage, the average difference between the curves is about $1.00, but it increases
to about $4.00 at the high end of the scale. Here we see clear evidence of treatment effect
heterogeneity. By contrast, the curves for the Favor dependent variable could hardly be
more parallel. Nearly all subjects appear to have a treatment effect very close to 1.0.
Both the Natural Cause and Not a Threat dependent variables in the global warming
study are binary, so I express the outcomes that each unit would express under each treat-
ment condition in terms of a probability. For binary outcomes, BART employs a version
of a probit model: I have translated these probits back into probabilities for ease of in-
terpretation. For Natural Cause, we see large differences in the estimated probabilities on
the order of a 0.10 difference in the probability of believing that global warming is due
to natural causes. This difference gets smaller as we approach zero or unit probability.
Interestingly, this pattern does not arise when inspecting the treatment versus control dif-
ferences in probits: the differences appear far more parallel in probits than in probabilities
(analysis not reported here). As noted in Chapter 1, the scale of the dependent variable
has strong implications for treatment effect heterogeneity. In probits, the treatment effects
are homogeneous but in probabilities, the effects are heterogeneous. In terms of evaluating
the Bayesian reasoning hypothesis, however, the question of the correct outcome scale is
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less important: in either scale, treatment effects are all estimated to be positive. The Not
a Threat dependent variable is plotted in the lower right hand panel and shows that across
the entire response surface, there is very little difference between the treated and control
potential outcomes. Not only does there appear to be no average effect, there does not not
appear to be any effect among any covariate profile in the sample.
Figure 2.1 echoes many of the findings highlighted by the OLS models presented above.
For example, in the Capital Punishment experiment, treatment had slightly bigger effects
on “Support” among proponents than among opponents. Whereas the OLS model focuses
attention on how effects were statistically significant for one group but not the other, the
BART analysis emphasizes that the response surfaces, while not exactly parallel, do not
diverge wildly for subjects with different backgrounds.
Table 2.9 summarizes the BART models for all six dependent variables presented in the
previous sections. The estimated ATE is the average of the estimates of the individual-level
treatment effects. The SE is the standard deviation of the distribution of estimated ATEs
across 1,000 posterior draws. The 95% credible interval is the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of
that distribution. These BART summaries are very similar to those returned by OLS. The
last column shows the proportion of estimated treatment effects across all 1,000 posterior
draws that were non-negative. With the exception of Threat, which is essentially unmoved
by the treatment, we observe almost exclusively positive treatment effects. Regardless of the
subgroup analyzed, there are almost no subjects who are estimated to experience negative
treatment effects, providing strong evidence that attitude polarization was not at work in
these experiments.
Table 2.9: Summaries of BART Estimation
ÂTE SE 95% CI Pr(τ̂i ≥ 0)
Study 1: Belief 0.923 0.137 [0.654, 1.208] 1.000
Study 1: Support 0.355 0.111 [0.134, 0.572] 0.938
Study 2: Amount 2.458 0.204 [2.070, 2.834] 0.998
Study 2: Favor 1.014 0.110 [0.800, 1.240] 1.000
Study 3: Natural Cause 0.110 0.021 [0.067, 0.154] 0.971
Study 3: Not a Threat 0.017 0.019 [-0.019, 0.053] 0.685
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2.7 Relationship of these Results to Previous Literature
The foregoing experimental evidence is seemingly at odds with the previous literature de-
scribing how individuals evaluate information and update their beliefs. There are, in my
view, at least two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, it is possible that the
conditions for attitude polarization that were present in previous experiments were not
present in these experiments. This is unlikely to be the case, first and foremost because
the results of study 1 are nearly identical to the original Lord et al. (1979) study when the
data are analyzed as those authors did. Further, the mechanisms hypothesized to drive
attitude polarization are often described in general terms: Taber and Lodge (2006, p. 756)
take as their starting premise the claim that “all reasoning is motivated.” Lord et al. (1979,
p. 2108) worry that due to biased assimilation, evidence will “frequently fuel rather than
calm the fires of debate.” While many contexts may be more politically contentious than
the survey experimental environment, it would seem to be an arbitrary domain restriction
to rule these experiments as outside the theoretical scope.
A second possibility for reconciling these findings with the work of others is that pre-
vious evidence has been misinterpreted. The Lord et al. study is suspect because the
analyses condition not on a randomly assigned treatment, but rather on subjects’ back-
ground characteristics. The observed correlation between opponent/proponent status and
the self-reported measure of change is not a good estimate of the effect of information; it is
biased due to unobserved heterogeneity.
A related study by Taber and Lodge (2006) uses an information board experiment to
demonstrate attitude polarization. In an information board experiment, the information
to which subjects are exposed is not in control of the researcher. Instead, subjects are
presented with a series articles they can choose to read or not. The main evidence for
attitude polarization in Taber and Lodge (2006) is a series of regressions of T2 attitude
extremity on T1 attitude extremity, subgroup by subgroup. Regression coefficients greater
than 1 are taken to indicate a strengthening of attitudes at T2 over T1. To be clear,
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this study did not condition its analyses according to a random assignment9 The authors
themselves seem to agree that such a design is prone to bias: “Since several independent
variables are measured rather than manipulated (prior attitude and sophistication), this is
more properly thought of as a quasi-experimental design” (p. 737).
Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson (2010) reports the results of a study that also makes
use of an information board but randomly assigns subjects to varying doses of counter-
attitudinal information. Subjects could still choose to read some articles or not, but the
“media environment” in which subjects made their choices was controlled by the researchers.
The premise of that article is finding the “affective tipping point,” or the dose of counter-
attitudinal information that will induce subjects to start moving in the direction of evidence.
Those authors hypothesize (p. 564) that small doses of counter-attitudinal information will
have negative treatment effects (movements away from evidence) but that at some point,
the dosage will be large enough to induce positive treatment effects (movements toward
evidence). The results of that study do not convincingly support the hypothesis that small
doses produce negative treatment effects. While the authors do not emphasize this point
(it is made in a footnote on page 579), the effects of small doses are too small to be
distinguishable from zero. The effects of large doses are positive and significant. In sum,
the evidence from these information board experiments corroborates the findings in this
chapter: subjects, when exposed to counter-attitudinal information, update their priors in
the direction of evidence.
I am aware of two studies that do demonstrate a negative treatment effect for a subgroup
when conditioning on a randomly assigned treatment. Nyhan et al. (2014) show that pro-
viding a “correction” about vaccine misperceptions can decrease vaccine-averse subjects’
reported intention to vaccinate; this finding was replicated in Nyhan and Reifler (2015).
While I have no reason to doubt the validity of this effect, I do interpret it in light of the
studies’ other findings. The correction decreases vaccine-averse subjects’ stated belief that
vaccines cause the flu (Nyhan and Reifler 2015, p. 462) and decreases their belief that
9The authors did randomize subjects into one of two studies – affirmative action or gun control – but
differences in outcomes due to this random assignment are not presented.
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vaccines cause autism. The corrections had unintended consequences among a subgroup,
but subjects in that subgroup did update their beliefs in the direction of evidence. For a
more thorough description of these results, see Appendix C.
A related literature considers “partisan motivated reasoning” (Leeper and Slothuus
2014) in which party-branded messages are sometimes (but not universally) found to cause
positive effects for co-partisans but negative effects for out-partisans (Arceneaux and John-
son 2013; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013; Druckman, Levendusky and McLain
2015). I view these effects as being consistent with Bayesian reasoning insofar as subjects
hold differing likelihood functions. Democrats, for example, may view a Republican-branded
argument for a policy as a bundle of two pieces of information: the argument itself (which
may be presumed to have a positive effect) and the partisan cue, which, according to the
Democrats’ likelihood functions, decreases the posterior probability that the policy is a
good one. The negative effect of the partisan cue may frequently overwhelm the positive
effect of information, but this does not constitute evidence against Bayesian reasoning as I
have conceived of it here.
2.8 Discussion
At the heart of the attitude polarization theory is the prediction that individuals evaluate
evidence relative to their pre-existing beliefs. I argue that this connection is best under-
stood as part of a Bayesian learning framework rather than a belief-preserving defensive
mechanism.
The experimental evidence is consistent across all three of the studies reported here. Pro-
capital-punishment evidence tends to make subjects more supportive of the death penalty
and to strengthen their beliefs in its deterrent efficacy. Evidence that the death penalty
increases crime does the opposite, while inconclusive evidence does not cause significant
shifts in attitudes or beliefs. Arguments about the minimum wage likewise move respondents
in the predicted direction – toward supporting a higher or a lower dollar amount according
to the slant of the evidence presented in the video treatments. Finally, scientific projections
about the likely trajectory of warming trends have a significant effect on subjects’ views
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about the causes of climate change. These findings are strongly in line with the “directional
Bayes” prediction: individuals’ beliefs are anchored by their priors and refreshed in the
direction of the evidence.
The studies reported here were designed to encompass a variety of different types of
information – scientific evidence described in tables and graphs in addition to more colloquial
video appeals. The issues covered vary along numerous dimensions: both “hot” (death
penalty) and “cold” (minimum wage), easily mapped to the partisan divide (global warming)
or not, and of varying degrees of salience. The results do not depend on the particular issue
or idiosyncratic features of the topics chosen. Importantly, the effects are not fleeting: In
the two studies in which I collected follow-up responses, subjects’ updated beliefs persisted
for at least 10 days after the initial experiment.
The experimental results reveal a surprising lack of treatment effect heterogeneity. Many
theories of persuasion predict that different groups will respond to information differently.
The direction and magnitude of the effect of new evidence depends on people’s prior beliefs,
their level of knowledge, or other factors such as whether they have a personal stake in
the issue. Contrary to such expectations, I find that subjects update in a parallel fashion
regardless of predispositions, level of education, or ideology. This lack of heterogeneity
raises important questions for the portion of the Bayesian theory that predicts differences
in effects depending on the strength of priors or idiosyncrasies of individuals’ likelihood
functions. The overall similarity of effects across subjects suggests that people might not
differ much with respect to the strength of their priors. That is, the “prior variance” of
policy attitudes, if we could measure it, might be similar across individuals.
These experiments show that when people are exposed to information, that they do
indeed update their views accordingly. However, one way in which these findings might not
generalize to non-experimental contexts is if people selectively avoid counter-attitudinal
information. Prior (2007) and Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) find that many individuals,
if given the choice, simply consume entertainment rather than news information, thereby
selecting out of both pro- and counter-attitudinal information in one stroke. On the other
hand, (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic 2015) shows that while partisan Facebook users do
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appear to prefer pro-attitudinal news stories, they are exposed to and do consume a large
amount of counter-attitudinal information. Future research should consider the conditions
under which individuals could be induced to seek out larger or smaller doses of information
with which they disagree.
A reasonable objection to these findings is that while subjects may not polarize when
reading relatively sterile descriptions of academic studies, individuals may do so when ac-
tually arguing about some proposition with an opponent. Political disputes linger and do
not easily resolve when new information comes to light. One possibility is that, under
some conditions, individuals’ likelihood functions may not follow the monotone likelihood
ratio property, the restriction that everyone has compatible expectations of the meaning of
evidence. I speculate that in contentious political environments, in which opposing sides
routinely insult the other (or much worse), the introduction of evidence could induce a
divergence in attitudes. Perhaps in such antagonistic contexts, individuals become dis-
trustful of counter-attitudinal arguments. These and other conditions under which attitude
polarization might occur are the subject of Chapter 3.
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3 The Rule, not the Exception: Bayesian Reason-
ing in Contentious Environments
In the previous chapter, I showed, contra the attitude polarization hypothesis, that in-
dividuals exhibit Bayesian reasoning when encountering counter-attitudinal arguments and
evidence; that is, they update their beliefs in the direction of evidence. An intriguing pos-
sibility is that the conditions for attitude polarization were lacking in the relatively sterile
survey experimental environment. This chapter explores this possibility by investigating in-
dividuals’ response to information in a wider variety of contexts. I randomize, along with
the presentation of attitude-consistent and -inconsistent evidence, a contextual factor hy-
pothesized to trigger motivated reasoning: ad hominem discourse. I show that insulting
language does not inhibit individuals’ capacity to incorporate new information. I conclude
from these results that even in contentious environments, information processing consistent
with Bayesian reasoning remains possible.
This chapter draws on joint work with Andrew Guess.
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The suite of theories falling under the heading “motivated reasoning” (Kunda 1990) is
frequently offered as a theoretical explanation for attitude polarization or “backlash”(e.g.,
Taber and Lodge 2006). Attitude polarization is a causal process in which individuals, in
response to some stimulus or by engaging in some activity, move away from the “center”
of opinion and toward the extremes. Describing the result of some treatment as attitude
polarization presumes a one-dimensional attitude space, with some individuals holding a
positive attitude toward a stimulus object and others holding a negative attitude. Attitude
polarization occurs when negative attitudes become more negative and positive attitudes
become more positive.
Backlash, at best, appears to be a very rare phenomenon. In chapter 1, I showed how
on a large range of issues, individuals update in parallel. This pattern, first observed at the
macro level in (Page and Shapiro 1992), also obtained at the micro level in a series of 20
survey experiments. In chapter 2, I forwarded a theory of Bayesian rationality that predicts
these changes. Individuals have prior beliefs, prior uncertainty, and a likelihood function
they use to process information. Individuals are allowed any prior belief or uncertainty.
Given a small restriction on the likelihood function (the minimum likelihood ratio property),
individuals are predicted to update either in the direction of evidence or not at all, but are
never predicted to update away from evidence.
Figure 3.1 shows that backlash does not occur on average. Treatment effect estimates
and 95% confidence intervals from the 20 survey experiments discussed in Chapter 1 are
plotted on the horizontal axis. The effects are ordered on the vertical axis by magnitude.
The polarity of the treatment effects matches the “direction of information.” By the direc-
tion of information, I mean that differences are scored relative to the sign of the hypothesized
effect. In most cases, this direction is easy to discern, e.g., pro-capital punishment infor-
mation should move subjects in a positive direction. The figure shows that the majority
of the treatment effects are estimated to be positive. Among those that are estimated to
be negative, not a single treatment effect estimate is statistically significant. At least on
average, no “incorrectly” signed statistically significant effects were observed in this set of
20 experiments.
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While the average effects of information treatments appear to be correctly signed in
most cases, there remains the possibility that under some conditions and for some sub-
groups, a particular information treatment might cause a negative effect. In this chapter, I
attempt to induce backlash effects by assigning subjects to reason in contentious informa-
tion environments. In an uncontentious control condition, subjects are randomly exposed
to evidence as in a standard information experiment. In a “contentious” condition, subjects
are insulted with ad hominem discourse designed to reproduce the contentious environments
in which political discourse often takes place – environments in which political observers
often lament the ubiquity of polarized debate, motivated reasoning, and backlash (Mutz
and Reeves 2005).
To preview the results, I find strong evidence that insults do not cause backlash. Subjects
in both processing conditions respond to evidence in the same way: small but perceptible
shifts in the direction of evidence.
3.1 Theory
To briefly recapitulate the theory presented in Chapter 2, Bayesian reasoning predicts that
individuals will update their attitudes and beliefs in accordance with the evidence provided
to them. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are three dimensions along which
individuals can vary: their prior beliefs, prior uncertainties, and their likelihood functions.
Individuals’ posterior beliefs are analogous to weighted averages of their priors and evidence,
where the weights are determined by their prior uncertainties and likelihood functions.
Individual with high prior uncertainty will be persuaded relatively more than those with
low prior uncertainty. Individuals whose likelihood functions lead them to regard evidence
with skepticism will be persuaded less than those with more forgiving likelihood functions.
In this framework, unless their likelihood functions are somehow “backwards,” (for example,
they interpret a positive jobs report as evidence of a flagging economy), people will either
update their beliefs in the direction of evidence or not update at all. Individuals are never
predicted to update away from the evidence presented to them.
These predictions stand in contrast to those made in the literature surrounding attitude
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polarization and backlash (Taber and Lodge 2006; Lord et al. 1979). Motivated reasoning is
the label given to a class of models of human information processing in which biases due to
directional goals inhibit individuals’ capacity for dispassionate evaluation of evidence. Many
phenomena can be explained either using a model of motivated reasoning or Bayesian rea-
soning; some phenomena predicted under motivated reasoning, however, are not predicted
by Bayesian reasoning. Attitude polarization or backlash is one such phenomenon.
Under one version of motivated reasoning, backlash occurs in the following way: Indi-
viduals encounter counter-attitudinal evidence. They then spend cognitive energy “counter-
arguing” the evidence presented to them. This process results in individuals becoming more
convinced of their original position than they would be had no evidence been presented at
all. In sum, the treatment effect of counter-attitudinal evidence is predicted to be negative.
The empirical literature on the effects of information has afforded few unambiguous
examples of information backlash. One incontrovertible example is that pro-vaccine in-
formation leads anti-vaccine subjects to report lower intention-to-vaccinate (Nyhan et al.
(2014), result replicated in Nyhan and Reifler (2015)), though those studies also found pos-
itive effects on belief in vaccine efficacy for all subjects (See Appendix C for details of these
studies). Many other demonstrations of backlash contain design and analysis choices (lack of
random assignment, conditioning on post-treatment variables, multiple comparisons) that
render results difficult to interpret.
Ad hominem remarks or insulting language in general may make subjects less likely to
receive and accept persuasive messages. There are at least two possible mechanisms by
which this effect may occur. The first is that ad hominem remarks may trigger “hot cog-
nition,” a hypothesis placing primacy on affect and post-hoc rationalization of preexisting
feelings toward an attitude object – in other words, inducing a strong directional moti-
vation in subjects’ reasoning (Redlawsk 2002). By this account, insulted subjects might
be more reluctant to back down or change their minds in response to evidence given the
perceived stakes and the nature of the opposition. The second possible channel operates via
the likelihood function. An insult may color how subjects perceive the source of the insult
and the caliber of the information that source later produces. Subjects may reason that an
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insulting source may not have good information, or may be attempting to manipulate or
mislead them.
There exists some empirical evidence for the hypothesized effects of ad hominem dis-
course. Abelson and Miller (1967) reports the results of an early field experiment conducted
with confederates in Washington Square Park in New York City. Subjects were invited to
take part in a survey on racial attitudes; a confederate posing as another survey respondent
(randomly) either insulted the subjects for their views or did not insult them. This experi-
ment is extraordinary enough that it is worth quoting Abelson and Miller’s description of
the insult treatment at length:
In the Insulting remarks variation [the confederate] preceded all of his statements
with insults to the subject. He had a list of five standard insults from which
he could draw the one which seemed the most appropriate for each statement,
provided that he used the majority of them for each subject. They were: (1)
‘That’s ridiculous’; (2) ‘That’s just the sort of thing you’d expect to hear in this
park’; (3) ‘That’s obviously wrong’; (4) ‘That’s terribly confused’; and (5) ‘No
one really believes that.’ In practice, he used all five insults for all subjects, for
it was found that they were general enough that they could be said in a natural
way almost regardless of what the subject had said.
Pre-treatment, the subjects all expressed pro-racial equality attitudes. In both the insult
and control conditions, the confederate expressed anti-equality views; the main dependent
variable was the extent to which the subject then reported agreeing with the confederate’s
statements. In the control condition, the average agreement was 16 on a 30 point agreement
scale; in the insults condition, average agreement was 7.5. My reading of this experiment
is that subjects were less likely to report agreeing with the confederate when they liked
him less, i.e., when they report a lower agreement score, they are registering their dislike of
the confederate, not necessarily their honest evaluation of his views. However, the evidence
from this experiment could provide support for either of the proposed mechanisms by which
ad hominem discourse is supposed to impede persuasion.
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3.1.1 Predictions
Figure 3.2 displays the predictions of the theories of Bayesian and motivated reasoning for
the patterns of treatment versus control response we should see, by information processing
condition. The plot contains four facets. The top row of facets presents the predictions
of Bayesian reasoning while the bottom row shows the predictions of motivated reasoning.
The left column corresponds to processing conditions that are “uncontentious.”
Beginning with the top left panel, the Bayesian theory of information processing predicts
that under uncontentious conditions, subjects will update their views in the direction of
evidence: while opponents and proponents hold different baseline views of the issue, the
average outcome when treated with con evidence is lower for both groups than when treated
with pro evidence. This is the pattern of evidence that has obtained in Chapters 1 and 2:
subjects update their views in line with the information presented to them. However,
those who assert that reasoning is motivated by directional goals might say that theories of
motivated reasoning would predict the same pattern. Because the information environment
is uncontentious, the impediments to the standard incorporation of evidence may not have
been present. For this reason, the predictions in the lower left panel, corresponding to the
outcomes predicted by motivated reasoning under uncontentious conditions, are identical
to those presented in the upper left panel.
The distinction between the two theories, then, comes when the information processing
environment becomes contentious. Under Bayesian reasoning (the top right panel), the
difference between pro evidence and con evidence is still positive for both types of subjects,
proponents and opponents alike. However, under motivated reasoning, the ordering changes:
the difference is negative for both types.
Figure 3.2 shows that both theories are consistent with a direct effect of the contentious
information environment on attitudes. For example, average opinions are higher for propo-
nents and lower for opponents under contentious conditions compared with uncontentious
conditions. The crucial distinction is how the information environments interact with sub-
jects’ ability to process information: under Bayesian reasoning, subjects update in the
same direction regardless of the processing condition, whereas under motivated reasoning,
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treatment effects are positive in uncontentious environments and negative in contentious
environments.
Figure 3.2: Predicted Outcomes by Subject Type, Treatment, and Theory
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3.2 Experimental Design
The overall design of the experiment is a two-arm information trial under two processing
conditions. A key feature of this design is a pre-treatment measure of subjects’ “believer”
or “skeptic” status. Prior to randomization, I asked all subjects, “How strongly do you
believe in the scientific evidence that global temperatures are rising due to human activ-
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ity?” Subjects were given two response options: those who answered “Very strongly” were
classified as believers, and those answering “Not very strongly” as skeptics.
3.2.1 Main Manipulation
The main information treatment consisted of an over time graph of global temperature
predictions with accompanying explanatory text. In the control condition, subjects were
presented with a graph of predictions (Figure 3.3a), showing general agreement among the
world’s climate scientists about the probable extent of temperature increases in the near
term. In the “Haitus” treatment, subjects were shown a graph indicating how the observed
temperature did not match predictions (Figure 3.3). These graphs are very similar to those
used in Study 3 but are not identical. The full text of these treatments is included in
Appendix A.
Figure 3.3: Main Manipulation
(a) Control (b) Hiatus Treatment
3.2.2 Processing Condition Manipulations
In addition to the main manipulation, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two
processing conditions:
• Control. In this condition, subjects were shown their main treatment graph with
explanatory text. This condition corresponds to an “uncontentious” processing envi-
ronment.
• Insults. In this condition, after answering the above pre-treatment question, subjects
were exposed to an ad hominem remark. Believers were told: “Some people think
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that your position makes you an alarmist supporter of big government. How do you
respond?” Skeptics were told: “Some people think that your position makes you an
unthinking opponent of science. How do you respond?” Subjects were given a text
box in which to respond to these insults.
3.2.3 Subjects
Table 3.1 summarizes the number of believers and skeptics in each experimental condition.
The sample contained relatively more believers than skeptics, though this in and of itself
does not present a threat to inference. Because of the larger sample size for that group,
estimates for believers will be more precise than those for skeptics.
Table 3.1: Number of Subjects in Each Condition
Believers Skeptics
Control Insults Control Insults
Control Graph 210 216 77 51
Hiatus Graph 207 188 63 70
3.2.4 Dependent Variables
I used two main dependent variables, Belief and Degrees
• Belief : Since 1850, there is a well-documented increase in global temperatures. Some
attribute this increase to human activity while others attribute it to natural causes.
Which comes closest to your view?
1. I believe that the increase is entirely due to natural causes
2. I believe that the increase is mostly due to natural causes
3. I believe that the increase is somewhat due to natural causes
4. I believe that the increase is equally due to human activity and natural causes
5. I believe that the increase is somewhat due to human activity
6. I believe that the increase is mostly due to human activity
7. I believe that the increase is entirely due to human activity
• Degrees: How many degrees do you believe the earth will warm over the next 100
years? (-1 to +3, slider)
These questions were of each subject twice, once immediately after the experimental
manipulation and a second time approximately 10 days later in a follow-up survey.
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3.3 Results
This section will present a series of analyses of increasing complexity, beginning with the
estimates of average effects of the information treatment and ending with estimates of the
conditional average treatment effects by skeptic/believer status and processing condition.
3.3.1 Average Treatment Effects
Table 3.2 presents estimates of the average treatment effect of the hiatus treatment on
the Belief and Degrees dependent variables, both with and without covariate adjustment.
The covariates include the processing conditions (insults or control) to which subjects were
randomly assigned as well as standard pre-treatment measures of demographics. In the first
column, I estimate that the hiatus treatment decreases the belief that global warming is
due to human activity by 0.17 scale points using difference-in-means estimation (p < 0.10)
The covariate-adjusted estimate, shown in the second column, is smaller in magnitude (0.10
scale point decrease, no longer statistically significant). I conclude from these results that
the average effect on Belief is likely to be in the correct direction but small.
The effects of treatment on the Degrees variable are similar. Without covariate ad-
justment, the effect is estimated to be a difference of 0.11 degrees; with adjustment it is
estimated to be 0.10 degrees. Both estimates are statistically significant at p < 0.05.
On average, the hiatus treatment causes subjects to become (marginally) more skeptical
of the idea that global warming is due to human activity and to predict a (slightly) smaller
increase in temperatures over the next 100 years.
3.3.2 Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Prior Beliefs
Many of the theoretical distinctions outlined above depend on subjects’ priors before en-
countering evidence. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the experimental results for believers and
skeptics separately. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3, both the unadjusted and adjusted
effects of the hiatus and insult treatments are presented. While covariate adjustment does
decrease the standard errors slightly, it does not help a great deal. As above, the effect of
the hiatus treatment is negative as is the effect of the insult treatment.
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Table 3.2: Average Treatment Effects on Belief and Degrees
Belief Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hiatus Treatment −0.173∗ −0.095 −0.114∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.094) (0.069) (0.049) (0.043)
Constant (Control) 5.061 3.592 1.747 1.402
(0.065) (0.231) (0.034) (0.138)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082
R2 0.003 0.478 0.005 0.274
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Columns 3 and 4 present the effects among skeptics. The effect of the hiatus treatment,
while negative, is not statistically significant. The effect appears larger among skeptics than
believers, but the difference between these coefficients (as tested with an interaction model)
is not itself statistically significant, so we cannot make confident claims about the difference
in effects for these two groups.
Table 3.3: Conditional Average Treatment Effects: Belief
Belief in Human-Caused Global Warming
Believers Believers Skeptics Skeptics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hiatus Treatment −0.100 −0.077 −0.169 −0.082
(0.071) (0.070) (0.191) (0.187)
Insult Treatment −0.076 −0.116∗ −0.290 −0.228
(0.071) (0.070) (0.191) (0.183)
Constant (Control) 5.632 5.440 3.405 4.061
(0.061) (0.198) (0.165) (0.511)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 821 821 261 261
R2 0.004 0.066 0.013 0.133
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A similar pattern in presented in Table 3.4: The effects of the hiatus treatment are
negative for both believers and skeptics but insignificant; the insult treatment does not
exert effects that are large enough to be distinguished from zero.
Table 3.4: Conditional Average Treatment Effects: Degrees
Predicted Increase in Global Temperatures
Believers Believers Skeptics Skeptics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hiatus Treatment −0.067 −0.059 −0.163 −0.157
(0.047) (0.046) (0.105) (0.107)
Insult Treatment 0.038 0.031 −0.122 −0.071
(0.046) (0.046) (0.104) (0.103)
Constant (Control) 1.926 2.087 1.135 1.847
(0.040) (0.129) (0.087) (0.287)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 821 821 261 261
R2 0.003 0.047 0.017 0.087
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
3.3.3 Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Processing Condition
and Prior Beliefs
The foregoing analysis considered the effects of the insult condition relative to the control
condition, averaging over the values of the hiatus treatment. However, the main purpose of
the study was to test for an interaction between a contentious reasoning environment and
the treatment information. Allowing for differences by prior beliefs and processing condition
requires a three-way interaction model: information by processing by prior beliefs. Such
models can be difficult to interpret when they are presented in regression tables, so I have
opted to present a series of conditional means in graphs in Figure 3.4, which follows a similar
format to Figure 3.2 for easy comparison.
In Figure 3.4, each panel represents the conditional mean of skeptics and believers, by
information condition and dependent variable. Most obviously, the baseline opinions of
skeptics and believers differ dramatically: skeptics’ average belief hovers around 3 where
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as the value is approximately 5.5 among believers. Similar differences are apparent for the
predictions about future warming. Turning now to the differences by information, we see
that the differences are consistently in the correct direction. In no cases is the control mean
higher than the hiatus treatment mean.
The first column of facets, corresponding to the control processing condition, looks very
similar to the column of facets corresponding to the insults processing condition; formal
statistical tests confirm this visual intuition. There do not appear to be any differences
in subjects’ response to information by processing condition – the insult preceding the
allocation of treatment information did not alter how these subjects interpreted the global
warming evidence.
3.4 Conclusion
The premise that “all reasoning is motivated” (Taber and Lodge 2006, p. 756) might lead
one to despair of the democratic process and of individuals’ capacity for reason. Some worry
that scientific evidence is counter-productive and that individuals, knowingly or not, might
become further entrenched when presented with evidence they do not like. The results of
this experiment show that this effect is difficult to uncover. As in the experiments reported
in Chapters 1 and 2, individuals – regardless of their initial position or the processing
condition to which they were randomly assigned – appeared to update their beliefs in the
direction of evidence.
The results of this experiment provide further evidence that if backlash does occur,
it occurs infrequently. The pattern of evidence appears to support the conclusion that
“correct”responses are far and away the most common reaction to information treatments.
As a description of everyday, commonplace responses to the sorts of persuasive messages
that are prevalent in the media, Bayesian reasoning performs remarkably well.
The past three chapters have demonstrated that persuasive effects are generally small,
positive, and homogeneous. The next two chapters explore the implications of these find-
ings for two questions of methodological interest. First, how well do survey experimental
estimates generalize from sample to sample? If effects are homogeneous, as these persuasive
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Figure 3.4: Effects on Belief and Degree, by Type, Treatment, and Processing
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effects appear to be, there are fewer dangers associated with extrapolating from one sample
to another. Second, how long do these effects last? By conducting additional rounds of
measurement, I am able to offer some preliminary results on the extent to which different
treatments endure.
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4 The Generalizability of Survey Experimental
Results
To what extent do survey experimental treatment effect estimates generalize to other pop-
ulations and contexts? Survey experiments conducted on convenience samples have often
been criticized on the grounds that subjects are sufficiently different from the public at large
to render the results of such experiments uninformative more broadly. In the presence of
moderate treatment effect heterogeneity, however, such concerns may be allayed. I provide
evidence from a series of 12 survey experiments that results derived from convenience sam-
ples like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk are similar to those obtained from national samples.
These results suggest that either the treatments deployed in these experiments cause similar
responses for many subject types or convenience and national samples do not differ much
with respect to treatment effect moderators. Using evidence of limited within-experiment
heterogeneity, I show that the former is likely to be the case. Despite a wide diversity of
background characteristics across samples, the effects uncovered in these experiments appear
to be relatively homogeneous.
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The generalizability of an experiment is the extent to which it generates knowledge
about causal relationships that is applicable beyond the narrow confines of the research
site. How much further beyond such confines results generalize is often a matter of great
scientific importance, and vigorous discussion of the generalizability of findings occurs across
all social scientific fields of inquiry (in economics: Levitt and List (2007); psychology: Sears
(1986); Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010), education: Tipton (2012); sociology: Lucas
(2003); and political science: McDermott (2002)).
The generalizability of an experiment is closely related to its replicability. If an experi-
ment is successfully replicated on a new sample that is drawn from a different population,
we learn that the results of the original experiment generalize to the new population. In
Clemens’ (2015) typology of replications, such a demonstration is an “extension.” If an
experiment is successfully replicated on a new sample drawn from the same population (a
“reproduction” in Clemens’ terms), we have confirmed that the original results were less
likely to be a fluke of sampling variability, but we have not learned much about the general-
izability of the finding itself. Both extensions and replications involve the same treatments
and outcome measures. By contrast, a “conceptual” replication alters both, thereby pos-
sibly changing the estimand. If a conceptual replication is successful, the extent to which
we have learned that a finding generalizes depends heavily on the strength of the analogy
between the treatments and outcome measures across studies. If a finding fails to replicate
in repeated extensions and reproductions, we can conclude that the finding does not gener-
alize (though we cannot, on this basis alone, conclude that the original finding was false or
incorrect).
Concerns about the generalizability (and therefore replicability) of findings usually fall
into one of two categories: criticisms of the experimental context and criticisms of the
experimental subjects. The first concern is a worry that an effect measured under exper-
imental conditions would not obtain in the “real world.” For example, a classic critique
of survey experiments that investigate priming is that the effect, while “real” in the sense
that priming has been shown to happen in the lab, is unimportant for the study of politics
because primes have fleeting effects and because political communication takes place in a
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competitive space where the marginal impact of a prime is likely to be canceled by a coun-
terprime (Chong and Druckman 2010). A similar question arises concerning the extent to
which laboratory behavior generalizes to the field. Because subjects in the laboratory may
respond to contextual clues and the obtrusive nature of the measurement, findings across
lab and field might be expected to diverge. Contrary to this expectation, an analysis of the
published record of paired lab and field studies finds a strong correlation of findings across
settings (Coppock and Green 2015).
Within political science, a point of some contention has been the increase in the use
of online convenience samples of experimental subjects, particularly samples obtained via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).1 Mechanical Turk respondents often complete dozens
of academic surveys over the course of a week, leading to concerns that such “professional”
subjects are particularly savvy or susceptible to demand effects (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer,
Mueller and Ratliff in press). These worries have been tempered somewhat by empirical
studies that find that the Mechanical Turk population responds in ways similar to other
populations (e.g., Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012b)), but concerns remain that subjects
on Mechanical Turk differ from other subjects in both measured and unmeasured ways.
In the present study, I contribute to the growing literature on the replicability of sur-
vey experiments across platforms, following in the footsteps of two closely-related studies.
Mullinix et al. (2015) replicate 20 experiments and find a high degree of correspondence
between estimates obtained on Mechanical Turk and on national probability samples, with
a cross-sample correlation of 0.75 (XXX when corrected for measurement error).2 Krup-
nikov and Levine (2014) find that when treatments are expected to have different effects by
subgroups, cross-sample correspondence is weaker. The correlation between the MTurk and
YouGov estimates is 0.41 (0.84 corrected).3 To preview the findings presented below, I find
1As noted by Krupnikov and Levine (2014), criticisms of MTurk are often made on blogs rather than in
academic journals. See, e.g., Kahan (2013).
2This figure obtained from private correspondence with the authors.
3I am grateful to Yanna Krupnikov for sharing the replication data for this study, from which this
correlation was calculated. In the course of reanalyzing the data, it was discovered that the statistical
routine originally used to compare samples overstated the confidence with which many of the YouGov/MTurk
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a strong degree of correspondence between national probability samples and Mechanical
Turk, with a cross-study correlation of 0.66 (0.83 corrected).
The remainder of this article will proceed as follows. First, I will present a theoreti-
cal framework that shows how the extent of treatment effect heterogeneity determines the
generalizability of findings to other places and times. I will then present replication results
from 12 studies, showing that in large part, original findings are replicated on both conve-
nience and probability samples. I attribute this strong correspondence to the overall lack of
treatment effect heterogeneity in these experiments; I conduct formal tests for unmodeled
heterogeneity to bolster this claim.
4.1 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity and Generalizability
Findings from one site are generalizable to another site if the subjects, treatments, contexts,
and outcome measures are the same – or would be the same – across both sites (Cronbach,
Shapiro et al. 1982; Coppock and Green 2015). I define a site as the time, place, and group
of units at and among which a causal process may hold. The most familiar kind of site is
the research setting, with a well defined group of subjects, a given research protocol, and
implementation team. Typically, the purpose of an experiment conducted at a given site
is to generalize knowledge to other sites where no experiment has been conducted. For
example, after an experiment conducted in one school district finds that a new curriculum
is associated with large increases in student learning, we use that knowledge to infer both
what would happen if the new curriculum were implemented in a different district, and
what must have happened in the places where the curriculum is already in place.
The inferential target of a survey experiment conducted on a national probability sample
of respondents is (often) the average treatment effect in the national population at a given
moment in time, the Population Average Treatment Effect (PATE). The site of such an
experiment might be an online survey administered to a random sample of adult Americans
in 2012. The inferential target of the same experiment conducted on a convenience sample
is a Sample Average Treatment Effect (SATE), where the sample in question is not drawn
differences could be deemed significant.
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at random from the population. The SATE and the PATE are not, in general, equal to
one another. If a treatment engenders heterogeneous effects such that the distribution of
treatment effects among those in the convenience sample is different from the distribution
in the population, then the SATE will likely be different from the PATE.
When treatments, contexts, and outcome measures are held constant across sites, the
generalizability of results obtained from one site to other sites depends on the degree and na-
ture of treatment effect heterogeneity. If treatments have constant effects (that is, treatment
effects are homogeneous), then the peculiarities of the experimental sample are irrelevant:
what is learned from any subgroup can be generalized to any other population of interest.
When treatments have heterogeneous effects, then the experimental sample might be very
consequential. In order to assert that findings from one site are relevant for another site, a
researcher must have direct or indirect knowledge of the distribution of treatment effects in
both sites.
To illustrate the relationship between generalizability and heterogeneity, consider Fig-
ure 4.1 below. It displays the potential outcomes and treatment effects for an entire pop-
ulation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario (represented in the left column of
panels), treatment effects are heterogeneous, whereas in the second scenario, treatment
effects are constant. The top row of panels displays the treated and untreated potential
outcomes of the subjects and the bottom row displays the individual-level treatment effects
(the difference between the treated and untreated potential outcomes).
An unobserved characteristic (U) of subjects is plotted on the horizontal axes of Fig-
ure 4.1. This characteristic represents something about subjects that is related to both
their willingness to participate in survey experiments and their political attitudes. In both
scenarios, U is negatively related to the untreated potential outcome (Y0): higher values are
associated with lower values of Y0. This feature of the example represents how convenience
samples may have different baseline political attitudes. Subjects on Mechanical Turk, for
example, have been shown to hold more liberal values than the public at large (Berinsky
et al. 2012b).
The untreated potential outcomes do not differ across scenarios, but the treated potential
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outcomes do. In scenario 1, effects are heterogeneous: higher values of U are associated with
higher treatment effects, though the relationship depicted here is nonlinear. In scenario 2,
treatment effects are homogeneous, so the unobserved characteristic U is independent of
the differences in potential outcomes.
In both scenarios, imagine that two studies are conducted: one that samples from the
entire population and a second that uses a convenience sample indicated by the shaded
region. The population-level study targets the PATE, whereas the study conducted with
the convenience sample targets a SATE. In scenario 1, the SATE and the PATE are different:
generalizing from one research site to the other would lead to incorrect inferences. Note
that this is a two-way street: with only an estimate of the PATE in hand, a researcher
would make poor inferences about the SATE and vice-versa. In scenario 2, the PATE and
SATE are the same: generalizing from one site to another would be appropriate.
Figure 4.1 illustrates four points that are important to the study of generalizability.
First, the fact that subjects may self-select into a study does not on its own mean that
a study is not generalizable. Generalizability depends on whether treatment effect het-
erogeneity is independent of the (observed and unobserved) characteristics that determine
self-selection. Second, even when baseline outcomes (Y0) are different in a self-selected
sample from some population, the study may still be generalizable. The relevant theoret-
ical question concerns the differences between potential outcomes (the treatment effects),
not their levels. Thirdly, when the characteristics that distinguish the population from
that sample are unobserved, the PATE may not be informative about the SATE, i.e., ex-
periments that target the PATE should not be privileged over those that use convenience
samples unless the PATE is truly the target of inference. Finally, it is important to dis-
tinguish systematic heterogeneity from idiosyncratic heterogeneity. When treatment effects
vary systematically with measurable subject characteristics, then the generalizability prob-
lem reduces to measuring these characteristics, estimating conditional average treatment
effects, then reweighting these estimates by post-stratification. This reweighting can lead
to estimates of either the SATE or the PATE, depending on the relevant target of inference.
However, when treatment effects vary according to some unobserved characteristic of sub-
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Figure 4.1: Implications of Treatment Effect Heterogeneity for Generalizability from
Convenience Samples
























0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Unobserved Heterogeneity (U). Only Units with U < 1/3 are Sampled.
Untreated Outcome Treated Outcome Treatment Effect
83
CHAPTER 4. THE GENERALIZABILITY OF SURVEY EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
jects (that also correlates with the probability of participation in a convenience sample),
then no amount of post-stratification will license the generalization of convenience sample
results to other sites.
4.2 Results I: Replications of 12 Survey Experiments
The approach I adopt in this chapter is to replicate surveys originally conducted on proba-
bility samples on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The experiments selected for replication came
in two batches. The first set of five (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz
2007; Transue 2007; Chong and Druckman 2010; Nicholson 2012) were selected for three
reasons. First, as evidenced by their placement in top journals, these studies addressed
some of the most pertinent political science questions. Second, these studies all had repli-
cation data available, either posted online, available on request, or completely described in
summaries published in the original article. Finally, they were all conducted on probability
samples drawn from some well-defined population. As shown in Table 4.1, the target pop-
ulation was not always the U.S. national population. For example, in Haider-Markel and
Joslyn (2001) the target of inference is the PATE among adult Kansans in 1999.
The second set of seven replications grew out of a collaboration with Time-Sharing Ex-
periments for the Social Sciences (TESS), an NSF-supported organization that funds online
survey experiments conducted on a national probability sample administered by GfK. These
studies are of high quality due in part to the peer-review of study designs prior to data col-
lection and to the TESS data-transparency procedures, by which raw data are posted one
year after study completion. I selected seven studies, four of which (Brader 2005; Nicholson
2012; McGinty, Webster and Barry 2013; Craig and Richeson 2014) I replicated on Mechan-
ical Turk, and three of which (Hiscox 2006; Hopkins and Mummolo 2015; Levendusky and
Malhotra 2015) I replicated both on Mechanical Turk and TESS/GfK. By and large, the
replications were conducted with substantially larger samples than the original studies. All
replications were conducted between January and September 2015.
The studies cover a wide range of issue areas – gun control, immigration, the death
penalty, the Patriot Act, home foreclosures, mental illness, free trade, health care, and
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Table 4.1: Study Manifest
Replications N
Citation Sampling Frame Original N MTurk TESS/GfK
Haider-Markel and
Joslyn (2001)
Kansans in 1999 (RDD) 518 1,010





Black and White Americans
in 2000-2001 (SRC)
1,182 1,176
Transue (2007) White Americans in the Twin




Americans in 2009 (Bovitz) 1,302 1,820
Nicholson (2012) Americans in 2008 (YouGov) 1,096 1,503
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polarization – and generally employ framing, priming, or information treatments designed
to persuade subjects to change their political attitudes. The particulars of each study’s
treatments and outcome measures are detailed in Appendix A. In most cases, the studies
employ multiple treatment arms and consider effects on a single dependent variable. In some
cases, however, a single treatment versus control comparison is considered with respect to
a range of dependent variables. All replications followed the original protocols with respect
to question wording and number of items. In some cases, not all dependent variables
were reported in the original publications; in such cases, I used the dependent variables as
reported. In other cases, (e.g., Brader (2005)), many dependent variables were measured; I
used my best judgment to decide which were the “main” outcome variables. I acknowledge
that these choices introduce some subjectivity into the analysis. Mullinix et al. (2015)
address this problem by focusing the analysis on the “first” dependent variable in each
study, as determined by the temporal ordering of the dependent variables in the original
TESS protocol. Their approach has the advantage of being automatically applicable across
all studies but is no less subjective.
A wide range of analysis strategies were used in the original publications, including
difference-in-means, difference-in-differences, ordinary least squares with covariate adjust-
ment, subgroup analysis, and mediation analysis. To keep the analyses comparable, I
reanalyzed all the original experiments using difference-in-means without conditioning on
subgroups or adjusting for background characteristics.4 Survey weights were incorporated
where available. In all cases, I employed the Neyman variance estimator, equivalent to a
standard variant of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Samii and Aronow 2012). I
used the identical specifications across each version of a study.
The study-by-study results are presented in Figure 4.2. On the horizontal axis of each
facet, I have plotted the point estimate of the ATE with 95% confidence intervals. The
scale of the horizontal axis is different for each study, for easy inspection of the within-
study correspondence across samples. On the vertical axes, I have plotted each treatment
4In the case of factorial designs, I used OLS to obtain a single set of coefficients for each factor, essentially
averaging over the other margins. In one case, I adjusted for blocks to account for the randomization scheme.
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versus control comparison, by study version. The top nine facets compare two versions of
each study (original and MTurk), while the bottom three compare three versions (original,
MTurk, and TESS/GfK). The coefficients are ordered by the magnitude of the original
study effects from most negative to most positive. This plot gives a first indication of the
overall success of the replications: in no cases do the replications directly contradict one
another, though there is some variation in the magnitudes of the estimated effects.
All together, I estimated 47 original-MTurk pairs of coefficients. Of the 28 coefficients
that were originally significant, 19 were significant in the MTurk replications, all with
the correct sign. Of the 19 coefficients that were not originally significant, 15 were not
significant in the MTurk replications either, for an overall replication rate (narrowly defined)
of (19 + 15)/(28 + 19) = 72%. In zero cases did two versions of the same study return
statistically significant coefficients with opposite signs. The match rate of the sign and
statistical significance of coefficients across studies is a crude measure of correspondence,
as it conflates the power of the studies with their correspondence. For example, if all pairs
of studies had a power of 0.05, i.e., they only had a 5% chance of correctly rejecting a false
null hypothesis of no average effect, then the match rate across pairs of studies would be
very high because nearly all coefficients would be deemed statistically insignificant.
A better measure of the “replication rate” is the correlation of the standardized coeffi-
cients. Rather than relying on the artificial distinction between significant and insignificant,
the correlation is a straightforward summary of the extent to which larger effects in the orig-
inal studies are associated with larger effects in the replications. One obstacle is that in the
presence of sampling error, correlation coefficients are biased towards zero. In an attempt
to combat this, I disattentuate the correlations using the procedure described in Chapter
1. In the case of these 12 pairs of studies (47 coefficients), the raw correlation between the
MTurk and original coefficients is 0.81. Corrected, this correlation increases to 0.84. This
correlation can be visually inspected in Figure 4.3, which plots each coefficient with 95%
confidence intervals for both the original and MTurk versions.
For the three studies replicated in parallel on MTurk and on fresh TESS/GfK samples
(Hiscox 2006; Hopkins and Mummolo 2015; Levendusky and Malhotra 2015), the replica-
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tion picture is even rosier. The raw correlation of the MTurk and original estimates is
0.94; TESS/GfK estimates with the MTurk estimates, 0.96; TESS/GfK with the original
estimates, 0.90. Corrected, all these correlations exceed 1.00.
All in all, these results show a strong pattern of replication across samples, lending
credence to the idea that at least for the sorts of experiments studied here, estimates
of causal effects obtained on Mechanical Turk samples in 2015 generalize to the national
population in 2015.
4.3 Results II: Testing the Null of Treatment Effect Homo-
geneity
What can explain the strong degree of correspondence between the Mechanical Turk and
probability sample estimates of average causal effects? It could be that effects are heteroge-
neous within each sample – but this heterogeneity works out in such a way that the average
effects across samples are approximately equal. This explanation is not out of the realm
of possibility, and future work should consider whether the conditional average treatment
effects (CATEs) estimated within well-defined demographic subgroups (e.g., race, gender,
and partisanship) also correspond across samples.
In this section, I will report the results of empirical tests of a second theoretical explana-
tion for the generalizabilty of these results across research sites: the treatments explored in
this series of experiments have constant effects. If effects are homogeneous across subjects,
then the differences in estimates obtained from different samples would be entirely due to
sampling variability.
Building on advances in Fisher permutation tests, Ding et al. (2015) propose a test of
treatment effect heterogeneity that compares treated and control outcomes with a modified
KolmogorovSmirnov (KS) statistic. The traditional KS statistic is the maximum observed
difference between two cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), and is useful for summa-
rizing the overall difference between two distributions. The modified KS statistic compares
the CDFs of the de-meaned treated and control outcomes, thereby removing the estimated
average treatment effect from the difference between the distributions and increasing the
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sensitivity of the test statistic to treatment effect heterogeneity.
The permutation test compares the observed values of the modified KS statistic to a
simulated null distribution. This null distribution is constructed by imputing the missing
potential outcomes for each subject under the null of constant effects, then simulating
the distribution of the modified KS statistic under a large number of possible random
assignments. One difficulty is choosing which constant effect to use for imputation. A
natural choice is to use the estimated ATE; however, as Ding et al. (2015) show, this
approach may lead to incorrect inferences. Instead, they advocate repeating the test for
all plausible values of the constant ATE and reporting the maximum p-value. In practice,
set of “all plausible” values of the ATE is approximated by the 99.99% confidence interval
around the estimated ATE.
This test, like other tests for treatment effect heterogeneity (Gerber and Green 2012, pp.
293-294), can be low-powered. To gauge the probability of correctly rejecting a false null
hypothesis, I conducted a small simulation study that varied two parameters: the number of
subjects per treatment arm and the degree of treatment effect heterogeneity. Equation 4.1
shows the potential outcomes function for subject i, where Zi is the treatment indicator and
can take values of 0 or 1, στ is the standard deviation of the treatment effects, and Xi is an
idiosyncratic characteristic, drawn from a standard normal distribution. The larger στ , the
larger the extent of treatment effect heterogeneity, and the more likely the test is to reject
the null of constant effects. To put στ in perspective, consider a treatment with enormous
effect heterogeneity: large positive effects of 0.5 standard units for half the sample, but large
negative effects of 0.5 standard units for the other half. In this case the standard deviation
of the treatment effects would be equal to 0.5. While the simple model of heterogeneity used
for this simulation study does not necessarily reflect how the test would perform in other
scenarios, it provides a first approximation of the sorts of heterogeneity typically envisioned
by social scientists.
Yi = 0 · Zi + στ ·Xi · Zi +Xi (4.1)
The results of the simulation study are presented in Figure 4.4. The MTurk versions of
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the experiments studied here typically employ 500 subjects per treatment arm, suggesting
that we would be well powered (power ≈ 0.8) to detect treatment effect heterogeneity on
the scale of 0.2 standard deviations, and moderately powered for 0.1 standard deviations
(power ≈ 0.6).
The main results of the heterogeneity test applied to the present set of 24 studies are dis-
played in Table 4.2. Among the original 12 studies, just 1 of the 55 treatment versus control
comparisons revealed evidence of effect heterogeneity.5 Among the Mechanical Turk repli-
cations, 7 of 55 treatments were shown to have heterogeneous effects. On the TESS/GfK
replications, a similar proportion (2 of 15) tests were significant. In only one case (Hiscox
2006), did the same treatment versus control comparisons return a significant test statistic
across samples. In order to guard against drawing false conclusions due to conducting many
tests, I present the number of significant tests after correcting the p-values by the Holm
correction (Holm 1979) in the last column of Table 4.2.6
Table 4.2: Tests of Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Study Site N Comparisons N Significant N Significant (Holm)
Original 55 1 0
Mechanical Turk 55 7 5
TESS/GfK 15 2 2
Far more often than not, we fail to reject the null of treatment effect homogeneity. Be-
cause we are relatively well-powered to detect politically-meaningful differences in treatment
response, I conclude from this evidence that the treatment-effect-homogeneity explanation
5The number of comparisons increases from 47 to 55 because this test cannot easily accommodate
averaging over the margins of a factorial design. In the case of a 2x2 factorial design, I would have estimated
two coefficients above but conducted three tests here.
6The Holm correction controls the family-wise error rate under the same assumptions as the more familiar
Bonferroni correction, but is strictly more powerful (Holm 1979). To implement the correlation, order the
m uncorrected p-values within a “family” from smallest to largest. Identify the smallest p-value for which
the following condition holds: pk ≤ kmα, where k indexes the p-values, and α is the target significance level.
The smallest p-value that meets this condition is insignificant, as are all larger p-values. All smaller p-values
are significant.
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of the correspondence across experimental sites is plausible.
4.4 Discussion
Levitt and List (2007, p. 170) remind us that “Theory is the tool that permits us to
take results from one environment to predict in another[.]” When the precise nature of
treatments varies across sites, we need theory to distinguish the meaningful differences from
the cosmetic ones. When the contexts differ across sites – public versus private interactions,
field versus laboratory observations – theory is required to generalize from one to the other.
When outcomes are measured differently, we rely on theory to predict how a causal process
will express itself across sites.
In the results presented above, I have not made theoretical claims about the differences
in treatments, contexts, or outcome measures across sites – they were all held constant by
design. The only remaining impediment to the generalizability of the survey experimental
findings from convenience samples to probability samples is the composition of the subject
pools. If treatments have heterogeneous effects, researchers have to be careful not to gener-
alize from a sample that has one distribution of treatment effects to populations that have
different distributions of effects.
Before this replication exercise (and others like it such as Mullinix et al. (2015) and
Krupnikov and Levine (2014)), social scientists had a limited empirical basis on which to
develop theories of treatment effect heterogeneity for the sorts of treatments explored here,
which by and large attempt to persuade subjects of policy positions. Within political sci-
ence, some theories predict heterogeneity by partisanship, political knowledge, and need for
cognition. Others, such as the theory of Bayesian updating offered in Chapter 2, predict
limited heterogeneity in persuasive treatment effects. Both within and across samples, the
treatments studied here have exhibited muted treatment effect heterogeneity. Whatever
differences (measured and unmeasured) there may be between the Mechanical Turk pop-
ulation and the population at large, they do not appear to interact with the treatments
employed in these experiments in politically meaningful ways. In my view, it is this lack of
heterogeneity that explains the overall correspondence across samples.
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I echo the concerns of Mullinix et al. (2015), who caution that the pattern of strong
probability/convenience sample correspondence does not imply that all survey experiments
can be conducted with opt-in Internet samples with no threats to inference more broadly.
Indeed, the crucial question is the extent of treatment effect heterogeneity. The weaker cor-
respondence findings of Krupnikov and Levine (2014) can be reconciled with those reported
here by noting that those authors had strong expectations of treatment effect heterogeneity
for some of their tests. Additionally, their experiments were conducted on relatively small
samples, implying that the observed correlation between MTurk and the national sample
treatment effect estimates (0.17) may be especially attenuated by measurement error.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the remarkable robustness of the experiments replicated
here. Concerns over p-hacking (Simonsohn, Nelson and Simmons 2014), fishing (Humphreys
et al. 2013), data snooping (White 2000), and publication bias (Franco, Malhotra and Si-
monovits 2014; Gerber, Malhotra, Dowling and Doherty 2010) have lead many to express a
great deal of skepticism over the reliability of results published in the scientific record (Ioan-
nidis 2005). An effort to replicate 100 papers in psychology (Open Science Collaboration
2015) was largely viewed as a failure, with only one-third to one-half of papers replicating,
depending on the measure. The raw Pearson correlation of original and replication was
0.51. By contrast, the empirical results in this set of experiments were largely confirmed.
The success of these replications could be due to a number of factors. First, a condition
for inclusion in my set of replications was the availability of the datasets (or sufficient sum-
mary statistics). It is possible that the availability of data post-publication is a marker for
study or research quality, which may be correlated with replicability. Second, the TESS
studies replicated here all went through pre-implementation peer review, which may have
increased quality on the front end. Finally, because all these studies have a similar design,
maintaining fidelity to the original protocols may have been easier than it was for the 100
psychology replications.
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5 The Persistence of Survey Experimental Treat-
ment Effects
Do treatments deployed in survey experiments have persistent effects? The prototypical
survey experiment collects background information, delivers experimental treatments, and
records outcomes all in the space of a few minutes. Survey experimental treatments may
cause real, underlying attitude change, or they may simply induce a temporary increase in
subjects’ probability of choosing one response over another. Further, some treatments may
have more persistent effects than others. I hypothesize that priming and framing treatments
that make certain considerations more accessible have fleeting effects whereas treatments
that make considerations newly applicable or provide new information persist longer. Results
from eighteen panel survey experiments show that on average, survey experimental treatment
effects persist after 10 days, albeit at approximately half their original magnitudes. This
suite of evidence also provides strong support for the theory that information treatments
have more persistent effects than framing treatments.
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The previous chapter examined the extent to which survey experiments shed light on
real-world political discourse, focusing on the generalizability or “external validity” of sur-
vey experimental investigations. This chapter addresses the separate, but related, issue of
treatment effect persistence. A common criticism of survey experiments is that they un-
cover real but fleeting effects. If so, the effects studied in survey experiments may be little
more than laboratory curiosities. In the words of Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk (2007, p. 6)
“The implications of survey-experimental results for politics depend crucially on how long
the effects last, with relevant periods measured in weeks, or months, not minutes.”
Why might survey experimental treatment effects fade? One hypothesis holds that large
initial effects are due to experimenter demand: subjects answer how they think researchers
want immediately after treatment, but do not face such pressure after some time has passed.
Another view is that subjects may simply forget the information provided to them in a
persuasive treatment. If it is the information itself that is responsible for short-term shifts
in attitudes, the effects should disipate as the memory of the treatments becomes more
distant. Framing treatments in particular are hypothesized to have fleeting effects because
subjects may naturally encounter counterframes in the days and weeks after treatment.
Understanding the persistence of persuasive effects is especially important in an era of
long electoral campaigns. If the effects of even very persuasive messages evaporate within a
few hours, then campaigns would be best served by not spending large amounts of money
on early advertisements, only to see those effects disappear by election day. If, however,
persuasive information can induce durable attitude change, the cumulative effects of two
years’ campaigning might have a substantial impact on election results.
Previous work has found mixed evidence on persistence. Those who find little or no
persistence include de Vreese (2004), who showed that subjects exposed to “strategic” news
about the enlargement of the EU reported higher (0.44 scale points, 5-point scale) political
cynicism than subjects who saw news focused on the issues surrounding enlargement. This
difference was almost non-existent in a follow up conducted one week later (0.02 scale
points). Similarly, Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that a special-interests frame increases
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support for a bill by 0.71 scale points (7-point scale); 10 days later this effect drops1 to
0.41. Mutz and Reeves (2005) report that videos featuring uncivil discourse decreased
political trust by 0.44 standard deviations relative to civil discourse videos but that the
difference (not reported) was no longer statistically significant approximately one month
after treatment.
Some survey experiments have found strong evidence of persistence: Tewksbury, Jones,
Peske, Raymond and Vig (2000) report that exposure to a pro-regulation news story in-
creased support for the regulation of hog farms by 24.1 percentage points relative to an
anti-regulation story; this difference remained at 25.2 percentage points three weeks later.
Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) show that a positive economic-benefit frame increased sup-
port for the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU by 1.1 scale points (7-point scale);
this effect was 0.93 a day later, 1.35 a week later, and 0.81 after two weeks.
These divergent results have led scholars to pose more nuanced theoretical questions. In-
stead of asking if survey experimental treatment effects persist in general, they ask, “Which
treatments exhibit stronger or weaker persistence?” Drawing on theories of framing, prim-
ing, and persuasion, Baden and Lecheler (2012) hypothesize that three features of an exper-
imental treatment in particular will influence its durability. Some primes and cues operate
by making subjects’ preexisting knowledge more accessible. Treatments that operate pri-
marily though this channel are hypothesized to have fleeting effects. Other treatments may
operate by making preexisting knowledge newly applicable. For example, drawing a con-
nection between a policy proposal and a social movement might induce subjects to consider
how the movement’s principles are applicable in the policy context. Such treatments may
persist longer. Finally, some treatments supply subjects with new information, possibly
leading to enduring belief change. Most treatments are likely to be a bundle of all three
processes – the idiosyncratic mix in each treatment may influence durability.
The Bayesian theory of persuasion elaborated in earlier chapters predicts that persuasive
1Approximately 50% of the sample completed the follow-up, leading to a loss of power to detect treatment
effects. The follow-up estimate is not significantly different from zero – or from the immediate estimate of
0.71.
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effects will last longer, the smaller the variance of subjects’ posterior views. That is, changes
in attitudes will last longer, when subjects are more certain of their “new” attitudes. In
the Bayesian framework, the process by which treatment effects decay is traced to subjects
organically encountering other relevant information in the intervening period between ex-
posure to a persuasive treatment and subsequent waves of measurement. Treatments that
make specific, well-reasoned persuasive arguments are predicted to decrease posterior vari-
ance and therefore should last longer than treatments that are more oblique. Additionally,
this theory predicts individual differences in the persistence of effects. Individuals’ posterior
variances are functions of their prior variances and their likelihood functions. Those with
small prior variances are harder to convince, but once persuaded, are predicted to stay con-
vinced. Those with more discriminating likelihood functions are predicted to have smaller
posterior variances as well. The Bayesian predictions for persistence are not at odds with
Baden and Lecheler (2012). Indeed, persuasive information should be posterior variance-
reducing, whereas the applicability and accessibility mechanisms are unlikely to affect the
certainty with which subjects hold their attitudes.
This framework underlines one major complication in the study of persistence: stronger
arguments may be associated both with larger initial effects and more enduring effects.
All else being equal, the stronger the persuasive argument, the larger the initial attitude
change and the smaller the posterior variance, suggesting a positive correlation between the
size of effects and their durability. However, a far less elaborate theory of persistence could
account for why some effects endure and others fade: big effects last and small effects do not.
In order distinguish between a Bayesian theory of persistence and this simpler argument,
a body of evidence with large effects generated by both strong and weak arguments is
required.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will describe the theoretical
framework alluded to above in greater detail. I will then describe how the set of treatments
used to explore durability were selected, the panel experimental design, and the statistical
model of persistence used here. I will then present results and interpret them in light of the
theoretical framework.
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5.1 Theory
The expectancy value model of attitudes (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Nelson, Oxley and
Clawson 1997; Zaller 1992; Chong and Druckman 2012) posits that subjects have a set
of considerations to which subjective weights are attached. When prompted by a survey
question, subjects take a weighted average of their considerations and return a response.
This framework can accommodate many of the types of treatments that are commonly
studied in survey experiments. Emphasis frames (Druckman 2001) are hypothesized to
affect responses by changing the weights, not the considerations themselves. Information
treatments, by contrast, change responses by furnishing subjects with new considerations
to take account of when offering a survey response. The manner in which survey responses
vary with framing or information treatments can therefore be modeled as:
Y (Z) ∼ f(W,C, Z, σY , . . .),
where Y is the survey response, W is a vector of weights attached to a vector of con-
siderations C, Z is an indictor for the treatment condition, and σY is a measure of prior
uncertainty that subjects have about the issue area. This description of how responses might
change is very general and includes “. . .” to indicate that many other factors influence at-
titudes. This model allows for complex interactions between Z, W, and C. Unfortunately
the flexibility of this model renders it difficult to work with when making predictions about
the relative durability of different treatments.




wj(Z) · cj ,
where Y is a simple weighted average of considerations. The weights wj are themselves re-
sponsive to Z, indicating that the weights attached to considerations might differ depending
on the treatment condition. In this model, there is no requirement that the weights wj sum
to 1. This choice reflects the theoretical possibility that the treatments themselves change
the amount of “attention” that a subject gives to a survey response. If a respondent has
been asked to carefully weigh a series of arguments for and against a proposition, the total
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amount of attention (weight) given to that response may be higher than if the subject were
solicited for a response without any additional context.
To illustrate how this model helps draw distinctions among treatments, suppose that all
subjects’ survey responses are a function of just three considerations, cA, cB, and cC , and
that the treatment indication Z can take three values: control, an emphasis frame or an
information treatment.
Response under control: Y (Z = 0) = 0.5 · cA + 0.2 · cB
Response under emphasis frame: Y (Z = 1) = 0.8 · cA + 0.2 · cB
Response under information treatment: Y (Z = 2) = 0.5 · cA + 0.2 · cB + 0.3 · cC
The baseline (control) responses are a weighted average of considerations cA and cB,
where the weights are 0.5 and 0.2. The responses under an emphasis are also a weighted
average of these two considerations, but cA is given a new weight, 0.8. Under an information
treatment, the weights on cA and cB remain unchanged, but a new consideration, cC , with
an associated weight of 0.3 is added.
With this notation in hand, we can define two estimands, the average treatment effect
framing and the average treatment effect of information. In this context, the expectation
operator E[·] denotes the true sample mean.
Average Framing Effect = E[Y (Z = 1)− Y (Z = 0)]
= (0.8 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB)− (0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB)
= 0.3 ∗ cA
Average Information Effect = E[Y (Z = 2)− Y (Z = 0)]
= (0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB + 0.3 ∗ cC)− (0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB) = 0.3 ∗ cC
The question under study here is, to what extent do these effects endure? In order to answer
this question, we must add a time dimension to our model. An attitude measured at time
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In this model, the weights are subscripted by consideration j and time t, and may be different
depending on treatment status (Z). Using this setup, I define the average persistence of an




E[Yt=2(Z = 1)− Yt=2(Z = 0)]
E[Yt=1(Z = 1)Yt=1(Z = 0)]
It should be emphasized that while this estimand is well defined, it is not equal to the average
of all individual-level ratios of time 1 effect to the time 2 effect because the expectation of
a ratio is not, in general, equal to the ratio of expectations. This non-equality is due to the
possible covariance between individuals’ treatment effects at time 1 with their treatment
effect at time 2. I recognize that this definition introduces a theoretical inconsistency: the
psychological processes hypothesized to be responsible for persistence take place at the
individual level but the persistence estimand is defined at the group level. Ultimately, this
inconsistency is unavoidable because of the fundamental problem of causal inference: we
can no more identify the covariance between effects at the individual level than we can
identify the effects themselves.
The average persistence estimand would be misleading in some scenarios. Imagine, for
example, that half the sample has a treatment effect of 1 at time 1 but 0 at time 2; the
other half has treatment effects of 0 at time 1 but 1 at time 2. For individuals in the
first group, the true persistence is 01 = 0; for individuals in the second group, the true
persistence is undefined: 10 . The average of these individual level persistences is likewise
undefined. The average persistence, however, is 0.50.5 = 1. By contrast, if treatment effects
were equal to 1 for the whole sample at time 1 and equal to 0.5 at time 2, then the














1 1 = 0.5.
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With this caveat in mind, I define the following persistence estimands:
Framing Effect Persistence =
E[Yt=2(Z = 1)− Yt=2(Z = 0)]
E[Yt=1(Z = 1)− Yt=1(Z = 0)]
=
(0.6 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB)− (0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB)







Information Effect Persistence =
E[Yt=2(Z = 2)− Yt=2(Z = 0)]
E[Yt=1(Z = 2)− Yt=1(Z = 0)]
=
(0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB + 0.2 ∗ cC)− (0.5 ∗ cA + 0.2 ∗ cB)







It is no accident that in the foregoing toy example, the information effect showed stronger
persistence than the framing effect. The assumption that changes in weights are less durable
than the addition of new considerations is central to the theory of treatment effect persis-
tence employed here.
This model can accommodate the theoretical predictions of treatment effect persistence
put forth by Baden and Lecheler (2012). Accessibility treatments are hypothesized to op-
erate primarily by increasing the weight given to a particular consideration. Because such
treatments only affect outcomes through the weighting scheme, they are hypothesized to
be fleeting. As an example of an accessibility treatment, consider the study described in
Transue (2007), replicated as Study 5 below. In that experiment, subjects were randomly
exposed to a treatment question that asked subjects: “How close do you feel to [your ethnic
or racial group]/[other Americans]?” The dependent variable was subjects’ attitudes toward
raising taxes for education; the treatment operates by increasing the weight given to ethnic
identity or superordinate identity when answering this question.
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Applicability frames also operate by changing the weights given to considerations, but
do so in a manner distinct from accessibility frames. In this model, subjects hold a set of
considerations in mind but the associated weights are attitude-specific. That is, consider-
ation cA may be given one weight when a subject is offering an attitude on gun control
but a different weight when responding to a question on national security. An applicability
frame works by linking the two attitudes, so that the considerations in common are given
greater weight. As an example of an applicability treatment, consider the frames employed
in Levendusky and Malhotra (2015), replicated below as Studies 12 and 13. Subjects are
exposed to news stories depicting the electorate as being either moderate or polarized. The
dependent variable is subjects’ attitudes toward four policies. The ancillary attitude is the
value subjects place on moderation in politics; the relevant considerations are given more
weight when responding to the policy questions.
Information treatments operate by adding new considerations. These treatments are
sometimes referred to as belief change treatments, a term I avoid so as to maintain a clear
distinction between the cause (information) and the effect (attitude change), although in
some instances, information treatments may persuade by changing beliefs. The treatments
in the capital punishment study explored in chapter 2 (Study 1 below) are examples of
information treatments: subjects were exposed to research reports on the efficacy of capital
punishment before registering their support or opposition to the practice.
Finally, I have cast framing treatments as operating on the weights and information
treatments as introducing new considerations, but there is no reason to imagine that a given
framing treatment could never introduce some new consideration or that an information
treatment does not influence the weights given to pre-existing considerations. Nevertheless,
the distinction is important to maintain in order to highlight the processes by which effects
may persist or decay.
This framework generates persistence predictions for the set of studies presented below.2
2The predictions for the 10 TESS replication studies (Studies 8 - 17) were pre-registered and posted
at http://egap.org/design-registration/registered-designs/. Study 3 did not employ a panel design
and is not included in this chapter.
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The descriptions below are limited to the bare-bones justifications for the associated pre-
dictions. See Appendix A for full descriptions of study design, including treatment stimuli,
number of subjects, and wording of dependent variables. Finally, scholars may reasonably
disagree about which set of mechanisms is primarily responsible for treatment effects, so I
will make the case for my own categorization while recognizing that others are possible as
well.
• Study 1: Capital Punishment
Treatments: Pro, con, or null social scientific evidence about the efficacy of capital
punishment in deterring crime.
Mechanisms: Information. The evidence was presented in graphs with accompanying
explanatory text.
Prediction: Strong persistence.
• Study 2: Minimum Wage
Treatments: Short web videos, two in favor of raising the minimum wave, two against
it, and two placebos.
Mechanisms: Information. The non-placebo treatments offered very detailed infor-
mation about the economics and politics of raising the minimum wage.
Prediction: Strong persistence.
• Study 4: Gun Control
Original study: Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001)
Treatments: Gun control question framing in terms of public safety or individual
rights.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. Safety and rights considerations are triggered by the frame.
Applicability. For some subjects, these considerations may be newly applicable to the
gun control debate. Information The questions also contained a small dose informa-
tion about a concealed carry gun law.
Prediction: Moderate persistence. With hindsight, I would change this prediction
to weak persistence, since the applicability and information channels are so thin. I
nevertheless group this study with the “moderate” predictions in the analyses that
follow.
• Study 5: Superordinate Identity
Original study: Transue (2007)
Treatments: Primes that activate either particularistic (racial/ethnic) or superordi-
nate (national) identity.
Mechanisms: Accessibility The treatment makes one identity more salient or accessi-
ble, but does not create new associative links or offer new information.
Prediction: Weak persistence.
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• Study 6: Patriot Act
Original study: Chong and Druckman (2010)
Treatment: Pro or con information about the Patriot Act.
Mechanisms: Information. Subjects are directly given facts about the Patriot Act.
Accessibility. The information framed to activate some pre-existing considerations
such as individual freedom. Applicability. The information may also create links
between considerations such as surveillance and national security.
Prediction: Strong persistence.
Of the replications, this was the only original study to measure outcomes at multiple
points in time – the strong persistence prediction, therefore, is made with the benefit
of knowing beforehand that the effects did indeed persist for 10 days originally.
• Study 7: Elite Endorsements
Original study: Nicholson (2012)
Treatments: Policy proposals with partisan endorsement cues.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. These cues may make considerations of partisan loyalty
more accessible but do not apply, for example, Democratic party values to new issue
areas. Information. This treatment may also operate by giving subjects the novel
information that someone they respect (or despise) endorses a proposal. This sort
of information is qualitatively different from information that, for example, informs
subjects of the policy’s expected benefits.
Prediction: Weak persistence.
• Studies 8 and 9: Free Trade A and B
Original study: Hiscox (2006)
Treatments: Valence frames, which describe why some Americans do or do not sup-
port free trade, and an expert frame, which states that professional economists are
united in their support for free trade.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. The valence frames prompt subjects to give negative or
positive economic considerations extra weight. Information Subjects learn that pro-
fessionals in this complicated area appear united on this question.
Prediction: Moderate persistence.
• Studies 10 and 11: Frame Breadth A and B
Original study: (Hopkins and Mummolo 2015)
Treatments: Pro-conservative statements by U.S. senators.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. These treatments operate by making terrorism, crime,
health care costs, or wasteful spending more salient when answering budget questions,
though the senators do provide information in their arguments.
Prediction: Weak persistence. In hindsight (but also with the benefit of having seen
the results) I would now predict moderate persistence for these treatments in view
of their information content, though a weak prediction was pre-registered. In the
analysis below, the pre-registered predictions will be used to evaluate the theoretical
framework.
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• Studies 12 and 13: Polarization A and B
Original study: Levendusky and Malhotra (2015)
Treatments: Articles depicting politics as polarized or moderate.
Mechanisms: Applicability. If subjects place a value on being “moderate” or “reason-
able” members of the electorate, and this value is made more salient via the polarized
treatment, then this consideration will be made newly applicable to the policy ques-
tions.
Prediction: Moderate persistence.
• Study 14: Immigration
Original study: Brader (2005)
Treatments: Positive or negative newspaper stories on immigration featuring either
Latino or European immigrants.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. The articles are intended to heighten racial considerations
when providing immigration policy preferences. Information. The accompanying text
also includes some information about, variously, the positive or negative economic
effects of immigration.
Prediction: Moderate persistence.
• Study 15: System Threat
Original study: (Craig and Richeson 2014)
Treatments: A frame highlighting the increasing population share of minorities.
Mechanisms: Accessibility. The treatment may trigger respondents’ racial anxieties.
Prediction: Weak persistence.
• Study 16: Expert Economists
Original study: Johnston and Ballard (2014) Treatments: Subjects are provided the
consensus view among economists for various policy proposals. Mechanisms: Infor-
mation. Subjects are given information about expert views on these five policies.
Accessibility. Subjects are more or less told which answer is the “correct” one. If the
first mechanism is at work, the treatment ought to have enduring effects. If effects
are primarily due to the second mechanism, effects should be fleeting. Overall, I view
this treatment as operating through the accessibility channel: the “correct” answer is
more accessible at the moment of providing a survey response.
Prediction: Weak persistence.
• Study 17: Mental Illness
Original study: McGinty et al. (2013)
Treatments: Newspaper vignettes depicting a mass shooting and providing policy pro-
posals.
Mechanisms: Accessiblity. One treatment (the story depicting the shooting) oper-
ates by highlighting considerations about gun violence. Information. The second
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• Study 18: Contentious Global Warming
Treatments: Graphs that showed a scientific consensus about warming trends or evi-
dence of a warming “hiatus”.
Mechanisms: Information. The treatment explicitly furnishes subjects with new in-
formation about warming trends.
Prediction: Strong persistence.
• Study 19: Newspapers
Treatments: Newspaper op-ed pieces on five policy areas.
Mechanisms: Information. The op-eds make extended arguments in favor of a partic-
ular policy.
Prediction: Strong persistence.
In this experiment, three waves of post-treatment measurement were conducted, so I
will provide a more detailed explanation of this study below. I also note that the de-
sign of this study was strongly influenced by (Hopkins and Mummolo 2015), replicated
here as Studies 10 and 11.
5.2 Research Approach
The 18 studies enumerated above share many common design elements. The majority of
the studies (15) were conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, with the remainder (3)
conducted on a nationally-representative survey administered by GfK. Four of the studies
conducted on Mechanical Turk are original: the capital punishment and minimum wage
experiments featured in Chapter 2, the contentious global warming experiment discussed in
Chapter 3, and the op-eds experiment explored in chapter 4. The remaining fourteen exper-
iments are replications of other authors’ work. Four (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Tran-
sue 2007; Chong and Druckman 2010; Nicholson 2012) were chosen for two main reasons.
First, as evidenced by their placement in top political science journals, they are well-crafted
and theoretically important. Second, because they employ text-based treatments, they are
directly replicable. Many other prominent survey experiments (e.g., Nelson, Clawson and
Oxley (1997); Mutz and Reeves (2005); Brader (2005)) present subjects with short videos
that, for example, depict political debates or advertisements. The original materials for
such experiments are sometimes no longer available and further, may appear out-of-date to
contemporary audiences.
Seven studies originally conducted by other authors on the Time-Sharing Experiments
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in the Social Sciences (TESS) platorm were also selected for replication. I chose these seven
studies because they met the following criteria:
1. The original experiments showed precisely estimated and substantively large immedi-
ate average treatment effects. In the absence of so-called “sleeper effects” (Hovland,
Lumsdaine and Sheffield 1949; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Cook and Flay 1978), unam-
biguous immediate effects are required for the study of persistence.
2. The experiments did not employ vignettes or hypothetical candidate scenarios. Asking
“Do you prefer Candidate A or Candidate B” after 10 days has no meaning without
re-displaying the stimuli, i.e., re-treating subjects.
3. The frames were sufficiently relevant to present-day (2015) politics. Experiments
that relied on subjects’ presumed familiarity with, for example, the 2008 presidential
election, could not be directly replicated.
4. The original authors provided a clear study description or write-up on the TESS
website. I did not pursue the few studies lacking this information. In their study of
the TESS database, Franco et al. (2014) showed that null results were far less likely
to be written up, suggesting that the studies excluded for this reason would probably
have been excluded for point 1 had more information been available in any case.
Three of the TESS studies (Hiscox 2006; Hopkins and Mummolo 2015; Levendusky and
Malhotra 2015) were replicated in parallel on Mechanical Turk and GfK. The other four
TESS replications (Brader 2005; Craig and Richeson 2014; Johnston and Ballard 2014;
McGinty et al. 2013) were conducted on Mechanical Turk only.3
The experiments all followed a similar panel survey experimental design.4 In wave 1,
subjects answered a battery of demographic questions, were exposed to their randomly-
assigned treatments, and then responded to questions whose answers constituted the out-
come variables. The average time spent on wave 1 surveys was between 5 and 10 minutes.
Wave 2 occurred approximately 10 days after treatment and consisted only of the depen-
dent variables. The Mturk studies were executed with the assistance of the MTurkR package
for R (Leeper 2015). In an effort to guard against a possible artifact in which subjects
3See chapter 4 for an exploration of the extent to which convenience and probability samples yield similar
results.
4Studies 1 and 2 also included a pre-treatment survey before wave 1.
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simply remember how they previously answered questions, in some studies, innocuous fea-
tures of the question presentation were manipulated. For example, in Studies 8-14, whether
follow-up response options were displayed vertically or horizontally was randomly varied.
Similarly, in one study (Study 19: Newspapers), half the sample was exposed to an addi-
tional op-ed treatment in order to defend against a demand effect in which subjects merely
remember what they think the experimenters want to hear. The results of these manipula-
tions (not reported here) are negligible, suggesting that these alternative explanations for
persistence are not at work.
5.2.1 Measuring Persistence
When discussing the duration of treatment effects, it is common to dichotomize effects into
those that persist and those that do not (Druckman and Nelson 2003; de Vreese 2004; Mutz
and Reeves 2005). For example, if a treatment caused a statistically significant shift in
outcomes at time 1, but the time 2 estimate is not statistically significant, the treatment
effect is said to “not persist.” While this categorization may have some heuristic value, the
approach taken here is to measure the percentage of the treatment effect measured at time
1 still present at time 2.
In the expressions below, YT1,i and YT2,i represent the outcome for subject i at time
1 and 2, respectively. Zi is subject i’s treatment assignment; the average treatment effect
(ATE) at time 1 is represented by α1 and the ATE at time 2 by β1. The error terms εi and
ηi represent idiosyncratic variation in the outcome variables not accounted for by Zi.
YT1,i = α0 + α1Zi + εi
YT2,i = β0 + β1Zi + ηi
The ratio of β1 to α1 is our metric of treatment effect persistence, γ, that is, the
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I estimate α1 and β1 separately by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of out-
comes on the treatment indicator. I estimate γ by calculating the ratio of β̂1 to α̂1, and
obtain standard errors and confidence intervals via the nonparametric bootstrap. Because
γ is a ratio, when α̂1 is very close to zero, persistence estimates may be correspondingly
very large, and further, are very unstable, swinging from extremely large positive values to
extremely large negative values. To combat this problem, I trim off the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles of the bootstrap samples before computing standard errors. This operation has a
very small influence on the resulting confidence interval estimates, but constrains estimates
of standard errors to a reasonable range of values. In practice, these standard errors are
slightly larger than those that result from two-stage least squares, a parametric model that
corresponds to this setup.
Another complication attending to the estimation of treatment effect persistence is panel
attrition. If not all subjects respond to the survey at time 2, then estimates of β1 (and
therefore γ) may be biased. I address this problem with an assumption about the sample
distribution of subject types. Subjects have a set of potential outcomes R that may differ
depending on their treatment assignment. For example Ri(Zi = 1) describes the subject i’s
reporting status when i is in treatment (Zi = 1). If this quantity is equal to 1, i reports in the
second round and not otherwise. Subjects who never report in the second round, regardless
of treatment status (Ri(Zi) = 0) are called “Never-reporters.” Subjects who always report,
regardless of treatment status (Ri(Zi) = 1) are called “Always-reporters.” Similarly, types
such as “If-treated reporters” and “If-untreated reporters” are theoretically possible. These
experiments, however, all have more than two treatment arms, so the possible number of
subject types quickly becomes unwieldy. In the analyses that follow, subjects are assumed
to be either Never-reporters or Always-reporters.5 The estimates of over-time persistence
only pertain to the Always-reporters. For this reason, α1 (the immediate effect of treatment)
will be estimated among Always-reporters only as well.
5See Aronow, Coppock, Gerber, Green and Kern (2015) for an alternative estimation strategy for Studies
12 and 13 (Polarization) that makes fewer assumptions.
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5.3 Results
In this section, I present summaries of the persistence of effects for all studies. To ease
interpretation, all outcome variables were standardized by subtracting off the control group
mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. In Study 7 (Elite Endorse-
ments), the ordinal dependent variable is rescaled to take numeric values between -1 and 1
in order to apply this standardization procedure.
Figure 5.1 plots standardized time 1 treatment effect estimates on the horizontal axis
and time 2 estimates on the vertical axis, separately for each study. Points lying on the
45 degree line represent perfect persistence: the time 2 estimate is the same as the time 1
estimate. Points above the 45 degree line indicate that the effect strengthened over time
and points below indicate that the treatment effect decayed over time. Figure 5.1 shows a
great deal of variation in persistence from study to study. Study 1 (Capital Punishment)
shows a very strong degree of persistence: effects that are strongly positive in time 1 are
strongly positive in time 2. Study 4 (Gun Control) featured a very robust time 1 estimate;
this effect evaporates completely by time 2.
Figure 5.2 plots estimates of γ, the percentage of the time 1 effect still present at time
2 separately for each treatment/dependent variable combination. When the estimate of
α, the effect of treatment at time 1, is very small (or imprecisely estimated), estimates of
γ become very unstable. In some cases, the estimate is far outside the -1.5 to 1.5 range
displayed on the plot. The vertical line represents the precision weighted average of the
effects in each study, and the vertical shading displays the 95% confidence interval implied
by the standard error6 of the weighted average (Gerber and Green 2012, p. 356). In all 18
studies, the weighted average of the persistence estimates is positive and the 95% confidence
interval does not cross zero in 10 of these studies.
6The calculation of this standard error relies on the assumption that the observations are independent of
one another; they are not. In the case of multiple treatment arms, effects are all assessed relative to the same
control group. In the case of multiple outcome variables, estimates compare the same subjects on multiple
dimensions, necessarily introducing dependence among them. Both of these features will produce a positive
covariance, implying that the variance estimates presented in the graph are slightly anti-conservative.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the same persistence estimates in two related ways. The
points in Figure 5.2 can be thought of as the ratio of the y-axis to the x-axis in Figure 5.1.
The slope of the points in Figure 5.1 is a summary of the overall persistence within a study,
similar to the weighted average summary represented by the vertical lines in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.1 presents persistence estimates of γ and associated standard errors for each
treatment effect. These estimates are identical to the estimates that would be obtained
by dividing the y-axis by the x-axis in Figure 5.1. As indicated by the sometimes large
standard errors, these estimates can be quite imprecise. A meta-analytic summary of all
studies is obtained by taking a weighted average of the estimates, where the weights are the
inverse of the squared standard errors (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins and Rothstein 2009, p.
65). The overall estimate is 44% with a standard error of 2%.
Table 5.1: Average Persistence of 18 Studies
Study Average Persistence SE Prediction
Study 7 Elite Endorsements -0.03 0.48 Weak
Study 16 Expert Economists 0.15 0.04 Weak
Study 10 Frame Breadth GfK 0.21 0.14 Weak
Study 15 System Threat 0.33 0.34 Weak
Study 11 Frame Breadth Mturk 0.60 0.15 Weak
Study 5 Superordinate Identity 0.99 1.14 Weak
Study 4 Gun Control -0.06 0.32 Moderate
Study 8 Free Trade GfK 0.12 0.17 Moderate
Study 13 Polarization Mturk 0.22 0.09 Moderate
Study 12 Polarization GfK 0.28 0.12 Moderate
Study 9 Free Trade Mturk 0.49 0.08 Moderate
Study 14 Immigration 0.62 0.36 Moderate
Study 17 Mental Illness 0.87 0.31 Moderate
Study 19 Newspapers 0.52 0.03 Strong
Study 6 Patriot Act 0.61 0.17 Strong
Study 2 Minimum Wage 0.62 0.06 Strong
Study 18 Contentious Global Warming 0.84 0.44 Strong
Study 1 Capital Punishment 0.93 0.08 Strong
All Studies 0.44 0.02
To what extent are the predictions of the theoretical framework presented above borne
out? Using the study-specific summaries presented in Table 5.1, I take the average of
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Figure 5.1: Standardized Average Treatment Effect Estimates: Time 1 versus Time 2
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Figure 5.2: Persistence Estimates for 18 Studies
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studies in each prediction category (weak, moderate, strong), weighting each study’s average
persistence by the inverse of its squared standard error. The table shows that on average,
studies predicted to have weak persistence were at 18% of their original strength after 10
days. Those predicted to have moderate persistence were at 34% the original magnitude,
while studies with a strong persistence prediction were at 58% of the time 1 effect at
time 2. The differences across the prediction groups are all statistically significant at p <
0.01. Broadly speaking, these results confirm the predictions generated by the theoretical
framework described above.
Table 5.2: Average Persistence, Pooled by Prediction




5.3.1 Alternative Explanation: Big Effects Persist?
To what extent can these results be explained by the more parsimonious theory that “big
effects persist; small ones do not?” Figure 5.3 shows that this theory fails to provide
meaningful insight into why some effects persist and others do not. On the x-axis, the
effect size estimated at time 1 (in absolute value) is presented; the persistence estimate
is on the y-axis. If the “big effects” theory of persistence were true, we would observe a
positive correlation in these data. The relationship between these two variables, however, is
essentially flat. The deviations from this flat relationship are highly heteroskedastic – the
variance of the persistence estimates gets larger as the time 1 estimate gets weaker. Stated
another way, the variance of a ratio estimate increases as the denominator gets closer to
zero.
5.4 Long Term Stability
The persistence results presented thus far suggest that treatment effects decline to approx-
imately half their original strength after 10 days. If effects continue to decay at the same
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Figure 5.3: Magnitude of T1 ATE Versus Persistence
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rate, we might project that they dissipate entirely after 20 days. Alternatively, effects might
exhibit some measure of proportional decay, resulting in 25% strength after 20 days, 12.5%
strength after 30 days, and so on. In order to trace a fuller picture of the rate of decay, we
need to measure outcomes at more points in time.
One of the studies (Study 17: Newspapers) included in the batch of 18 analyzed above
included a third wave of post-treatment measurement after 30 days. That study employed
a 6-group design: 5 groups that read an op-ed on a particular policy area and one control
group. All subjects answered a series of questions in each issue area. These questions were
combined into a composite scale using principal components analysis. Question wordings
and details of scale construction are available in Appendix A.
Figure 5.4 displays the results of this experiment. In each panel, the average outcomes
for a single policy area are shown on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis is the number of
days since treatment, and displays three measurements for each of the six randomly-formed
groups: immediately after reading the op-eds, 10 days after treatment, and 30 days after
treatment.
The pattern of results is extraordinarily consisent across all five issue areas. The group
that was treated with the issue-specific op-ed has much higher outcomes immediately after
zero; the remaining groups cannot be distinguished from control. After 10 days, as we saw
above, treatment effects decay to 52.1% (SE=2.4%) their original magnitudes. Remarkably,
there appears to be very little further decay appears to take place between 10 days and 30
days after treatment. After 30 days, average persistence declines to 50.0% (SE = 2.4%),
indicating that the change in treatment effect persistence between day 10 and day 30 is not
statistically significant.
These results suggest a “hockey stick” pattern of decay: after an initial decline, subse-
quent decreases are smaller. This pattern can be reconciled with the larger theoretical setup
described above: when new considerations are introduced, they arrive with artificially high
weights attached. Over time, these weights “settle,” but the consideration itself remains in
the mind of the subject. This conjecture should be subjected to further empirical testing
in experiments that track subjects’ responses to treatment over longer periods of time.
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5.5 Discussion
The results from this diverse set of studies yields a striking summary conclusion: on average,
survey experimental treatment effects are approximately half their immediate size after 10
days. The challenge set by Gaines et al. (2007) was to demonstrate that survey experimental
estimates of effects are politically relevant by showing that such effects endure beyond
the few minutes it takes to complete a public opinion survey. By that standard, I have
demonstrated that persuasive treatments of the kind studied here likely do have important
and long-lasting impacts on political discourse.
The theoretical framework above predicted that treatments that operate primarily by
making considerations more accessible would have fleeting effects, and treatments that
operate by creating new associations or providing new information would last longer. This
pattern was confirmed: the treatments in studies 1, 2, 6, 18 and 19 provided subjects with
new information and all had strongly persistent effects. Studies 7 and 15 were predicted
to increase the accessibility of certain considerations; the effects of these treatments appear
not to have persisted after 10 days.
These results also offer an opportunity to revisit the large literature in psychology on
the so-called “sleeper effect” (Hovland et al. 1949; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Cook and Flay
1978), in which initially null effects would blossom into strong effects in time. The proposed
mechanism is that subjects would forget why they initially discounted some new piece of
information; when the discounting falls away, the information would exert some persuasive
influence. Attempts to document the existence of the sleeper effect have usually failed.
Consistent with this line of evidence, none of the studies reported here saw an initially null
result that became statistically significant. I do grant, however, that a determined advocate
of the sleeper effect would rightly point out that the required theoretical conditions are
probably not present in these experiments.
These results indicate that the psychological mechanisms of accessibility, applicability,
and new information may indeed play a role in the persistence of treatment effects; they
also may play a role in the strength of treatment effects measured immediately. However,
the treatments in this set of studies do not only vary along these dimensions. For example,
120
CHAPTER 5. THE PERSISTENCE OF SURVEY EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
EFFECTS
each one is concerned with a different issue area. Further, some deliver treatments as
questions and others as statements. In order to determine the extent to which each of these
mechanisms influences persistence, it would be preferable to hold all other features of the
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A Study Manifest
A.1 Study 1: Capital Punishment
This study was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Guess. It embeds a replication
of the Lord et al. (1979) laboratory demonstration in a larger random-assignment study.
The results of the experiment indicate that presenting subjects with pro or con information
about capital punishment changed both their beliefs about and support for the policy.
Sample: 683 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 2, 628 in wave 3. In wave 1, pre-treatment
attitudes and beliefs were measured and treatments were allocated in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: May 2014.
Treatments: There were six sets of experimental stimuli: The content of the reports could
be Pro, Con, or Null, and the study methodology could be time series or cross sectional.
Each report contained two sections: Subjects were first presented study summaries, then
study details and criticisms. Subjects saw two sets of evidence. In total, subjects could be
assigned to one of 18 combinations of treatments, as shown in the table below. Conditions
7, 8, 11, and 12 correspond to the conditions to which subjects could be assigned in the
original Lord et al. (1979) experiment.
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Table A.1: Capital Punishment Treatment Conditions
1st Study 2nd Study
Content Method Content Method Condition Info Content N
1 Con Cross Con Time Con Con -2 62
2 Con Time Con Cross Con Con -2 54
3 Con Cross Null Time Con Null -1 31
4 Con Time Null Cross Con Null -1 30
5 Null Cross Con Time Con Null -1 28
6 Null Time Con Cross Con Null -1 26
7 Con Cross Pro Time Pro Con 0 26
8 Con Time Pro Cross Pro Con 0 36
9 Null Cross Null Time Null Null 0 67
10 Null Time Null Cross Null Null 0 45
11 Pro Cross Con Time Pro Con 0 23
12 Pro Time Con Cross Pro Con 0 33
13 Null Cross Pro Time Pro Null 1 28
14 Null Time Pro Cross Pro Null 1 32
15 Pro Cross Null Time Pro Null 1 32
16 Pro Time Null Cross Pro Null 1 28
17 Pro Cross Pro Time Pro Pro 2 49
18 Pro Time Pro Cross Pro Pro 2 53
18 Pro Pro Time Cross Pro Pro 2 53
A.1.1 Experimental Materials: Study Summaries
• Pro Time
Kroner and Phillips (2012) compared murder rates for the year before and the year
after adoption of capital punishment in 14 states. In 11 of the 14 states, murder rates
were lower after adoption of the death penalty.
This research supports the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
• Con Time
Kroner and Phillips (2012) compared murder rates for the year before and the year
after adoption of capital punishment in 14 states. In 11 of the 14 states, murder rates
were higher after adoption of the death penalty.
This research opposes the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
• Null Time
Kroner and Phillips (2012) compared murder rates for the year before and the year
after adoption of capital punishment in 14 states. In 5 of the 14 states the murder
rate was lower after adoption of capital punishment laws. Another 5 of the 14 states
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showed the opposite pattern. In the remaining states, there was no change in the
murder rate before and after the adoption of capital punishment laws.
This research is inconclusive regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
• Pro Cross Palmer and Crandall (2012) compared murder rates in 10 pairs of neigh-
boring states with different capital punishment laws. In 8 of the 10 pairs, murder
rates were lower in the state with capital punishment. This research supports the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.
• Con Cross Palmer and Crandall (2012) compared murder rates in 10 pairs of neigh-
boring states with different capital punishment laws. In 8 of the 10 pairs, murder
rates were higher in the state with capital punishment. This research opposes the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.
• Null Cross Palmer and Crandall (2012) compared murder rates in 10 pairs of neigh-
boring states with different capital punishment laws. In 4 of the 10 pairs, murder
rates were lower in the state with capital punishment. In 4 of the 10 pairs, murder
rates were higher in the state with capital punishment. In the remaining two pairs,
murder rates were the same in both states. This research is inconclusive concerning
the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
A.1.2 Experimental Materials: Study Details and Criticism
The format of the Study Details and Criticism section was the same in all conditions. Sub-
jects first saw a description of the debate over capital punishment, followed by a description
of the research design employed by the fictitious researchers. The next page of the survey
presented the conclusions, table, and graph. The final page contained a critique of the
design and a summary of a replication study (which always confirmed the original results).
There are two main differences between these stimuli and those used by Lord et al.: First,
the original study did not include either of the Null study reports. Second, the fictitious
publication dates were 1977 for the main study, and 1978 for the replication. I also updated
the tables and graphs using modern statistical software.
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Pro Time Series Details and Criticism
Can crime be prevented by the death penalty?
In recent years there has arisen a great public debate over whether or not capital pun-
ishment (the death penalty) is effective in preventing murders. Those who favor capital
punishment claim that the death penalty acts as a deterrent by reminding the potential
murderer of the possible consequences, whereas those who oppose capital punishment claim
that such officially sanctioned killing by the state sets a violent example that will produce
murders that might have been avoided. A recent research effort attempted to shed light on
this continuing debate.
The researchers (Kroner and Phillips, 2012) noticed that within the past twelve years
fourteen states have passed capital punishment laws or reinstated the death penalty. They
reasoned that if capital punishment laws deter murders, the murder rate should have been
higher for the year just before the adoption of the death penalty than for the year just after
the adoption of death penalty in each of these states.
The results, shown in the table and graph below, were that in 11 of the 14 states the
murder rate was lower after adoption of capital punishment laws than before the adoption
of capital punishment laws. The researchers concluded that the death penalty does act to
deter murderers.
Critics of the study have complained that the crime rate in general dropped significantly
in many of the states studied during the two-year period surrounding the legal change, and
that they may be able to show that murder rates, when expressed as a percentage of all
crimes, actually increased following the adoption of capital punishment (though they present
no supporting data).
In addition, they pointed out that many other factors may have changed in addition to
the adoption of the death penalty, drawing attention especially to the fact that several of
the states studied had made parole more difficult for convicted murderers at the same time
that they adopted or reinstated capital punishment laws, thus accounting for all or part of
the changes.
Kroner and Phillips (2013) have recently replied to this last criticism by stating that
several of the states included in their study had also adopted more lenient parole procedures,
thus balancing the states that have become stricter on paroles.
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Murder Rate in 14 States for One Year Before and After Adoption of Capital Punishment
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Table reproduced with permission from Kroner and Phillips (2012)
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Con Time Series Details and Criticism
Can crime be prevented by the death penalty?
In recent years there has arisen a great public debate over whether or not capital pun-
ishment (the death penalty) is effective in preventing murders. Those who favor capital
punishment claim that the death penalty acts as a deterrent by reminding the potential
murderer of the possible consequences, whereas those who oppose capital punishment claim
that such officially sanctioned killing by the state sets a violent example that will produce
murders that might have been avoided. A recent research effort attempted to shed light on
this continuing debate.
The researchers (Kroner and Phillips, 2012) noticed that within the past twelve years
fourteen states have passed capital punishment laws or reinstated the death penalty. They
reasoned that if capital punishment laws deter murders, the murder rate should have been
higher for the year just before the adoption of the death penalty than for the year just after
the adoption of death penalty in each of these states.
The results, shown in the table and graph below, were that in 11 of the 14 states the
murder rate was higher after adoption of capital punishment laws than before the adoption
of capital punishment laws. The researchers concluded that the death penalty does not act
to deter murderers.
Critics of the study have complained that the crime rate in general dropped significantly
in many of the states studied during the two-year period surrounding the legal change, and
that they may be able to show that murder rates, when expressed as a percentage of
all crimes, actually decreased following the adoption of capital punishment (though they
present no supporting data).
In addition, they pointed out that many other factors may have changed in addition to
the adoption of the death penalty, drawing attention especially to the fact that several of
the states studied had made parole more difficult for convicted murderers at the same time
that they adopted or reinstated capital punishment laws, thus accounting for all or part of
the changes.
Kroner and Phillips (2013) have recently replied to this last criticism by stating that
several of the states included in their study had also adopted more lenient parole procedures,
thus balancing the states that have become stricter on paroles.
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Murder Rate in 14 States for One Year Before and After Adoption of Capital Punishment
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Null Time Series Details and Criticism
Can crime be prevented by the death penalty?
In recent years there has arisen a great public debate over whether or not capital pun-
ishment (the death penalty) is effective in preventing murders. Those who favor capital
punishment claim that the death penalty acts as a deterrent by reminding the potential
murderer of the possible consequences, whereas those who oppose capital punishment claim
that such officially sanctioned killing by the state sets a violent example that will produce
murders that might have been avoided. A recent research effort attempted to shed light on
this continuing debate.
The researchers (Kroner and Phillips, 2012) noticed that within the past twelve years
fourteen states have passed capital punishment laws or reinstated the death penalty. They
reasoned that if capital punishment laws deter murders, the murder rate should have been
higher for the year just before the adoption of the death penalty than for the year just after
the adoption of death penalty in each of these states.
The results, shown in the table and graph below, were inconclusive: in 5 of the 14 states
the murder rate was lower after adoption of capital punishment laws. Another 5 of the
14 states showed the opposite pattern. In the remaining states, there was no change in
the murder rate before and after the adoption of capital punishment laws. The researchers
concluded that the death penalty has an indeterminate effect on deterrence.
Critics of the study have complained that the crime rate in general dropped significantly
in many of the states studied during the two-year period surrounding the legal change, and
that they may be able to show that murder rates, when expressed as a percentage of all
crimes, actually do respond to the adoption of capital punishment (though they present no
supporting data).
In addition, they pointed out that many other factors may have changed in addition to
the adoption of the death penalty, drawing attention especially to the fact that several of
the states studied had made parole more difficult for convicted murderers at the same time
that they adopted or reinstated capital punishment laws, thus accounting for all or part of
the changes.
Kroner and Phillips (2013) have recently replied to this last criticism by stating that
several of the states included in their study had also adopted more lenient parole procedures,
thus balancing the states that have become stricter on paroles.
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Murder Rate in 14 States for One Year Before and After Adoption of Capital Punishment
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Pro Cross Section Details and Criticism
Does Capital Punishment Prevent Crime?
One of the most controversial public issues in recent years has been the effectiveness
of capital punishment (the death penalty) in preventing murders. Proponents of capital
punishment have argued that the possibility of execution deters people who might otherwise
commit murders, whereas opponents of capital punishment denied this and maintain that
the death penalty may even produce murders by setting a violent model of behavior. A
recent research effort attempted to shed light on this controversy.
The researchers (Palmer and Crandall, 2012) decided to look at the difference in murder
rates in states that share a common border but differ in whether their laws permit capi-
tal punishment or not. Carefully limiting the states included to those which had capital
punishment laws in effect or not in effect for at least five years, they compiled a list of all
possible pairs and then selected ten pairs of neighboring states that were alike in the degree
of urbanization (percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas), thus controlling
for any relationship between the size of urban population and crime per capita. They also
limited the capital punishment states to those which had actually used their death penalty
statutes, thus controlling for the possibility that the mere existence of the death penalty
may not carry the same weight unless capital punishment is known to be a possibility. Us-
ing the murder rate (number of willful homicides per 100,000 population) in 2010 as their
index, they assembled the table and graph shown on the next page. They reasoned that
if capital punishment has a deterrent effect, the murder rates should be lower in the state
with capital punishment laws.
The results, as shown in the table and graph below, were that in eight of the ten pairs
of states selected for their study the murder rates were lower in the state with capital pun-
ishment laws than in the state without capital punishment laws. The researchers concluded
that the existence of the death penalty does work to deter murderers.
Critics of the study have complained that selection of a different set of ten neighboring
states might have yielded a far different, perhaps even the opposite, result.
In replying to this criticism, Palmer and Crandall (2013) have recently reported a repli-
cation of their study, using a different set of ten states that share a common border but
differ in whether their laws permit capital punishment or not. The results of this second
study were essentially the same, murder rates being lower in the capital punishment state
for seven of the ten comparisons.
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Con Cross Section Details and Criticism
Does Capital Punishment Prevent Crime?
One of the most controversial public issues in recent years has been the effectiveness
of capital punishment (the death penalty) in preventing murders. Proponents of capital
punishment have argued that the possibility of execution deters people who might otherwise
commit murders, whereas opponents of capital punishment denied this and maintain that
the death penalty may even produce murders by setting a violent model of behavior. A
recent research effort attempted to shed light on this controversy.
The researchers (Palmer and Crandall, 2012) decided to look at the difference in murder
rates in states that share a common border but differ in whether their laws permit capi-
tal punishment or not. Carefully limiting the states included to those which had capital
punishment laws in effect or not in effect for at least five years, they compiled a list of all
possible pairs and then selected ten pairs of neighboring states that were alike in the degree
of urbanization (percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas), thus controlling
for any relationship between the size of urban population and crime per capita. They also
limited the capital punishment states to those which had actually used their death penalty
statutes, thus controlling for the possibility that the mere existence of the death penalty
may not carry the same weight unless capital punishment is known to be a possibility. Us-
ing the murder rate (number of willful homicides per 100,000 population) in 2010 as their
index, they assembled the table and graph shown on the next page. They reasoned that
if capital punishment has a deterrent effect, the murder rates should be lower in the state
with capital punishment laws.
The results, as shown in the table and graph below, were that in eight of the ten
pairs of states selected for their study the murder rates were higher in the state with
capital punishment laws than in the state without capital punishment laws. The researchers
concluded that the existence of the death penalty does not work to deter murderers.
Critics of the study have complained that selection of a different set of ten neighboring
states might have yielded a far different, perhaps even the opposite, result.
In replying to this criticism, Palmer and Crandall (2013) have recently reported a repli-
cation of their study, using a different set of ten states that share a common border but
differ in whether their laws permit capital punishment or not. The results of this second
study were essentially the same, murder rates being higher in the capital punishment state
for seven of the ten comparisons.
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Null Cross Section Details and Criticism
Does Capital Punishment Prevent Crime?
One of the most controversial public issues in recent years has been the effectiveness
of capital punishment (the death penalty) in preventing murders. Proponents of capital
punishment have argued that the possibility of execution deters people who might otherwise
commit murders, whereas opponents of capital punishment denied this and maintain that
the death penalty may even produce murders by setting a violent model of behavior. A
recent research effort attempted to shed light on this controversy.
The researchers (Palmer and Crandall, 2012) decided to look at the difference in murder
rates in states that share a common border but differ in whether their laws permit capi-
tal punishment or not. Carefully limiting the states included to those which had capital
punishment laws in effect or not in effect for at least five years, they compiled a list of all
possible pairs and then selected ten pairs of neighboring states that were alike in the degree
of urbanization (percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas), thus controlling
for any relationship between the size of urban population and crime per capita. They also
limited the capital punishment states to those which had actually used their death penalty
statutes, thus controlling for the possibility that the mere existence of the death penalty
may not carry the same weight unless capital punishment is known to be a possibility. Us-
ing the murder rate (number of willful homicides per 100,000 population) in 2010 as their
index, they assembled the table and graph shown on the next page. They reasoned that
if capital punishment has a deterrent effect, the murder rates should be lower in the state
with capital punishment laws.
The results, as shown in the table and graph below, were that in four of the ten pairs
of states selected for their study the murder rates were lower in the state with capital
punishment laws than in the state without capital punishment laws. In another four pairs,
the opposite was true. In two of the ten pairs, the states had the same murder rates.
The researchers concluded that the existence of the death penalty has an indeterminate
deterrent effect on murderers.
Critics of the study have complained that selection of a different set of ten neighboring
states might have yielded a far different result.
In replying to this criticism, Palmer and Crandall (2013) have recently reported a repli-
cation of their study, using a different set of ten states that share a common border but
differ in whether their laws permit capital punishment or not. The results of this second
study were essentially the same, murder rates being lower in the capital punishment state
for some comparisons and higher in others.
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Outcomes:
• Attitude: Which view of capital punishment best summarizes your own? (1: I
am very much against capital punishment; 7: I am very much in favor of capital
punishment)
• Belief : Does capital punishment reduce crime? Please select the view that best
summarizes your own. (1: I am very certain that capital punishment does not reduce
crime; 7: I am very certain that capital punishment reduces crime.)
A.1.3 Results
Tables A.2 and A.3 show the effects of information content on the Attitude and Belief
dependent variables, respectively. The effect on attitude is estimated to be 0.08 scale points
for a unit change in information content; this effect is estimated with far greater precision
when covariates are included. The effect on belief is very strong, at 0.24 scale points for a
unit change, which implies that the effect of going from the Con Con condition to the Pro
Pro condition is nearly a full scale point. Both effects are strongly persistent after 10 days.
Table A.2: Effect of Research Reports on Support for Capital Punishment
Attitude Toward Capitial Punishment
Wave 2 Wave 3
Information Content (-2 to 2) 0.080 0.108∗∗∗ 0.100 0.102∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.025) (0.068) (0.025)
Condition: Null Null −0.335 −0.069 −0.387∗ −0.051
(0.215) (0.072) (0.224) (0.073)
Constant 3.514 0.273 3.598 0.223
(0.092) (0.184) (0.096) (0.203)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 686 683 628 628
R2 0.005 0.871 0.008 0.883
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Null Null condition is coded 0.
Covariates: T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
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Table A.3: Effect of Research Reports on Belief in Deterrent Effect
Belief in Deterrent Effect
Wave 2 Wave 3
Information Content (-2 to 2) 0.239∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.032) (0.051) (0.030)
Condition: Null Null −0.467∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.090) (0.171) (0.086)
Constant 3.601 1.486 3.655 1.277
(0.069) (0.233) (0.071) (0.245)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 686 683 628 628
R2 0.043 0.645 0.052 0.722
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Null Null condition is coded 0.
Covariates: T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
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A.2 Study 2: Minimum Wage
This study was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Guess. It showed that viewing pro
or con videos about the minimum wage moved opinions about raising the minimum wage
in the direction of information.
Sample: 1,170 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 1, 1,019 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: August 2014.
Treatments: Subjects were assigned to see 2 of 6 videos. A placebo group was assigned
to see both placebo videos. The treatment groups were assigned to see any two of the four
treatments videos – all orderings of two videos were possible, as shown in the table below.
Table A.4: Minimum Wage Treatment Conditions
1st Video 2nd Video
Content Tone Content Tone Condition Info Content N
1 Con Old Con Young Con Con -1 79
2 Con Young Con Old Con Con -1 83
3 Con Old Pro Old Con Pro 0 86
4 Con Old Pro Young Con Pro 0 91
5 Con Young Pro Old Con Pro 0 93
6 Con Young Pro Young Con Pro 0 99
7 Pro Old Con Old Pro Con 0 79
8 Pro Old Con Young Pro Con 0 102
9 Pro Young Con Old Pro Con 0 78
10 Pro Young Con Young Pro Con 0 93
11 Pro Old Pro Young Pro Pro 1 90
12 Pro Young Pro Old Pro Pro 1 104
13 Placebo Placebo Placebo Placebo Placebo NA 93
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Pro Young





Good morning Hank, it’s Tuesday. So you’ve started a lot of businesses: Crash Course,
Scishow, DFTBA Records, Vidcon, the ceaseless juggernaut that is 2D glasses. And Hank
your companies employ dozens of people, none of whom work for the federally-mandated
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.
But Hank, let’s imagine that your next project is a fast food restaurant: Corndogs and
Sodium. What impact would raising the federal minimum wage have on you and your
employees?
At first glance it seems like a no-brainer. Any minimum wage is terrible, both for
Corndogs and Sodium and for its employees. The Econ 101 argument goes like this. The
free market is going to set wages where they need to be. Like, if you want to pay $5.00
an hour for Corndogs and Sodium employees but no one takes the job for $5.00 an hour,
you’re gonna have to pay more. You’ll increase your wages until you can attract the kind of
employees that you need to, you know, batter and fry and serve encased cast-off pig meat.
And we know that economies tend to grow less when governments set and control prices, so
higher minimum wages restrict economic growth. Plus, unemployment will go up, because
if the minimum wage is $10.00 per hour, Corndogs and Sodium can only afford to hire one
person. But if there was an unrestricted wage market, then they could attract two people
who would be willing to work for $5.00 an hour each. So in the end, setting a minimum
wage is an attempt to alleviate poverty that actually increases it.
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However Hank, surprisingly enough, it turns out that actual labor markets are a lot
more complex than the models of labor markets created by college freshmen. This brings
us to a famous study by two economists: David Card and Alan Krueger. So in 1992, the
state of New Jersey raised its minimum wage 18.8%. Pennsylvania, right next door, did not
raise its minimum wage. Card and Krueger had the bright idea to go to the border of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania and do employment surveys on either side of it. And what they
found is that restaurant employment in New Jersey actually increased when the minimum
wage went up. Since then a bunch of other studies have confirmed Card and Krueger’s
findings, while some have found that there actually are negative effects to unemployment
when you raise the minimum wage though it’s surprisingly and consistently mild.
Why? Well, a bunch of reasons. For one, the minimum wage is probably near where
the market would set it. But also, low-wage workers tend to spend most of their pay raises,
which leads to increased economic activity, which in turn leads to more jobs. And higher
wages also means less turnover, which leads to lower costs of training and hiring and firing.
On the downside, higher wages are also associated with higher prices on goods and services
that rely on low-wage labor which means that your corndogs, Hank, would probably be a
bit more expensive.
But Hank the larger question is whether raising the minimum wage actually reduces
poverty. And on that front there is consensus that – at least in the medium run – it does.
A number of recent studies have shown that raising the minimum wage 10% reduces the
number of people in poverty by about 2.5%. Even many opponents of the minimum wage
acknowledge this. But it’s important to note that, like, that won’t always work. At some
point, raising the minimum wage will lead to inflation and slower job creation. It’s just
not clear where that point is. But it’s just as disingenuous to call the minimum wage a
job killer as it is to say that the minimum wage is going to fix economic inequality. In
short Hank, in economics, there’s no such thing as a free lunch. But when it comes to
reducing poverty without affecting employment, higher minimum wages seem at least to be
the cheapest lunch available.
But ultimately, Hank, now that I’m, I guess, an employer, I’m more persuaded by the
personal argument. We’ve found that paying a living wage, which we would do even if we
opened Corndogs and Sodium, leads to happier more productive employees. Now I know
that’s hard to quantify, but it’s also what’s allowed Vidcon and DFBTA Records to retain
employees for years and years and grow sustainably.
Now Hank, obviously I am not an economist (although I did win a bronze medal in
economics at the Alabama state academic decathlon tournament in 1993). But our strategy
has worked out pretty well for us so far, and it’s also working at much larger companies like
CostCo.
Hank, the United States is a rich country and I think that there’s a growing body of
evidence that the U.S. doesn’t benefit from having poor workers. Of course raising the
minimum wage isn’t going to fix that problem, but I hope at least we can begin to have a
nuanced conversation about the problem.
Hank – I’ll see you on Friday.
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Pro Old
Title: Raise the Minimum Wage to $15/hr (in 2 minutes 30 seconds)




Democrats are getting ready for a major push to raise the federal minimum wage to $10.10
an hour. Now that’s better than nothing. But it is not enough. The federal minimum wage
should be raised to $15.00 an hour, incrementally, over the next three years.
Here’s seven reasons why.
One. Had the minimum wage of 1968 been adjusted for inflation it would be well above
$10.00 an hour today. A typical worker today is also more than twice as productive as back
then. Adjusted for inflation and productivity gains therefore, the minimum wage should be
at least $15.00 an hour.
Two. $10.10 an hour is not enough to lift all workers and their families out of poverty.
This is especially true for millions of low-wage workers who want full time jobs but can
only work and find part time work. Most of the workers are not teenagers. They are major
breadwinners for their families.
Three. Because some employers don’t pay wages that lift their workers out of poverty,
the rest of us pay for their Medicaid, food stamps, housing, and other assistance. In
effect, subsidizing these low-wage employers. Some, like McDonald’s, actually advise their
employees to use public programs because their pay is just too low.
Four. Some jobs may be lost if the minimum is raised to $15.00. But many more people
will be lifted out of poverty. And because low-wage workers will have more money to spend,
their spending will create many more jobs.
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Five. Such a wage increase is more likely to come out of profits than be passed on
in higher prices, because most employers of low wage workers face intense competition for
customers.
Six. Since Republicans will no doubt try to push Democrats to go even lower than their
$10.10 proposal, it’s doubly important to be clear about what’s right in the first place.
Democrats should be talking about a bigger increase, not listening to Republican demands
for a smaller one.
Seven, and finally. At a time in our nation’s history when 95% of all economic gains are
going to the top 1%, raising the minimum wage to $15.00 isn’t just smart economics, it’s
the right thing to do.
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Con Young





More money more happiness? Or more money more problems? We’re cashing in on the
effects of raising the minimum wage in this episode of Hotnomics. Raising the minimum
wage is a hot topic right now, with President Obama calling on Congress to raise the
minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to $10.10 an hour. That’s a 40% hike! Who wouldn’t
take more money, right?
But when it comes to raising the federal minimum wage, it might be a little different
than you think. You have to look at the bigger overall picture to really understand what it
would mean for workers in our country. Workers in entry level jobs will earn a little more –
that is if they even get to keep their job. When asked if they would cut hiring if the federal
minimum wage was raised to $10 an hour, the majority of chief financial officers across the
country said “Yes.”
A recent report from the Congressional Budget Office predicts that 500,000 Americans
will lose their job by 2016 if the federal minimum wage is raised is to $10.10 an hour.
500,000 people! That’s a lot of out of work teens, Mom and Dad.
Just over half of the minimum wage earners are 16 to 24 years old and tend to live
in middle-class households with a family income of over $65,000 dollars per year. Way
above the poverty line. In fact, the CBO also estimates that only 20% of minimum wage
earners fall below the poverty line. And with raising the federal minimum wage, the skill
level that employers expect their employees to have also rises. So the youth from low
155
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
income neighborhoods and disadvantaged adults that are supposed to benefit from a higher
minimum wage actually get pushed out of jobs.
But you say, “I don’t work in an entry-level job and I don’t have teenage kids, so what
do I care?” Well you might care the next time you go to get that $1.50 hot dog special at
your favorite joint on the corner, when it’s now $2.00 a hot dog. Yep. Higher minimum
wages means that business owners will be forced to up their prices to compensate for the
increase in employee wages.
And what about the differences in the cost of living across the country? $10.10 means
one thing in Manhattan, as opposed to Birmingham, Alabama.
A recent letter to federal policy makers signed by 500 economists including several Nobel
prize winners said that raising the minimum wage is not a silver bullet solution to poverty.
Instead these economists support finding solutions that encourage employment, business
creation, and boost earnings, rather than across the board mandates that raise the cost of
labor.
So in this case, raising the federal minimum wage means more problems for the economy
as a whole.
To learn more about how the economic machine works, keep tuning in to Hotnomics.
Not your typical economics class.
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Con Old





Some politicians argue that raising the minimum wage helps the poor and disadvantaged.
It might seem that way at first. Certainly workers who are earning $8.00 an hour today
would be better off if they were earning $12.00 an hour instead. The problem is that this
view of the minimum wage overlooks one important detail. A $12.00 minimum wage doesn’t
force employers to pay $12.00 to every worker. It forces them to pay $12.00 to the workers
the employer chooses to keep. The employer pays $0.00 to the workers who get laid off, or
who were never hired in the first place.
Let’s look at an example. Suppose this guy owns a burger joint. The reason the
employer hires a worker is because the worker generates value for the owner. Suppose that,
not counting what he pays his worker, the owner makes 10 cents on every burger he sells.
Here’s Al. Al can flip 100 burgers an hour. If the owner makes 10 cents on every burger,
not counting what he pays Al, then Al generates $10.00 worth of burgers for the owner
every hour. If the owner pays Al $8.00 an hour, then the owner makes $2.00 an hour profit:
$10.00 an hour on the burgers, minus $8.00 an hour that he pays Al.
Now, suppose that the owner hires three workers of varying abilities: Al, Bob, and
Carl. Bob is a faster worker, and can cook 120 burgers an hour. Carl is a slower worker,
and can only cook 90 burgers an hour. Since each burger is worth 10 cents to the owner,
each hour Al produces $10.00 worth of burgers, Bob produces $12.00, and Carl produces
$9.00. Suppose the owner pays Al, Bob, and Carl $8.00 an hour each. After paying the
workers, the owner earns $2.00 an hour profit from employing Al, $4.00 an hour profit from
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employing Bob, and $1.00 an hour profit from employing Carl. In total, the owner makes
$7.00 profit per hour from employing the three workers.
Now, suppose the government imposes a minimum wage of $9.50 an hour. What does
this do to the profit of our three workers? Al produces $10.00 worth of burgers per hour.
At a cost of $9.50 an hour, Al now generates a profit of only 50 cents an hour for the
owner. Bob produces $12.00 worth of burgers an hour. At a cost of $9.50 an hour, Bob
now generates a profit of $2.50 an hour. But look at what happens to Carl. Carl produces
$9.00 worth of burgers per hour, but he now costs the owner $9.50 per hour in wages. Carl
is no longer generating profit for the owner. Carl now generates a loss. In fact, the owner
would be 50 cents an hour better off if he fires Carl.
The minimum wage was good for Al and Bob. They’re each a $1.50 an hour better off
than they were before. But it was devastating for Carl. Carl lost his job, and so is $8.00
an hour worse off than he was before.
Here’s the first lesson of the minimum wage. It doesn’t help the worker at the expense
of the owner. It helps the more productive workers at the expense of the less productive
workers. What’s even worse is that the more productive workers usually don’t need the
help. What do you think would have happened over time to Bob, the most productive
worker? Either the owner would have rewarded Bob’s higher productivity with a raise, or,
if the owner didn’t reward Bob, one of the owner’s competitors would have offered Bob
more money to go work for the competitor. Either way, Bob would have ended up earning
more anyway.
This is the second lesson of the minimum wage. Many of the workers that it does help
would have ended up better off anyway, even if the minimum wage hadn’t existed. It works
this way in the real world. Increases in the minimum wage have little effect on unemployment
among college graduates. Increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment among
high school graduates. And among the least skilled, least educated workers, increases in
the minimum wage significantly increase unemployment.
The minimum wage may be a well-intentioned policy. But it often hurts the very workers
who are in most need of our help.
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Placebo 1





Workers who receive tips, like waitresses or waiters, are entitled to the minimum wage, but
it works a little different for those folks. The employer is required to pay them at least
$2.13 an hour, but their tips must equal the amount of the minimum wage, which is $7.25
an hour. If their total compensation does not equal $7.25 an hour, the employer must pay
the difference.
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Placebo 2
Title: Labor Law Posters: Colorado Minimum Wage Labor Law Poster




Poster Compliance Center would like to welcome you to our labor law quick update for
Colorado. Minimum wage regulations are changing and we would like to inform you of
these important changes. As of January 1st, 2011, the state minimum wage will increase
to $7.36 per hour. The minimum wage rate for tipped employees also increases to $4.34
per hour. Changes have been made to the contact information listed. The minimum wage
order 27 poster will replace the minimum wage order 26 poster. Poster Compliance Center
would like to thank you for joining us. We look forward to serving you and all of your labor
law needs.
Outcomes
• Favor Raising: The federal minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour. Do you favor
or oppose raising the federal minimum wage? (1: Very much opposed to raising the
federal minimum wage, 7: Very much in favor of raising the federal minimum wage)
• Amount: What do you think the federal minimum wage should be? Please enter an
amount between $0.00 and $25.00 in the text box below.
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A.2.1 Results
As shown in tables A.5 and A.6, the videos exerted a strong influence on both the Favor
Raising and Amount dependent variables. Effects on both dependent variables are strongly
persistent, as shown by the third and fourth columns of each table.
Table A.5: Effects of Videos on Favoring Raising the Minimum Wage
Favoring Raising the Minimum Wage
Wave 2 Wave 3
Information Content (-1 to 1) 0.424∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.064) (0.102) (0.063)
Condition: Placebo 0.701∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.132) (0.228) (0.139)
Constant 5.067 1.629 4.989 1.172
(0.056) (0.258) (0.061) (0.294)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,170 1,170 1,020 1,020
R2 0.018 0.638 0.009 0.638
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Placebo condition is coded 0.
Covariates: T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
Table A.6: Effects of Videos on Favoring Raising the Minimum Wage
Amount
Wave 2 Wave 3
Information Content (-1 to 1) 1.138∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.118) (0.195) (0.125)
Condition: Placebo 0.687∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.333 0.378∗∗
(0.345) (0.163) (0.378) (0.187)
Constant 9.685 2.399 9.782 1.791
(0.103) (0.459) (0.115) (0.409)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,170 1,170 1,019 1,019
R2 0.035 0.674 0.010 0.727
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The information content of the Placebo condition is coded 0.
Covariates: T1 Attitude, T1 Belief, age, gender, ideology, race, and education.
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A.3 Study 3: Global Warming
This study was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Guess. It showed that presenting
information about a global warming “hiatus” changed whether subjects think global warm-
ing is due to natural causes but did not change whether subjects viewed it as a threat to
their way of life.
Sample: 1,690 Mechanical Turk subjects.
Dates of data collection: October 2014.
Treatments: Subjects could be assigned to one of two conditions: a control condition and
a “hiatus” condition.
Control Condition:
Global warming refers to the increase in the Earth’s temperature over the last century.
Since 1900, temperatures have increased by 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Scientists, politicians,
and citizens have been debating over what, if anything, to do to combat global warming.
In order to understand what to do about global warming, we need to know more than
how much the Earth has warmed in the past. We need to know how much the Earth will
warm in the future.
Climate scientists try to predict how much warming will occur by training statistical
models on historical data, then running those models forward. Because any one model can
be wrong, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) averages many
forecasts, as shown in the figure below.
The colored lines show the models’ best guesses for the changes in temperature. The black
line shows the actual observed temperature.
There is a great deal of agreement between the models and the observed temperature.
This agreement means that we can have greater confidence in the models’ projections into
the future.
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The Earth is warming, and the models predict that the warming trends will continue
into the future.
Hiatus Treatment Condition
Global warming refers to the increase in the Earth’s temperature over the last century.
Since 1900, temperatures have increased by 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Scientists, politicians,
and citizens have been debating over what, if anything, to do to combat global warming.
In order to understand what to do about global warming, we need to know more than
how much the Earth has warmed in the past. We need to know how much the Earth will
warm in the future.
Climate scientists try to predict how much warming will occur by training statistical
models on historical data, then running those models forward. Because any one model can
be wrong, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) averages many
forecasts, as shown in the figure below.
The colored lines show the models’ best guesses for the changes in temperature. The solid
black line shows the actual observed temperature.
The dotted line represents the moment in time when the predictions were made. To the
left of the dotted line, the models and the observed temperature agree. But to the right
of the dotted line, the actual levels of warming clearly disagree with the predictions of the
models.
This disagreement means we cannot be confident of the models’ projections into the
future. The shaded region describes the updated projections based on more recent data.
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Outcomes:
• Temp Cause: Some people believe that increases in the Earth’s temperature over the
last century are due to the effects of pollution from human activities. Others believe
that temperature increases are due to natural changes in the environment. Which
comes closer to your view? (Temperature increases are mainly due to the effects of
pollution from human activities, Temperature increases are mainly due to natural
changes in the environment, Temperature increases are due to both human activities
and natural changes, I do not believe the Earth’s temperature has risen.) The outcome
Natural Cause is coded 1 if the respondent chose “Temperature increases are mainly
due to natural changes in the environment” or “Temperature increases are due to both
human activities and natural changes” and 0 otherwise.
• Threat: Do you believe global warming will pose a serious threat to your way of life
in your lifetime? (Yes, No). The outcome Not A Threat is coded 1 if the subject
chose “No” and 0 otherwise.
A.3.1 Results
As shown in Table A.7, the hiatus treatment causes subjects to increase their belief that
global warming was due to natural causes by 10 percentage points. Any effect that the treat-
ment may have had on belief that global warming will pose a serious threat was statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
Table A.7: Effects of Hiatus Treatment
Natural Cause Not a Threat






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.4 Study 4: Gun Control
Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) report the results of test of experimental primes on at-
titudes toward gun control, finding that a public safety frame decreased support for a
controlled carry law, relative to a citizen’s rights frame.
A.4.1 Original Study
Sample: 518 adult residents of Kansas City.
Dates of data collection: March 7 through April 3, 1999.
Treatments:
• Public Safety Frame: Concealed handgun laws have recently received national
attention. Some people have argued that laws allowing citizens to carry concealed
handguns threaten public safety because they would allow almost anyone to carry a
gun almost anywhere, even onto school grounds. What do you think about concealed
handgun laws?
• Citizens’ Rights Frame: Concealed handgun laws have recently received national
attention. Some people have argued that law-abiding citizens have the right to protect
themselves. What do you think about concealed handgun laws?
Outcomes:
• Support for concealed handgun laws: 1: Strongly Oppose to 7: Strongly Support.
The data for the original study were not available. However, the original article (p.
526) included histograms of the dependent variable by treatment condition. For the “Re-
constructed” version of the dependent variable, I measured the height of each bar of the
histogram in pixels and then backed out the number of subjects giving each response. This
procedure worked well for the public safety frame – the reconstructed variable had a mean
equal to the mean reported in the main text (2.5). However, the reconstructed mean for
the citizens’ rights frame was lower than reported (3.3 versus 3.5). I then constructed an
“Reported” version of the dependent variable that matched this mean that required as few
changes to the pixel-reconstructed version as possible. These changes were done by hand
and almost certainly do not reflect the true dataset; it is nevertheless close enough for
assessing standard errors to a first approximation.
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A.4.2 Replication Study
Sample: 1,502 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1; 1,311 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: March 2015.
Treatments: In addition to the Public Safety Frame and Citizens’ Rights Frame
treatments above, I included a No Frame control condition: Concealed handgun laws,
which allow citizens to obtain permits to carry concealed handguns, have recently received
national attention. What do you think about concealed handgun laws?
A.4.3 Results
As shown in Table A.8, the public safety frame had strong negative effects on support for
concealed handgun laws in the original study (columns 1 and 2) and in the first wave of the
MTurk replication (column 3). By the second wave, the strong effects in the first wave had
dissipated (column 4).
Table A.8: Gun Control Original and Replication Results
Support for Concealed Carry Law
Reconstructed Reported Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Safety Frame −0.806∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.207)
Pure Control 0.525∗∗∗ −0.033
(0.126) (0.137)
Constant (Rights Frame) 0.421∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.131) (0.141)
Constant 3.332 3.504 3.558 3.820
(0.155) (0.158) (0.092) (0.101)
Sample Original Original MTurk MTurk
N 518 518 1,502 1,311
R2 0.029 0.042 0.013 0.001
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
‘Reconstructed’ refers to the DV measured by histogram pixels.
‘Reported’ adjusts the ‘Reconstructed’ DV to match the reported ATE estimate.
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A.5 Study 5: Superordinate Identity
Transue (2007) reports the results of a test of identity frames on support for taxes. These
frames had small to negligible effects on tax preferences.
A.5.1 Original Study
Sample: 397 adult residents of Minneapolis-Saint Paul.
Dates of data collection: July and August 1998.
Treatments:
• Ethnic Identity Frame: How close do you feel to your ethnic or racial group? Very
close, somewhat close, not very close, not at all close.
• Superordinate Identity Frame: How close do you feel to other Americans? Very
close, somewhat close, not very close, not at all close.
Outcomes:
• Support Tax Increase (Public Schools): Some people have said that taxes need
to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would you be to have
your taxes raised to improve education in public schools? Very willing, somewhat
willing, not very willing, not at all willing.
• Support Tax Increase (Minority Opportunity): Some people have said that
taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would
you be to have your taxes raised to improve educational opportunities for minorities?
Very willing, somewhat willing, not very willing, not at all willing.
The original experiment conditioned on subjects’ answers to the treatment questions,
arguing that effects of the identity frames are mediated through (and moderated by) the
extent to which subjects accept their identities. This procedure is prone to bias, so in my
reanalysis of the data, I assessed the treatment effect of the identity frame using difference-
in-means.
A.5.2 Replication Study
Sample: 496 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1, 447 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: March 2015.
Treatments: The treatments used the identical text as the original.
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Outcomes: I used the same outcome measures with the same wording. In the second wave,
I randomly varied whether subjects saw the questions as written above or in a “matrix” style
format, in order to thwart subjects “learning” the right way to answer. This manipulation
did not appear to affect responses, and it is not presented below.
A.5.3 Results
In the original, the average difference in outcomes by identity frame was not statistically
significantly different from zero, either for increasing taxes to support minority education
or public schools. In the replication, I obtained results with the opposite sign that, for the
public schools dependent variable, are weakly significant. The difference in sign notwith-
standing, my interpretation of these results is that the frames, if anything, have a negligible
effect on tax preferences, a conclusion supported by the results of both studies.
Table A.9: Superordinate Identity Original and Replication Results
Minority Opportunity Public Schools
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Other Americans 0.030 −0.028 −0.051 0.080 −0.064∗ −0.064∗
(0.047) (0.040) (0.043) (0.050) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant (Ethnic) 0.466 0.529 0.561 0.492 0.599 0.599
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036) (0.027) (0.027)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 191 254 232 206 242 242
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.012
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.6 Study 6: Patriot Act
Chong and Druckman (2010) report the results of an experiment testing the effects of pro
and con information on attitudes toward the Patriot Act. This study is unique among those
I replicated in being the only study to have included an over time component originally.
A.6.1 Original Study
Sample: 862 adult Americans.
Dates of data collection: December 2009.
Treatments: Subjects could be assigned to receive no treatment, a series of Pro-Patriot
Act messages, a series of Con-Patriot Act messages, or both types of messages.
Pro messages:
• The Patriot Act was enacted in the weeks after September 11, 2001 to strengthen law
enforcement powers and technology.
• Under the Patriot Act, law enforcement agencies have more tools to prevent new
terrorist incidents.
• The Patriot Act gives U. S. security forces the resources they need to identify terrorist
plots on American soil and to prevent attacks before they occur.
• The Patriot Act enhances domestic security through counterterrorism funding, surveil-
lance, border protection, and other security policies.
• The Patriot Act includes less known provisions including funding for terrorism victims
and their families.
• The Patriot Act enables officials to effectively combat national security threats, and
provides prompt aid and compensation to victims in the event of a terrorist attack.
Con messages:
• The Patriot Act was enacted in the weeks after September 11, 2001 to strengthen law
enforcement powers and technology.
• The Patriot Act has sparked numerous controversies and been criticized for weakening
the protection of citizens’ civil liberties.
• Under the Patriot Act, the government has access to citizens’ confidential information
from telephone and e-mail communications.
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• The Patriot Act allows law enforcement officials to search citizens’ homes, businesses,
and financial records without their permission or knowledge.
• The Patriot Act significantly expands government policing powers without specifying
an agency that is responsible for safeguarding citizens’ rights.
• Since its passage, the Patriot Act has been challenged in federal courts on the grounds
that many of its provisions are unconstitutional.
Subjects who were assigned to Pro, Con, or Both information treatments were also assigned
to a processing condition. I will collapse over these categories in all my analyses.
• On-line processing. After reading each statement, subjects are asked: “To what extent
does this statement decrease or increase your support for the Patriot Act?”
• Memory-based processing. After reading each statement, subjects are asked: “How
dynamic would you say this statement is? (Remember that a statement is more
dynamic when it uses more vivid action words.)”
• No instructions. Subjects are asked to read each statement with no further instruc-
tions.
Outcomes:
• Patriot Act Support: “Do you oppose or support the Patriot Act?” 1: Oppose
very strongly to 7: Support very strongly.
A.6.2 Replication Study
Sample: 1161 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1, 912 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: March 2015.
Treatments: The treatments used the identical text as the original.
Outcomes: I used the same outcome measure with the same wording.
A.6.3 Results
In wave 1 of both the original and replication experiments, Pro information increases support
for the Patriot Act and Con information decreases it. When both Pro and Con information
treatments are presented together, there is no average change in attitudes relative to control.
In the original, these effects decline within 10 days and are no longer distinguishable from
zero. In the replication, the Con information has a strongly persistent effect on attitudes
toward the Patriot Act.
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Table A.10: Patriot Act Original and Replication Results
Patriot Act Support
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Con Information −0.743∗∗∗ −0.254 −0.698∗∗∗ −0.518∗∗
(0.213) (0.217) (0.182) (0.220)
Pro + Con Information −0.079 −0.025 −0.099 −0.203
(0.209) (0.212) (0.184) (0.218)
Pro Information 0.648∗∗∗ 0.184 0.603∗∗∗ 0.156
(0.207) (0.211) (0.186) (0.218)
Constant (Control) 4.455 4.384 3.530 3.621
(0.180) (0.184) (0.159) (0.190)
Sample Original Original MTurk MTurk
N 826 826 1,161 912
R2 0.091 0.010 0.077 0.022
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.7 Study 7: Elite Endorsements
Nicholson (2012) reports the results of a test of partisan cues on support for legislation.
Relative to out-party cues, in-party cues increase support for legislation.
A.7.1 Original Study
Sample: 1315 Americans who identify as a Republican or a Democrat, surveyed by YouGov.
915 responded to the foreclosure question and 718 responded to the immigration question.
Dates of data collection: The 2008 Presidential campaign.
Treatments:
• In Party: For each of the dependent variables shown below, I define a subject as
being in the “In Party” condition if their own party identification matches that of the
endorser.
• Out Party: For each of the dependent variables shown below, I define a subject as
being in the “Out Party” condition if their own party identification is opposite that
of the endorser.
• No Cue: Subjects in the no cue condition were asked about their support for the
two bills without any endorsement.
Outcomes:
• Support for Foreclosure Bill: A bill circulating in Congress [supported by Barack
Obama/John McCain/George W. Bush/the Democratic Party/the Republican Party]
would allow the Federal Housing Administration to guarantee up to $300 billion in
new loans to help at-risk homeowners refinance into more affordable mortgages. What
is your view of this bill? (-1: I oppose this policy, 0: Not sure, 1: I support this policy)
• Support for Immigration Bill: As you know, there has been a lot of talk about
immigration reform policy in the news. One proposal [backed by Barack Obama/John
McCain/George W. Bush/the Democratic Party/the Republican Party]provided legal
status and a path to legal citizenship for the approximately 12 million illegal immi-
grants currently residing in the United States. What is your view of this immigration
reform policy? (-1: I oppose this policy, 0: Not sure, 1: I support this policy)
The original analysis did not group the treatments into In Party and Out Party, but
because the experiment is somewhat underpowered, I think that doing so gives a clearer
picture of the modest effect that party endorsements in general have on support. In the
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analyses I present below, I include an indicator for party, as Republicans and Democrats
have different probabilities of assignment to in- and out- party treatments.
A.7.2 Replication Study
Sample: 1,245 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1; 1,095 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: March 2015.
Treatments: Treatments were defined in the same way as the original. I added two
treatment conditions, Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush. Unfortunately, due to a coding error,
those assigned to see endorsements by Hillary Clinton or Jeb Bush in the immigration
experiment actually saw an endorsement by George W. Bush. This error is addressed when
constructing the categorical party match treatment variable.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.7.3 Results
Table A.11: Elite Endorsements Original and Replication Results: Immigration
Support for Immigration Bill Support for Foreclosure Bill
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In Party Cue 0.172∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.029 0.191∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.069) (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.046) (0.049)
No Cue 0.118 −0.021 −0.017 0.220∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.039
(0.088) (0.072) (0.076) (0.074) (0.070) (0.076)
Republican −0.656∗∗∗ −0.714∗∗∗ −0.778∗∗∗ −0.623∗∗∗ −0.429∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.056) (0.059) (0.054) (0.049) (0.053)
Constant 2.009 2.487 2.551 2.227 2.403 2.555
(0.054) (0.033) (0.035) (0.046) (0.032) (0.033)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 718 1,245 1,095 915 1,245 1,095
R2 0.130 0.134 0.166 0.130 0.070 0.063
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Relative to the Out Party condition, subjects in the In Party condition report higher
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support for both policies. This is true in both the original and in the replication. Unsur-
prisingly, both the original and the replication studies find a strong negative correlation
between party identification and support for the policies, both of which are relatively lib-
eral. Neither of the effects from the first wave of the replication study persist into wave
2.
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A.8 Studies 8 and 9: Free Trade




Dates of data collection: The 2008 Presidential campaign.
Treatments: This study employed a 2 X 4 factorial design, where the first factor is the
Expert treatment and the second factor is the frame the subject is shown: positive, negative,
both, or neither.
• Expert: According to the New York Times, almost 100 percent of American economists
support increasing trade with other nations. In 1993 over a thousand economists, in-
cluding all living winners of the Nobel Prize in economics, signed an open letter to
the New York Times urging people to support efforts to increase trade between the
United States and neighboring countries.
• Positive: Many people believe that increasing trade with other nations creates jobs
and allows Americans to buy more types of goods at lower prices.
• Negative: Many people believe that increasing trade with other nations leads to job
losses and exposes American producers to unfair competition.
• Positive + Negative: Many people believe that increasing trade with other nations
creates jobs and allows Americans to buy more types of goods at lower prices. Oth-
ers believe that increasing trade with other nations leads to job losses and exposes
American producers to unfair competition.
• Control (No introduction before asking the free trade question.)
Outcomes:
• Support for Free Trade: Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other na-
tions? (0: oppose; 1: favor)
A.8.2 GfK Replication Study
Sample: 2,084 GfK respondents in wave 1; 1,838 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: August 2015.
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Treatments: Treatments were defined in the same way as the original.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.8.3 MTurk Replication Study
Sample: 2,972 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1; 2,307 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: Treatments were defined in the same way as the original.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.8.4 Results
Table A.12: Free Trade Original and Replication Results
Support for Free Trade
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expert 0.110∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.002 0.126∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.018)
Positive −0.078∗∗ −0.015 −0.003 −0.035∗ −0.037
(0.038) (0.030) (0.033) (0.019) (0.024)
Negative −0.114∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗
(0.039) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021) (0.025)
Pos + Neg −0.186∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.151∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗
(0.039) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021) (0.024)
Constant (Control) 0.686 0.713 0.708 0.784 0.766
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 1,578 2,084 1,838 2,972 2,307
R2 0.031 0.026 0.0003 0.046 0.010
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The results of this experiment are remarkably consistent across all three versions. The
Expert treatment causes about a 10 point increase in support for free trade; on GfK this ef-
fect dissipates after 10 days but declines to only 7 points on MTurk. The Positive treatment
is oddly ineffective: null or even negative effects across the board. The Negative treatment
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and the Positive + Negative treatments both exert strongly negative effects on free trade
support, both of which persist in the MTurk sample but not the GfK sample.
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A.9 Studies 10 and 11: Frame Breadth
Hopkins and Mummolo (2015) show that frames in one issue area by and large affect only
“target” attitudes and not attitudes in other domains.
A.9.1 Original Study
Sample: 3,269 Adult Americans (GfK).
Dates of data collection: The 2008 Presidential campaign.
Treatments: Subjects were assigned at random to see two of these treatment texts. Sub-
jects saw one at random, answered a random two of the outcome variables, then saw a
second treatment, and answered the remainder of the treatment questions. “The argument
below was recently made by a U.S. Senator. Please take a moment to read the argument
carefully and then tell us what you think. [Treatment Text] Do you think the Senator is
making a convincing argument? Please tell us why or why not. [Text entry]. ”
• Crime: America is very vulnerable to violent crime, with forty-two Americans mur-
dered every single day on average. Innocent people can be killed in their front yards.
Across the country, we have to do everything we can to reduce the threat of violent
crime. We have to stop violent criminals before they act. This means cracking down
on the smaller offenses that all too often lead to violent crime, and making sure that
convicted criminals always serve out their full sentences.
• Health Care: Health care is one of the most complicated issues we face. It involves
1 of every 6 dollars spent here in the United States. The health care system includes
millions of doctors and nurses and thousands of hospitals and clinics. Together, they
regularly make decisions that can mean life or death. The government in Washing-
ton can’t even balance its own budget. How can we trust it to run something as
complicated as the health care system?
• Stimulus: With a recession as deep as this one, there are more than 10 million unem-
ployed Americans, and it’s going to take years for our economy to recover. In February
2009, the government in Washington made things worse by passing an $800 billion
stimulus package, which is more than $2,500 for every person living in this country.
Now, it looks like a lot of that money didn’t help the economy. Unemployment is still
very high. The money went to pork-barrel projects and federal bureaucrats rather
than creating jobs for unemployed Americans. The government in Washington can’t
even balance its own budget. How can we trust it to spend so much taxpayer money?
• Terror: The September 11th attacks and the news that al-Qaeda was planning new
attacks on U.S. soil show how vulnerable America still is to terrorists. Innocent people
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can be killed while traveling to visit family or going to work. Across the country,
we have to do everything we can to reduce the threat of terrorism. We have to stop
terrorists before they act. This means conducting more frequent searches of suspicious
people boarding planes, trains, subways, and buses.
Outcomes: Spending preferences were measured in all four areas, regardless of treatment
assignment. The response options were 1: Decreased a lot, 2: Decreased a moderate amount,
3: Decreased a little; 4: Kept about the same; 5: Increased a little; 6: Increased a moderate
amount; 7: Increased a great deal.
• Crime Spending Should federal spending on dealing with crime be increased, de-
creased, or kept the same?
• Health Care Spending Should federal spending on health care be increased, de-
creased, or kept the same?
• Stimulus Spending Should federal spending to stimulate the economy be increased,
decreased, or kept the same?
• Terrorism Spending Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be increased,
decreased, or kept the same?
The relatively complicated random assignment procedure requires the analyst to make
some choices. I chose to define a subject as in treatment if they answered the “target”
dependent variable after being exposed to the corresponding treatment (For example, if a
person saw the health care treatment after answering the health care treatment, I would
define that subject as being in control for the health care experiment).
A.9.2 GfK Replication Study
Sample: 3,189 GfK respondents in wave 1; 2,510 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: August 2015.
Treatments: I assigned each subject to only see one of the treatments, which was shown
before any of the dependent variables. This design simplifies the analysis while still allowing
for the assessment of “direct” and “spillover” effects across issues.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
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A.9.3 MTurk Replication Study
Sample: 2,972 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1; 2,281 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: Treatments were defined in the same way as in the GfK replication.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.9.4 Results
Table A.13: Crime Spending Original and Replication Results
Support for Crime Spending
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crime Argument 0.079 0.113 −0.083 −0.016 0.068
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.076)
Constant (Control) 4.445 4.481 4.583 4.220 4.185
(0.035) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.032)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 3,269 3,189 2,510 2,972 2,281
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00002 0.0004
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
180
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Table A.14: Health Care Spending Original and Replication Results
Support for Health Care Spending
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Health Care Argument −0.044 −0.044 0.054 −0.080 −0.049
(0.081) (0.085) (0.088) (0.076) (0.088)
Constant (Control) 4.606 4.289 4.256 4.928 4.920
(0.043) (0.037) (0.041) (0.034) (0.039)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 3,271 3,188 2,513 2,972 2,281
R2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A.15: Stimulus Spending Original and Replication Results
Support for Stimulus Spending
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stimulus Argument −0.317∗∗∗ −0.455∗∗∗ −0.113 −0.415∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.079) (0.087) (0.074) (0.081)
Constant (Control) 4.200 4.233 4.099 4.655 4.600
(0.048) (0.035) (0.038) (0.031) (0.035)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 3,266 3,179 2,512 2,972 2,281
R2 0.006 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.004
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
181
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Table A.16: Terrorism Spending Original and Replication Results
Support for Terrorism Spending
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Terrorism Argument 0.361∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.056 0.155∗∗ 0.031
(0.076) (0.080) (0.088) (0.077) (0.087)
Constant (Control) 3.571 4.233 4.323 3.291 3.228
(0.042) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 3,272 3,180 2,513 2,972 2,281
R2 0.011 0.004 0.0002 0.001 0.0001
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.10 Studies 12 and 13: Polarization
Levendusky and Malhotra (2015) show that descriptions of a polarized electorate led sub-
jects to view Republicans and Democrats as further apart on issues.
A.10.1 Original Study
Sample: 1587 American adults (GfK).
Dates of data collection: 11/29/12 - 12/12/12.
Treatments: Subjects were assigned at random to see one of three treatments: Polarized,
Moderate, or a Placebo.
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Polarized:
Electorate as Divided as Ever
Jefferson Graham (USA Today)
In the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election, interviews with voters at a diner in
Smithfield, PA reveal an electorate as divided as ever. When asked about the importance
of the election results, Republican Marlene Evers of nearby Fairchance said, “I can’t believe
Obama won. He is a radical socialist. He will destroy the Christian values set forth by the
Founding Fathers that have made this country great. If he gets his way, he’ll overturn 5,000
years of tradition and allow gay marriage, destroying the American family. We must stop
him any way we can.”
Later on that evening, Democratic voter and Obama supporter Dan Thompson of Ma-
sontown pointed to economic issues as influencing his vote in the election. “The Republican
Party is for corporate greed and will do nothing but destroy the lives and hopes of regular
working people in this country. They tried to use voter ID laws to steal this election, because
they know the American people reject their ideas.” He added, “Bush was a complete idiot
who bankrupted this nation with the Iraq War, and Romney would have been just as bad,
destroying the economy. Republicans want to roll back women’s reproductive freedom by
restricting access to contraception and labeling women who defend it sluts and prostitutes.”
As we left Smithfield, it is clear that Republicans and Democrats in the area seem as
divided as ever before. This same pattern also holds nationally: Democrats and Republicans
across the country are deeply divided. For example, Gallup data released last week shows
that while nearly 9 in 10 Democratic voters (88 percent) approve of President Obama’s job as
president, less than 1 in 10 Republicans (8 percent) approves. This 80 point gap between the
parties in approval is among the largest ever recorded (see figure). “Differences in Obama’s
approval reflect fundamental divides between the parties,” says Stanford political science
professor Neil Malhotra. “Democrats and Republicans really do hold different beliefs.”
184
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Moderate:
Electorate Remains Moderate
Jefferson Graham (USA Today)
In the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election, interviews with voters at a diner
in Smithfield, PA reveal few real divisions in the electorate. When asked about Obama’s
victory, Republican Marlene Evers of nearby Fairchance said, “I don’t agree with all of
Obama’s economic policies, but he seems to be trying hard to resolve America’s economic
problems. He’s doing things that we all agree with, like trying to bring down the deficit.
He’s also trying to find a middle ground on social issues like his gay marriage decision.
While he supports gay marriage, he did not push to change federal on policy on this issue,
knowing that it might upset some voters. I am pro-life, but I agree with President Obama
that women need access to safe and affordable family planning tools.”
Later on that evening, Democratic voter and Obama supporter Dan Thompson of Ma-
sontown pointed to economic issues as influencing his vote in the election. “I’m not an
ideologue. I find myself mostly in the middle, and really just want the country to get back
on track and find common-sense solutions to get our economy fixed.” Thompson also noted
that he wanted a break from the culture wars, and wants politicians to stop focusing on
controversial social issues like abortion. “Americans can all agree that, even if we support
the right to abortion, it should be rare and avoided, and the President’s policies are trying
to reduce the need for abortion in this country.”
As we left Smithfield, it is surprising to find that Republicans and Democrats in the
electorate seem to want the same things, very different from the picture we get from Wash-
ington. This same pattern also holds nationally: Democrats and Republicans across the
country are not really very divided. For example, recent data from the Pew Center for the
People and the Press show that Democrats and Republicans alike overwhelmingly support
leaders who compromise to get things done. 75 percent of Democrats feel this way, as do
79 percent of Republicans, a nearly identical level (see figure). “This shows that there is
no divide between ordinary Democrats and Republicans,” says Stanford political science
professor Neil Malhotra. “Democrats and Republicans really do want the same things.”
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Placebo:
Blake Predicts Pop Singer Will Win Season 3 of the Voice
Blake Shelton knows what he wants to happen on The Voice this season. “There are
some pop singers that are really good,” said Shelton, who coached pop singer Dia Frampton
to the final four during season 1. “We had a few last year but we didn’t end up with a pop
singer winning the show. Jermaine Paul, an R & B singer, won season 2.”
The celebrity coaches – Blake, along with Christina Aguilera, Cee Lo Green and Adam
Levine – will be back in the rotating chairs for season 3’s blind auditions.
During the blind auditions, the celebrity coaches will hear contestants sing without
seeing what they look like. If they like what they hear, the coaches can push the button,
turn their chair around and see the face behind the voice, selecting the singer for their team.
So, there’s no guarantee that Blake will coach the aspiring pop stars.
“I know anything can happen,” he says, “but I really believe in my heart that one of
several pop singers that we have on our show this year have a shot at winning the whole
thing.”
Outcomes: I focus on two dependent variables. The first, Perceived Polarization, is
built from subjects’ responses to a series of policy questions. After giving their response to
each question in the list below, subjects were asked how they think a “typical Democratic
voter” and a “typical Republican voter” would respond to each question. The outcome
variable is the average of the absolute values of the differences in subjects’ Democratic and
Republican Responses.
• The tax rates on the profits people make from selling stocks and bonds, called capital
gains taxes, are currently lower than the income tax rates many people pay. Do you
think that capital gains tax rates should be increased, decreased, or kept about the
same? (7 point scale. Decreased a lot: -3; Increased a lot: 3)
• There is some debate about whether or not undocumented immigrants who were
brought to this country illegally as children should be deported. Which of the following
positions on the scale below best represents your position on this issue? (7 point scale.
Very strongly oppose deportation: -3; Very strongly support deportation: 3)
• The United States is currently considering signing additional free trade agreements
with Central American, South American, and Asian countries. The Democratic Party
wants to make it more difficult for the U.S. to enter into such agreements. The
Republican Party wants to make it easier to do so. What do you think? Do you
support or oppose the United States signing more free trade agreements with Central
American, South American, and Asian countries? (7 point scale. Very strongly oppose
free trade: -3; Very strongly support free trade: 3)
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• Public financing of elections is when the government pays for the cost of campaigning
for various offices, rather than the campaigns relying on donations from the general
public, corporations, or unions. Democrats typically support public financing plans
while Republicans have wanted to eliminate them. What do you think? Do you
support or oppose the government paying for the public financing of elections? (7
point scale. Very strongly oppose public financing: -3; Very strongly support public
financing: 3)
A.10.2 GfK Replication Study
Sample: 2,115 GfK respondents in wave 1; 1,855 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: August 2015.
Treatments: The wording of the Polarized and Moderate conditions is the same as

































Prefer Leaders Who Compromise
(b) Moderate
I used a different placebo text, due to the time-bound nature of reality TV:
Placebo:
The Lasting Appeal of So You Think You Can Dance
After 12 seasons of dance, you’ve got to shake things up a bit and bring in something
fresh – and the new format really has done that. From what I’ve seen, being in Vegas and
watching the audition cities that I had not seen previously, we are getting some of the best
of the best talent. And on my side, the Street side, we’re getting some incredible people
who previously would not have even tried for So You Think You Can Dance. We’re dealing
with people who have never left their cities, much less taken any dance classes or had any
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formal training, and now they’re starting to come out and wanting to show what they can
do – because they have the chance to do what it is that they do.
There’s something about a family show like So You Think You Can Dance offering a
wide variety of talent in many different packages – whether it be color, creed, size, anything
– because you get to see these people doing what it is they’re strongest at, and you never
know who that’s going to inspire as they’re watching. And I think that’s been one of the
strongest common threads through every season: that it’s ongoing inspiration for the future
generation, and there’s always somebody that you can connect with. Out of the 20, there’s
at least one person, and even if they don’t make it to the top 20, if you watch through the
audition specials, you’ll see someone that you connect with; they’ll strike a chord. It moves
you.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.10.3 MTurk Replication Study
Sample: 2,972 Mechanical Turk respondents in wave 1; 2,288 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: Treatments were defined in the same way as in the GfK replication.
Outcomes: The wording of the outcome questions was identical to the original.
A.10.4 Results
As shown in Table A.17, the polarized treatment did cause subjects to view themselves as
more moderate. By contrast, as shown in Table A.18, subjects viewed Republicans and
Democrats as being further apart on issues. This effect appears to have persisted for 10
days.
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Table A.17: Extremity Original and Replication Results
Extremity of Policy Views
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Placebo Treatment −0.008 0.016 −0.037 −0.001 −0.030
(0.064) (0.044) (0.049) (0.030) (0.033)
Polarizied Treatment −0.042 0.043 0.031 −0.036 −0.039
(0.061) (0.043) (0.048) (0.030) (0.033)
Constant (Moderate) 1.318 1.395 1.432 1.540 1.626
(0.045) (0.031) (0.035) (0.021) (0.024)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 1,521 2,115 1,855 2,972 2,288
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A.18: Perceived Polarization Original and Replication Results
Perceived Polarization
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Placebo Treatment 0.260∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.022 0.320∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.123) (0.096) (0.107) (0.059) (0.064)
Polarizied Treatment 0.413∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.121) (0.093) (0.097) (0.058) (0.064)
Constant (Moderate) 2.550 2.639 2.960 3.126 3.550
(0.084) (0.068) (0.072) (0.041) (0.045)
Sample Original GfK GfK MTurk MTurk
N 1,471 2,115 1,845 2,972 2,288
R2 0.013 0.020 0.003 0.018 0.002
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.11 Study 14: Immigration
A.11.1 Original Study
Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008) find that news articles focusing on the negative eco-
nomic impacts of immigration decrease support for immigration.
Sample: 353 Adult Americans (GfK)
Dates of data collection: 10/21/03 - 11/5/03
Treatments: Subjects could be assigned to one of four treatment stories or a placebo news
story. The treatment stories were made to look like articles in the New York Times.
Negative European/Latino
(a) Negative Latino (b) Negative European
Immigration Concerns Governors
Questions Raised About Economic, Cultural Impact of Immigrants
NEW YORK (AP) - During the 1990s, more immigrants entered the United States than
in any previous decade, and the growing number of immigrants in the U.S. clearly has some
Americans worried. At a state governors’ convention in June, many governors called for the
Bush Administration and Congress to step in to restrict the flow of immigrants.
Several governors voiced concern that immigrants are driving down the wages of Amer-
ican workers while taxpayers are forced to meet the rising costs of social services for the
newcomers. Governors say these views are shared by many of their constituents.
John Baine, shift manager at a large auto parts factors in Cleveland, said he is angered
that “a number of friends have been laid-off or forced to take a pay cut” because of the
influx of cheap immigrant labor.
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Nancy Petrey, a Boulder, Colo. nurse, has seen staff let go for similar reasons. “People
give twenty years of their lives to this hospital and then, boom, they’re out the door because
some foreigner will do their job for half the pay,” Petrey said. “It just isn’t right.”
Governors also say constituents are worried that the country is no longer a “melting
pot,” because new immigrants are not adopting American values or blending into their new
social world.
Mary Stowe, an Omaha-based sales associate, says she is frustrated by the fact that
recent immigrants to her area “do not learn English or make any effort to fit in.”
Bob Callaway, a construction supervisor in Newark, says he sees similar problems with
immigrants hired by his company. “These people are totally unwilling to adopt Ameri-
can values like hard work and responsibility,” Callaway said. “I try not to complain, but
sometimes they are so pushy and uncooperative – it’s not acceptable.”
When asked his opinion, [Nikolai Vandisnky]/[Jose Sanchez], a recent immigrant from
[Russia]/[Mexico], says he welcomes the chance for a better life in America. “Many of my
cousins find work here and now it’s my turn. I want a good job and benefits.”
“But,” [Vandinsky]/[Sanchez] added, “that doesn’t mean I have to change who I am.
We love our culture. I’m proud to be from [Russia]/[Mexico].”
While there was agreement at the convention that the federal government needs to do
more to help states manage the rising tide of newcomers, few governors agree on exactly
why immigration levels have increased.
Some blame the Immigration Act passed by Congress in 1990, which loosened federal
restrictions on immigration. Others point to the fact that large companies are attracting im-
migrants to the U.S. with the promise of prosperity, a practice that has become widespread
in recent years.
Still others maintain that, in a world full of turmoil, people are attracted here by the
hope of a better way of life.
Whatever is bringing immigrants to these shores in record numbers, everyone seems
certain that the numbers will continue to grow.
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Positive European/Latino
(a) Positive Latino (b) Positive European
Immigration Heartens Governors
Promise Seen in Economic, Cultural Contribution of Immigrants
NEW YORK (AP) – During the 1990s, more immigrants entered the United States
than in any previous decade, and the growing number of immigrants in the U.S. clearly
has some Americans hopeful about the future. At a state governors’ convention in June,
many governors called for the Bush Administration and Congress to protect the flow of
immigrants from further restrictions.
Several governors said they are encouraged by how immigrants are helping to strengthen
the economy, while also providing a welcome boost to tax revenues. Governors say these
views are shared by many of their constituents.
John Baine, shift manager at a large auto parts factory in Cleveland, says he is enthu-
siastic about how much the influx of immigrant labor has “helped the company keep a lid
on costs and remain competitive.”
Nancy Petrey, a Boulder, Colo. nurse, has seen similar benefits for the hospital where
she works. “These people take jobs that are often hard for us to fill, and they’re willing to
work shifts that other people don’t want,” Petrey said. “It’s a big help.”
Governors also say many constituents take pride in the fact that the country is still a
“melting pot,” where immigrants continue to bring new experiences and ideas that enrich
American culture.
Mary Stowe, an Omaha-based sales associate, says she admires what it must take to
“leave home and come to a place that is so different, without knowing the language or
anything about the way of life here.”
Bob Callaway, a construction supervisor in Newark, says he sees similar qualities in the
immigrants hired by his company. “These people are determined and persistent, ” Callaway
said. “I’ve gotta give ’em credit, they’ll do what it takes to get ahead. That’s something I
respect.”
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When asked his opinion, [Nikolai Vandisnky]/[Jose Sanchez], a recent immigrant from
[Russia]/[Mexico], says he welcomes the chance for a better life in America. “Many of my
cousins find work here and now it’s my turn. I want a good job and benefits.”
“But,” [Vandinsky]/[Sanchez] added, “that doesn’t mean I have to change who I am.
We love our culture. I’m proud to be from [Russia]/[Mexico].”
While there was agreement at the convention that the federal government needs to do
more to help states manage the rising tide of newcomers, few governors agree on exactly
why immigration levels have increased.
Some blame the Immigration Act passed by Congress in 1990, which loosened federal
restrictions on immigration. Others point to the fact that large companies are attracting im-
migrants to the U.S. with the promise of prosperity, a practice that has become widespread
in recent years.
Still others maintain that, in a world full of turmoil, people are attracted here by the
hope of a better way of life.
Whatever is bringing immigrants to these shores in record numbers, everyone seems
certain that the numbers will continue to grow.
Outcomes:
• Support for Immigration: Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign
countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased
a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a
lot? (1: Decreased a lot, 5: Increased a lot)
• Negative Impact: In your opinion, how likely is it that immigration will have
a negative financial impact on many Americans? (Very Likely, Somewhat Likely,
Somewhat Unlikely, Very Unlikely) (1: Very Unlikely, 4: Very Likely)
A.11.2 Replication Study
Sample: 2,138 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 1; 1,773 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: The treatments used the identical text as the original.
Outcomes: I used the same outcome measures with the same wording. In the second wave,
I randomly varied whether subjects saw the questions as written above or in a “matrix” style
format, in order to thwart subjects “learning” the right way to answer. This manipulation
does not affect responses, so it is not presented below.
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A.11.3 Results
In both the original and in the replication, the negative frame has a negative effect on
Support for Immigration and a positive effect on the Negative Impact dependent variable.
These effects appear to dissipate after 10 days.
Table A.19: Immigration Original and Replication Results
Support for Immigration Negative Impact
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative Frame −0.561∗∗∗ −0.116∗ 0.029 0.430∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.052
(0.157) (0.068) (0.075) (0.145) (0.058) (0.061)
Positive Frame −0.140 0.178∗∗∗ 0.116 0.124 −0.094∗ −0.080
(0.163) (0.066) (0.074) (0.147) (0.057) (0.061)
Constant (Control) 2.347 2.958 2.857 2.611 2.198 2.181
(0.136) (0.054) (0.062) (0.123) (0.048) (0.050)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 352 2,138 1,773 353 2,138 1,771
R2 0.051 0.013 0.002 0.034 0.012 0.004
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
194
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
A.12 Study 15: System Threat
A.12.1 Original Study
Craig and Richeson (2014) show small effects of a news story describing the US as becoming
“majority-minority” on various measures of system threat.
Sample: 611 American Adults (GfK).
Dates of data collection: 5/23/2012 - 6/1/2012.
Treatments:
Majority Minority Treatment
In a Generation, Racial Minorities May Be the U.S. Majority
New U.S. Census Bureau data suggest that America will become a majority-minority
nation much faster than once predicted. The nation’s racial minority population is steadily
rising, advancing an unmistakable trend that could make minorities the new American
majority by midcentury.
The data show a declining number of White adults and growing under-18 populations of
Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities. Demographers calculate that by 2042, Americans
who identify themselves as Hispanic, Black, Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian,
or Pacific Islander will together outnumber non-Hispanic Whites. The main reasons for
the accelerating change are rapid immigration growth and significantly higher birthrates
among racial and ethnic minorities. As White baby boomers age past their childbearing
years, younger Hispanic parents are having children and driving U.S. population growth.
For example, there are now roughly 9 births for every 1 death among Hispanics, compared
to a roughly one-to-one ratio for Whites.
The latest figures are predicated on current and historical trends, which can be thrown
awry by several variables, including prospective overhauls of public policy.
Placebo
U.S. Census Bureau Reports Residents Now Move at a Higher Rate.
New U.S. Census Bureau data suggest that the rate of geographical mobility, or the
number of individuals who have moved within the past year, is increasing.The national
mover rate increased from 11.9 percent in 2008 (the lowest rate since the U.S. Census
Bureau began tracking the data) to 12.5 percent in 2009.
According to the new data, 37.1 million people changed residences in the U.S. within the
past year. 84.5 percent of all movers stayed within the same state. Renters were more than
five times more likely to move than homeowners. The estimates also reveal that many of the
nation’s fastest-growing cities are suburbs. Specifically, principal cities within metropolitan
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areas experienced a net loss of 2.1 million movers, while the suburbs had a net gain of 2.4
million movers. For those who moved to a different county or state, the reasons for moving
varied considerably by the length of their move.
The latest figures are predicated on current and historical trends, which can be thrown
awry by several variables, including prospective overhauls of public policy.
Outcomes:
• Way of Life: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following
statement: The American way of life is seriously threatened. (1: Strongly Disagree,
7: Strongly Agree)
• Support for Immigration: Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign
countries who are allowed to come to the U.S. to live should be increased a lot,
increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot? (1:
Decreased a lot, 5: Increased a lot)
A.12.2 Replication Study
Sample: 1,276 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 1; 1,065 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: The treatments used the identical text as the original. I also included a pure
control (No Frame) condition.
Outcomes: I used a very slightly different wording for the immigration question: Support
for Immigration: Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are
permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little,
left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot? For Way of Life, I used a
5-point scale (1: Strongly Disagree, 5: Strongly Agree). In order to make them comparable,
I present effects on the Way of Life DV in standard units.
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A.12.3 Results
The effects Majority Minority treatment could not be distinguished from zero in the original
experiment, but did exert a negative effect on support for immigration in the replication.
Table A.20: System Threat Original and Replication Results
Way of Life (Standardized) Support for Immigration
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Frame 0.094 0.096 −0.060 −0.089
(0.067) (0.075) (0.077) (0.084)
Majority Minority −0.144 0.071 0.039 −0.003 −0.174∗∗ −0.082
(0.110) (0.068) (0.074) (0.109) (0.077) (0.080)
Constant (Placebo) 3.156 1.723 1.679 2.398 3.018 2.946
(0.075) (0.046) (0.052) (0.076) (0.054) (0.057)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 611 1,276 1,052 608 1,276 1,056
R2 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.00000 0.004 0.001
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.13 Study 16: Expert Economists
(Johnston and Ballard 2014) found that informing the public of economists’ expert opinion
on various economic policies exerted a profound effect on subjects stated preferences. In
five issue areas, subjects who learned of economists’ views on policy were far more likely to
support those positions than subjects in a control condition.
A.13.1 Original Study
Sample: 2,041 American Adults (Gfk).
Dates of data collection: 9/6/2013 - 9/23/2013.
Treatments: Subjects were assigned to respond to an economic opinion question on one
of five topics. Subjects were assigned to see the “expert” or “control” versions of each
question. Technically, this is a 2 x 5 factorial design, in which the first factor is whether
subjects saw economists’ opinions and the second factor is which economic opinion question
seen. The estimand is the effect of learning economists’ opinions on subjects’ agreement
with the economists’ point of view.
Factor 1:
• Expert: A sample of professional economists with widely varying political preferences
was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: [Treatment
Text] To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Strongly Agree,
Agree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly, Uncertain)
• Control: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
(Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly, Uncertain)
Factor 2:
• Immigration: The average US citizen would be better off if a larger number of
highly educated foreign workers were legally allowed to immigrate to the US each
year. (Economists: Strongly Agree: 49, Agree: 46)
• Health Care: Long run fiscal sustainability in the U.S. will require cuts in currently
promised Medicare and Medicaid benefits and/or tax increases that include higher
taxes on households with incomes below $250,000. (Economists: Strongly Agree: 56,
Agree: 35)
• Trade with China: Trade with China makes most Americans better off because,
among other advantages, they can buy goods that are made or assembled more cheaply
in China. (Economists: Strongly Agree: 59, Agree: 41)
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• Tax Cut: A cut in federal income tax rates in the US right now would raise taxable
income enough so that the annual total tax revenue would be higher within five years
than without the tax cut. (Economists: Strongly Disagree: 57, Disagree: 39)
• Gold Standard: If the US replaced its discretionary monetary policy regime with
a gold standard, defining a “dollar” as a specific number of ounces of gold, the
price-stability and employment outcomes would be better for the average American.
(Economists: Strongly Disagree: 66, Disagree: 34)
Outcomes:
• Agree: For each question, the agreement dependent variable was coded 1 if the sub-
ject chose either “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” when the economists did or “Strongly
Disagree” or “Disagree” when the economists did.
A.13.2 Replication Study
Sample: 2,985 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 1; 2,487 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: Instead of assigning subjects to see only one question, I had subjects see all
five questions, randomizing within question whether a subject saw the “control” or “expert”
version. The questions were otherwise identical.
Outcomes: I defined agreement in the same way as in the original.
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A.13.3 Results
The results of the original and replication experiments are in close agreement. The Expert
treatment increases agreement with the economists’ point of view on every issue. This
strong effect evaporates within 10 days.
Table A.21: Expert Economists: Immigration and Health Care
Agree on Immigration Agree on Health Care
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expert Treatment 0.069 0.163∗∗∗ 0.020 0.075 0.172∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.057) (0.018) (0.020) (0.050) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant (Control) 0.249 0.387 0.454 0.220 0.345 0.323
(0.038) (0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.012) (0.013)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 413 2,985 2,487 409 2,985 2,487
R2 0.006 0.027 0.0004 0.007 0.030 0.0002
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A.22: Expert Economists: China and Tax Cuts
Agree on Trade with China Agree on Tax Cut
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expert Treatment 0.122∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.052) (0.018) (0.020) (0.051) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant (Control) 0.207 0.440 0.420 0.148 0.376 0.360
(0.033) (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) (0.012) (0.014)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 408 2,985 2,487 403 2,985 2,487
R2 0.019 0.044 0.002 0.043 0.048 0.0002
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.23: Expert Economists: Gold Standard
Agree on Gold Standard
Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3)
Expert Treatment 0.122∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.052) (0.018) (0.020)
Constant (Control) 0.207 0.440 0.420
(0.033) (0.013) (0.014)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk
N 408 2,985 2,487
R2 0.019 0.044 0.002
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.14 Study 17: Mental Health
(McGinty et al. 2013) show that a news article about a mass shooting affects support for
stricter gun control laws as well as perceptions of how dangerous people with serious mental
illness are.
A.14.1 Original Study
Sample: 2,935 American Adults (GfK).
Dates of data collection: May 2012.
Treatments:
News The gunman who opened fire in an Indianapolis park yesterday morning has been
identified as Indianapolis resident Jake Robinson, age 30. According to police, the shooter
has a history of serious mental illness. Mr. Robinson’s motivation for opening fire in Smith
Park in central Indianapolis is unclear. Witnesses said Mr. Robinson arrived at the park
around seven-thirty am and appeared agitated, pacing up and down and talking to himself.
At approximately 8:15 am, Mr. Robinson took a gun out of his bag and began to shoot.
Three adults passing through the park on their way to work were shot and killed. Three
more adults and two children were wounded. The police officer leading the investigation
said that Jake Robinson used a semiautomatic weapon to shoot about 30 bullets in a row
before he was tackled by a security guard from a nearby building. Little is known about
Mr. Robinson, who lived alone and appears to have no immediate family. Mr. Robinson’s
cousin, who lives in South Carolina, said Mr. Robinson was hospitalized for mental illness
last year.
LCM Ban Yesterday’s shooting in downtown Indianapolis left residents looking for
solutions to the problem of gun violence. According to the Indianapolis Coalition against
Violence – a group whose membership includes city lawmakers, law enforcement officials,
researchers, advocacy groups and citizens concerned about violence in Indianapolis – gun
violence in the United States has reached epidemic proportions.
“With more than 65,000 Americans shot in an attack last year, we have to do something
to keep dangerous guns off our streets,” said Kim Jones, the spokesperson for the group.
One proposal currently being considered by Congress is a good start, Jones said. Congress is
considering legislation to ban large ammunition clips, which are military-style high capacity
magazines that can shoot 30, 50, or 100 bullets without requiring the shooter to stop and
reload. According to Kim Jones, “Getting this law in place is one way to protect the public
from dangerous guns.”
Mental Illness Yesterday’s shooting in downtown Indianapolis left residents looking
for solutions to the problem of gun violence. According to the Indianapolis Coalition against
Violence – a group whose membership includes city lawmakers, law enforcement officials,
researchers, advocacy groups and citizens concerned about violence in Indianapolis – gun
violence in the United States has reached epidemic proportions.
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“With more than 65,000 Americans shot in an attack last year, we have to do something
to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous people,” said Kim Jones, the spokesperson for
the group. One proposal currently being considered by Congress is a good start, Jones said.
Congress is considering legislation to require states to enter people with serious mental ill-
ness into a background check system used by gun dealers to identify people prohibited from
buying guns, or face a penalty. According to Kim Jones, “Getting this law in place is one
way to protect the public from dangerous people.”
Outcomes:
• Magazines: As you may know, high-capacity gun magazines or clips can hold many
rounds of ammunition, so a shooter can fire more rounds without manually reloading.
Would you support or oppose a nationwide ban on the sale of high-capacity gun
magazines that hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition? (Strongly Oppose: 1;
Strongly Support: 5)
• SMI Danger: Do you agree with the following statement? “People with serious
mental illness are, by far, more dangerous than the general population.” (Strongly
Disagree: 1; Strongly Agree: 5)
A.14.2 Replication Study
Sample: 2,985 Mechanical Turk subjects in wave 1; 2,474 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
Treatments: The treatments used the identical text as the original.
Outcomes: The outcomes were the same as in the original.
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A.14.3 Results
In the original study, the News treatment increased subjects support for a ban on high-
capacity magazines as well as perceptions of the mentally ill as dangerous. These effects
were not apparent in the replication. The effects of the LCM Ban treatment on support for
a high capacity magazine ban were consistent across the original and the replication, and
endured for at least 10 days.
Table A.24: Mental Illness Original and Replication Results
Magazines SMI Danger
Original Wave 1 Wave 2 Original Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News 0.208∗∗∗ 0.054 0.004 0.147∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.018
(0.055) (0.054) (0.059) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044)
LCM Ban 0.315∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.170∗∗ −0.035 0.001 −0.044
(0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
Mental Illness 0.138∗∗ −0.062 0.008 −0.061 −0.023 −0.025
(0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054)
Constant (Control) 3.308 3.543 3.577 3.251 3.133 3.050
(0.057) (0.054) (0.059) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044)
Sample Original MTurk MTurk Original MTurk MTurk
N 2,935 2,985 2,474 2,933 2,985 2,474
R2 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.0002 0.0004
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.15 Study 18: Contentious Global Warming
This study was conducted in collaboration with Andy Guess and was designed to measure
subjects’ ability to process scientific information about global warming under contentious
conditions.
Sample: 2,156 Mechanical Turk Subjects in wave 1; 1,802 in wave 2.
Dates of data collection: June 2015.
This study used a pre-treatment measure of support: How strongly do you believe in the
scientific evidence that global temperatures are rising due to human activity? (Very strongly,
Not very strongly). Subjects who select “Very strongly” are coded as “proponents” while
those who respond “Not very strongly” are coded as “opponents”.
Treatments: Subjects could be assigned to a control or “hiatus” treatment. Additionally,
subjects were assigned to a control processing condition or an “insults” processing condition.
Control Global warming refers to the increase in the Earth’s temperature over the last
century. Since 1900, temperatures have increased by 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Scientists,
politicians, and citizens have been debating over what, if anything, to do to combat global
warming.
In order to understand what to do about global warming, we need to know more than
how much the Earth has warmed in the past. We need to know how much the Earth will
warm in the future.
Climate scientists try to predict how much warming will occur by creating statistical
models based on historical data, then using those models to predict future temperatures.
Because any one model can be wrong, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) averages many forecasts, as shown in the figure below.
Figure A.4: Main Manipulation: Control
The colored lines show the models’ best guesses for the changes in temperature. The
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black line shows the actual observed temperature.
There is a great deal of agreement between the models and the observed temperature.
This agreement means that we can have greater confidence in the models’ projections into
the future.
The Earth is warming, and the models predict that the warming trends will continue
into the future.
Hiatus Global warming refers to the increase in the Earth’s temperature over the last
century. Since 1900, temperatures have increased by 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Scientists,
politicians, and citizens have been debating over what, if anything, to do to combat global
warming.
In order to understand what to do about global warming, we need to know more than
how much the Earth has warmed in the past. We need to know how much the Earth will
warm in the future.
Climate scientists try to predict how much warming will occur by creating statistical
models based on historical data, then using those models to predict future temperatures.
Because any one model can be wrong, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) averages many forecasts, as shown in the figure below.
Figure A.5: Main Manipulation: Hiatus Treatment
The colored lines show the models’ best guesses for the changes in temperature. The
solid black line shows the actual observed temperature.
The dotted line represents the moment in time when the predictions were made. To the
left of the dotted line, the models and the observed temperature agree. But to the right
of the dotted line, the actual levels of warming clearly disagree with the predictions of the
models.
This disagreement means we cannot be confident of the models’ projections into the
future. The shaded region describes the updated projections based on more recent data.
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Processing Conditions:
• Insults: (if “Very Strongly”) Some people think that your position makes you an
alarmist supporter of big government. How do you respond? [Text entry]. If (“Not
very strongly”) Some people think that your position makes you an unthinking oppo-
nent of science. How do you respond? [Text entry].
• Control. In this condition, subjects proceeded directly to their information treatment.
Outcomes:
• Belief in Increase: Since 1850, there is a well-documented increase in global tem-
peratures. Some attribute this increase to human activity while others attribute it to
natural causes. Which comes closest to your view? (1: I believe that the increase is
entirely due to natural causes, 7: I believe that the increase is entirely due to human
activity)
• Degrees: How many degrees do you believe the Earth will warm over the next 100
years? (Slider: -1 to 3)
• Temp Cause: Some people believe that increases in the Earth’s temperature over the
last century are due to the effects of pollution from human activities. Others believe
that temperature increases are due to natural changes in the environment. Which
comes closer to your view? (Temperature increases are mainly due to the effects of
pollution from human activities, Temperature increases are mainly due to natural
changes in the environment, Temperature increases are due to both human activities
and natural changes, I do not believe the Earth’s temperature has risen.) The outcome
Natural Cause is coded 1 if the respondent chose “Temperature increases are mainly
due to natural changes in the environment” or “Temperature increases are due to both
human activities and natural changes” and 0 otherwise.
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A.15.1 Results
The Hiatus treatment decreased subjects’ belief that global warming was due to human
causes and decreased subjects’ predictions about future temperature increases.
Table A.25: Contentious Global Warming Results
Belief in Increase Degrees Natural Cause
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hiatus Treatment −0.173∗ −0.169 −0.114∗∗ −0.097∗ 0.020 0.046
(0.094) (0.104) (0.049) (0.053) (0.030) (0.033)
Insult −0.080 −0.019 0.016 0.004 0.018 0.022
(0.094) (0.103) (0.049) (0.053) (0.030) (0.033)
Constant (Control) 5.100 5.095 1.739 1.827 0.511 0.471
(0.080) (0.090) (0.042) (0.044) (0.026) (0.028)
N 1,082 911 1,082 911 1,082 912
R2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.003
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.16 Study 19: Newspapers
This study was conducted in collaboration with Emily Ekins and David Kirby. It shows
that when subjects are shown newspaper opinion pieces, they update their attitudes and
beliefs in the direction of the opinion piece.
Sample: 3,567 Mechanical Turk Subjects in wave 1; 2,989 in wave 2; 2,448 in wave 3.
Dates of data collection: July 2015.
A.16.1 Treatments
Subjects could be assigned to see either nothing or one of five op-ed pieces. The text of








APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
The Amtrak Crash: Is More Spending the Answer?
By Randal O’Toole 5/13/15 At 4:46 PM
It is too soon to tell what caused the Amtrak train crash that killed seven people on May
12. But advocates of increased government spending are already beginning to use the crash
to promote more spending on infrastructure and are criticizing Republicans who voted to
reduce Amtrak’s budget the day after the crash.
Yet there is a flaw in the assumption that spending more money would result in better
infrastructure. In fact, in some cases, the problem is that too much money is being spent
on infrastructure, but in the wrong places.
The reason for this is that politicians prefer to spend money building new infrastructure
over maintaining the old. The result is that existing infrastructure that depends on tax
dollars steadily declines while any new funds raised for infrastructure tend to go to new
projects.
We can see this in the Boston, Washington, and other rail transit systems. Boston’s
system is $9 billion in debt, has a $3 billion maintenance backlog, and needs to spend
nearly $700 million a year just to keep the backlog from growing. Yet has only budgeted
$100 million for maintenance this year, and instead of repairing the existing system, Boston
is spending $2 billion extending one of its light-rail lines.
Similarly, Washington’s Metro rail system has a $10 billion maintenance backlog, and
poor maintenance was the cause of the 2009 wreck that killed nine people. Yet, rather than
rehabilitate their portions of the system, Northern Virginia is spending $6.8 billion building
a new rail line to Dulles Airport; D.C. wants to spend $1 billion on new streetcar lines; and
Maryland is considering building a $2.5 billion light-rail line in D.C. suburbs.
On the other hand, infrastructure that is funded out of user fees is generally in good
shape. Despite tales of crumbling bridges, the 2007 Minnesota bridge collapse was due to
a construction flaw and the 2013 Washington state bridge collapse was due to an oversized
truck; lack of maintenance had nothing to do with either failure.
Department of Transportation numbers show that the number of bridges considered
structurally deficient has fallen by more than 50 percent since 1990, while the average
roughness of highway pavement has decreased. State highways and bridges, which are
almost entirely funded out of user fees, tend to be in the best condition while local highways
and bridges, which depend more on tax dollars, tend to be the ones with the most serious
problems.
Before 1970, almost all of our transportation infrastructure was funded out of user fees
and the United States had the best transportation system in the world. Since then, funding
decisions have increasingly been made by politicians who are more interested in getting
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their pictures taken cutting ribbons than in making sure our transportation systems run
safely and smoothly.
Proponents of higher gas taxes and other increased funding on infrastructure may talk
about crumbling bridges, but what they really want is to spend more money on new projects
that are often of little value. For example, they want high-speed trains that cost more but
go less than half the speed of flying and light-rail trains that cost more but can move fewer
people than buses.
This country doesn’t need more infrastructure that it can’t afford to maintain. Instead,
it needs a more reliable system of transport funding, and that means one based on user fees
and not tax subsidies.
Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why
We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do About It.
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The Political Assault on Climate Skeptics
Members of Congress send inquisitorial letters to universities, energy companies, even
think tanks. By Richard S. Lindzen March 4, 2015 6:50 P.M. ET
Research in recent years has encouraged those of us who question the popular alarm
over allegedly man-made global warming. Actually, the move from “global warming” to
“climate change” indicated the silliness of this issue. The climate has been changing since
the Earth was formed. This normal course is now taken to be evidence of doom.
Individuals and organizations highly vested in disaster scenarios have relentlessly at-
tacked scientists and others who do not share their beliefs. The attacks have taken a
threatening turn.
As to the science itself, it’s worth noting that all predictions of warming since the onset
of the last warming episode of 1978-98 – which is the only period that the United Nations In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) attempts to attribute to carbon-dioxide
emissions – have greatly exceeded what has been observed. These observations support a
much reduced and essentially harmless climate response to increased atmospheric carbon
dioxide.
In addition, there is experimental support for the increased importance of variations
in solar radiation on climate and a renewed awareness of the importance of natural un-
forced climate variability that is largely absent in current climate models. There also is
observational evidence from several independent studies that the so-called “water vapor
feedback,” essential to amplifying the relatively weak impact of carbon dioxide alone on
Earth temperatures, is canceled by cloud processes.
There are also claims that extreme weather – hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts, floods,
you name it – may be due to global warming. The data show no increase in the number
or intensity of such events. The IPCC itself acknowledges the lack of any evident relation
between extreme weather and climate, though allowing that with sufficient effort some
relation might be uncovered.
World leaders proclaim that climate change is our greatest problem, demonizing carbon
dioxide. Yet atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide have been vastly higher through most
of Earth’s history. Climates both warmer and colder than the present have coexisted with
these higher levels.
Currently elevated levels of carbon dioxide have contributed to increases in agricultural
productivity. Indeed, climatologists before the recent global warming hysteria referred to
warm periods as “climate optima.” Yet world leaders are embarking on costly policies
that have no capacity to replace fossil fuels but enrich crony capitalists at public expense,
increasing costs for all, and restricting access to energy to the world’s poorest populations
that still lack access to electricity’s immense benefits.
Billions of dollars have been poured into studies supporting climate alarm, and trillions
of dollars have been involved in overthrowing the energy economy. So it is unsurprising
that great efforts have been made to ramp up hysteria, even as the case for climate alarm
is disintegrating.
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The latest example began with an article published in the New York Times on Feb. 22
about Willie Soon, a scientist at the Harvard Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Mr.
Soon has, for over 25 years, argued for a primary role of solar variability on climate. But
as Greenpeace noted in 2011, Mr. Soon was, in small measure, supported by fossil-fuel
companies over a period of 10 years.
The Times reintroduced this old material as news, arguing that Mr. Soon had failed to
list this support in a recent paper in Science Bulletin of which he was one of four authors.
Two days later Arizona Rep. Raul Grijalva, the ranking Democrat on the Natural Resources
Committee, used the Times article as the basis for a hunting expedition into anything said,
written and communicated by seven individuals – David Legates, John Christy, Judith
Curry, Robert Balling, Roger Pielke Jr., Steven Hayward and me – about testimony we
gave to Congress or other governmental bodies. We were selected solely on the basis of our
objections to alarmist claims about the climate.
In letters he sent to the presidents of the universities employing us (although I have
been retired from MIT since 2013), Mr. Grijalva wanted all details of all of our outside
funding, and communications about this funding, including “consulting fees, promotional
considerations, speaking fees, honoraria, travel expenses, salary, compensation and any
other monies.” Mr. Grijalva acknowledged the absence of any evidence but purportedly
wanted to know if accusations made against Mr. Soon about alleged conflicts of interest or
failure to disclose his funding sources in science journals might not also apply to us.
Perhaps the most bizarre letter concerned the University of Colorado’s Mr. Pielke. His
specialty is science policy, not science per se, and he supports reductions in carbon emissions
but finds no basis for associating extreme weather with climate. Mr. Grijalva’s complaint
is that Mr. Pielke, in agreeing with the IPCC on extreme weather and climate, contradicts
the assertions of John Holdren, President Obama’s science czar.
Mr. Grijalva’s letters convey an unstated but perfectly clear threat: Research disputing
alarm over the climate should cease lest universities that employ such individuals incur
massive inconvenience and expense – and scientists holding such views should not offer
testimony to Congress. After the Times article, Sens. Edward Markey (D., Mass.), Shel-
don Whitehouse (D., R.I.) and Barbara Boxer (D., Calif.) also sent letters to numerous
energy companies, industrial organizations and, strangely, many right-of-center think tanks
(including the Cato Institute, with which I have an association) to unearth their alleged
influence peddling.
The American Meteorological Society responded with appropriate indignation at the
singling out of scientists for their scientific positions, as did many individual scientists. On
Monday, apparently reacting to criticism, Mr. Grijalva conceded to the National Journal
that his requests for communications between the seven of us and our outside funders was
“overreach.”
Where all this will lead is still hard to tell. At least Mr. Grijalva’s letters should help
clarify for many the essentially political nature of the alarms over the climate, and the
damage it is doing to science, the environment and the well-being of the world’s poorest.
Mr. Lindzen is professor emeritus of atmospheric sciences at MIT and a distinguished
senior fellow of the Cato Institute.
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Blow Up the Tax Code and Start Over
Apply a 14.5% flat tax to personal income and to businesses. Cut deductions. Watch
the economy roar.
By Rand Paul June 17, 2015 7:09 P.M. ET
Some of my fellow Republican candidates for the presidency have proposed plans to fix
the tax system. These proposals are a step in the right direction, but the tax code has
grown so corrupt, complicated, intrusive and antigrowth that I’ve concluded the system
isn’t fixable.
So on Thursday I am announcing an over $2 trillion tax cut that would repeal the entire
IRS tax code – more than 70,000 pages – and replace it with a low, broad-based tax of 14.5%
on individuals and businesses. I would eliminate nearly every special-interest loophole. The
plan also eliminates the payroll tax on workers and several federal taxes outright, including
gift and estate taxes, telephone taxes, and all duties and tariffs. I call this “The Fair and
Flat Tax.”
President Obama talks about “middle-class economics,” but his redistribution policies
have led to rising income inequality and negative income gains for families. Here’s what
I propose for the middle class: The Fair and Flat Tax eliminates payroll taxes, which are
seized by the IRS from a worker’s paychecks before a family ever sees the money. This will
boost the incentive for employers to hire more workers, and raise after-tax income by at
least 15% over 10 years.
Here’s why we have to start over with the tax code. From 2001 until 2010, there were
at least 4,430 changes to tax laws – an average of one “fix” a day – always promising more
fairness, more simplicity or more growth stimulants. And every year the Internal Revenue
Code grows absurdly more incomprehensible, as if it were designed as a jobs program for
accountants, IRS agents and tax attorneys.
Polls show that “fairness” is a top goal for Americans in our tax system. I envision a
traditionally All-American solution: Everyone plays by the same rules. This means no one
of privilege, wealth or with an arsenal of lobbyists can game the system to pay a lower rate
than working Americans.
Most important, a smart tax system must turbocharge the economy and pull America
out of the slow-growth rut of the past decade. We are already at least $2 trillion behind
where we should be with a normal recovery; the growth gap widens every month. Even
Mr. Obama’s economic advisers tell him that the U.S. corporate tax code, which has the
highest rates in the world (35%), is an economic drag. When an iconic American company
like Burger King wants to renounce its citizenship for Canada because that country’s tax
rates are so much lower, there’s a fundamental problem.
Another increasingly obvious danger of our current tax code is the empowerment of a
rogue agency, the IRS, to examine the most private financial and lifestyle information of
every American citizen. We now know that the IRS, through political hacks like former
IRS official Lois Lerner, routinely abused its auditing power to build an enemies list and
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harass anyone who might be adversarial to President Obama’s policies. A convoluted tax
code enables these corrupt tactics.
My tax plan would blow up the tax code and start over. In consultation with some
of the top tax experts in the country, including the Heritage Foundation’s Stephen Moore,
former presidential candidate Steve Forbes and Reagan economist Arthur Laffer, I devised
a 21st-century tax code that would establish a 14.5% flat-rate tax applied equally to all
personal income, including wages, salaries, dividends, capital gains, rents and interest. All
deductions except for a mortgage and charities would be eliminated. The first $50,000 of
income for a family of four would not be taxed. For low-income working families, the plan
would retain the earned-income tax credit.
I would also apply this uniform 14.5% business-activity tax on all companies – down
from as high as nearly 40% for small businesses and 35% for corporations. This tax would be
levied on revenues minus allowable expenses, such as the purchase of parts, computers and
office equipment. All capital purchases would be immediately expensed, ending complicated
depreciation schedules.
The immediate question everyone asks is: Won’t this 14.5% tax plan blow a massive
hole in the budget deficit? As a senator, I have proposed balanced budgets and I pledge to
balance the budget as president.
Here’s why this plan would balance the budget: We asked the experts at the nonpartisan
Tax Foundation to estimate what this plan would mean for jobs, and whether we are raising
enough money to fund the government. The analysis is positive news: The plan is an
economic steroid injection. Because the Fair and Flat Tax rewards work, saving, investment
and small business creation, the Tax Foundation estimates that in 10 years it will increase
gross domestic product by about 10%, and create at least 1.4 million new jobs.
And because the best way to balance the budget and pay down government debt is to
put Americans back to work, my plan would actually reduce the national debt by trillions
of dollars over time when combined with my package of spending cuts.
The left will argue that the plan is a tax cut for the wealthy. But most of the loopholes
in the tax code were designed by the rich and politically connected. Though the rich will
pay a lower rate along with everyone else, they won’t have special provisions to avoid paying
lower than 14.5%.
The challenge to this plan will be to overcome special-interest groups in Washington who
will muster all of their political muscle to save corporate welfare. That’s what happened
to my friend Steve Forbes when he ran for president in 1996 on the idea of the flat tax.
Though the flat tax was surprisingly popular with voters for its simplicity and its capacity
to boost the economy, crony capitalists and lobbyists exploded his noble crusade.
Today, the American people see the rot in the system that is degrading our economy day
after day and want it to end. That is exactly what the Fair and Flat Tax will do through
a plan that’s the boldest restoration of fairness to American taxpayers in over a century.
Sen. Paul, a Republican from Kentucky, is running for his party’s presidential nomina-
tion.
215
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
The Other Veterans Scandal
By Michael F. Cannon And Christopher A. Preble June 15, 2014
Washington The Department of Veterans Affairs is mired in scandal. More than
57,000 veterans have been waiting at least three months for a doctor’s appointment. Another
64,000 never even made it onto a waiting list. There are allegations that waits for care either
caused or contributed to veterans’ deaths.
But another, even larger problem with the Department of Veterans Affairs is being
overlooked: Even when the department works exactly as intended, it helps inflict great
harm on veterans, active-duty military personnel and civilians.
Here’s how. Veterans’ health and disability benefits are some of the largest costs involved
in any military conflict, but they are delayed costs, typically reaching their peak 40 or 50
years after the conflict ends. Congress funds these commitments – through the Department
of Veterans Affairs – only once they come due.
As a result, when Congress debates whether to authorize and fund military action, it can
act as if those costs don’t exist. But concealing those costs makes military conflicts appear
less burdensome and therefore increases their likelihood. It’s as if Congress deliberately
structured veterans’ benefits to make it easier to start wars.
The Department of Veterans Affairs is supposed to help wounded veterans, but its
current design makes soldiers more likely to get killed or injured in the first place. The
scandal isn’t at the Department of Veterans Affairs. The scandal is the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
Is there a better way? We propose a system of veterans’ benefits that would be funded
by Congress in advance. It would allow veterans to purchase life, disability and health
insurance from private insurers. Those policies would cover losses related to their term of
service, and would pay benefits when they left active duty through the remainder of their
lives.
To cover the cost, military personnel would receive additional pay sufficient to purchase
a statutorily defined package of benefits at actuarially fair rates. The precise amount would
be determined with reference to premiums quoted by competing insurers, and would vary
with the risks posed by particular military jobs.
Insurers and providers would be more responsive because veterans could fire them –
something they cannot do to the Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans’ insurance
premiums would also reveal, and enable recruits and active-duty personnel to compare, the
risks posed by various military jobs and career paths.
Most important, under this system, when a military conflict increases the risk to life
and limb, insurers would adjust veterans’ insurance premiums upward, and Congress would
have to increase military pay immediately to enable military personnel to cover those added
costs.
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Consider how this system might have prevented Congress’s misbegotten decision to
authorize President George W. Bush to invade Iraq. In 2002, the Bush administration
played down estimates that the war would cost as much as $200 billion, insisting the cost
would be less than $50 billion. To give you a sense of how mistaken this was: The economists
Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz put the cost of veterans’ benefits alone, from the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, at roughly $1 trillion.
Like others before her, Hillary Rodham Clinton has admitted that voting to authorize
the Iraq invasion was a “mistake,” though she made “the best decision I could with the
information I had.” How many members of Congress would have voted differently if con-
fronted with the long-term health and disability needs of the troops they had already sent
into Afghanistan and those they were sending into Iraq? How many would have pressed
harder to end the wars sooner if they had to confront the mounting cost of veterans’ benefits,
in addition to the wars’ other growing costs, every year the wars dragged on?
The alternative system we propose combines the universal goal of improving veter-
ans’ benefits with conservative Republicans’ preference for market incentives and antiwar
Democrats’ desire to make it harder to wage war. Pre-funding veterans benefits could pre-
vent unnecessary wars, or at least end them sooner. We can think of no greater tribute to
the men and women serving in our armed forces.
Michael F. Cannon is the director of health policy studies, and Christopher Preble is the
vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, at the Cato Institute.
217
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Wall Street Offers Very Real Benefits: Opposing view
But headlines focus on the bad behavior.
By Thaya Knight 7:16 pm May 26, 2015
Not every person on Wall Street is a morally corrupt Gordon Gekko. Do Wall Street
traders want to make money? Yes. Are they generally people who thrive in a fast-paced,
competitive environment? You bet. And that is a good thing.
At its core, here’s what Wall Street does: It makes sure that companies doing useful
things get the money they need to keep doing those things. Do you like your smartphone?
Does it make your life easier? The company that made that phone got the money to develop
the product and get it into the store where you bought it with the help of Wall Street.
When a company wants to expand, or make a new product, or improve its old products,
it needs money, and it often gets that money by selling stock or bonds. That helps those
companies, the broader economy and consumers generally.
When we have flashing headlines about Wall Street traders acting badly, as we had last
week with news of five major banks pleading guilty to criminal charges, it is very easy to
hate Wall Street. But we only hear headlines about the worst behavior.
No one writes news stories about traders who go about their business every day, carefully
complying with the many (and there are many) rules and regulations that govern their work.
Also, the financial sector, which is usually what people mean when they say “Wall Street,”
isn’t only or even mostly the big banks.
There are small firms, banks, funds and advisers that make up a large portion of our
financial industry. While the news about corruption, corporate welfare and lawbreaking is
very bad, it doesn’t mean the entire industry is rotten. Or, more important, that we don’t
need it.
Wall Street could be better. We could eliminate regulations that crowd out competition
for the big banks. We could reform the system to do away with “too big to fail,” making it
harder for bad traders to get away with bad behavior. Either way, we shouldn’t lose sight
of the very real economic and social benefits Wall Street provides.
Thaya Knight is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute.
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A.16.2 Outcomes
I asked a series a outcome questions on each of the five issue areas.
Amtrak Outcomes:
• Do you think the government should spend more, less, or about what it does now on
transportation and infrastructure? [1: A lot more, A lot less]
• Would you prefer government pay for building and maintaining roads and infrastruc-
ture through raising taxes for transportation spending, or through charging user-fees,
like paying tolls when you drive on the highways? [1: Fund entirely through tax
increases, 4: Both Equally, 7; Fund entirely through user fees]
• If the government raised taxes to pay for more transportation spending, do you ex-
pect that money would primarily go toward building new infrastructure projects or
maintaining and improving existing infrastructure? [1: Entirely toward NEW in-
frastructure projects, 4: Both Equally, 7: Entirely toward maintaining EXISTING
infrastructure]
• For every dollar the government spends on transportation and infrastructure projects,
about how many cents do you think are spent inefficiently? [Slider 0 - 100, How Many
Cents Spent Inefficiently?]
Climate Outcomes:
• Would you say that climate change is best described as a ... (1: Crisis, 7: Not a
problem at all)
• From what you’ve read and heard, do you believe increases in Earth’s temperature
are due... (1: Entirely due to the effects of pollution from human activity, 7: Entirely
due to natural causes)
• Do you think the solution to the climate change problem will primarily come from
government policies or technological innovation in the free market? (1: Entirely from
the free market, 7: Entirely from government policies)
• Thinking about what’s in the news, is the seriousness of global warming generally
exaggerated, correct, or underestimated? (1: Generally exaggerated, 4: Generally
Correct, 7: Generally underestimated)
• How many degrees (Fahrenheit) do you believe the Earth will warm over the next 100
years? (Select “0” if you think the temperature will stay about the same) [Slider -3
to 3]
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Flat Tax Outcomes:
• Would you favor or oppose changing the federal tax system to a flat tax, where
everyone making more than $50,000 a year pays the same percentage of his or her
income in taxes? [1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
• What percentage of income, from 0 to 100, do you think Americans should pay in
federal taxes on average? [Slider 0 - 100, Average Tax Rate]
• Do you favor or oppose reducing the business and corporate tax rate to 14.5% percent?
[1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
• Do you think a flat tax on incomes over $50,000 without tax deductions or credits will
do more to help all Americans or do more to help wealthy Americans? [1: Do more
to help ALL Americans, 7: Do more to help WEALTHY Americans]
Veterans Outcomes:
• How would you rate your feelings toward the Department of Veterans Affairs (the
VA) on a scale of 0 to 100, where a rating of 100 means you feel as warm and positive
as possible and 0 means you feel as cold and negative as possible? How do you feel
toward... [Department of Veterans Affairs]
• How much confidence do you have in the Department of Veterans Affairs’ ability to
care for veterans? [1: A Great Deal, 7: None At All]
• Would you favor or oppose changing the healthcare system for Veterans to a system
where the government provides additional money sufficient for Veterans to purchase a
government-approved health insurance plan from private health insurance companies?
[1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
• For every dollar the government spends on Veterans Benefits, about how many cents do
you think are spent inefficiently? [Slider 0 - 100, How Many Cents Spent Inefficiently?]
Wall Street Outcomes:
• How would you rate your feelings toward the following on a scale of 0 to 100, where a
rating of 100 means you feel as warm and positive as possible and 0 means you feel as
cold and negative as possible. How do you feel toward... [CEOs; Wall Street Bankers;
Government Regulators]
• What percentage of Wall Street bankers, from zero to one hundred, do you think are
corrupt? [Slider 0 - 100: % Wall Street Bankers Corrupt]
• How much confidence do you have in Wall Street bankers and brokers to do the right
thing... [1: A Great Deal, 7: None at all]
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• Compared to what it’s doing now, do you think the federal government needs to
regulate banks and financial institutions [1: A lot more, A lot less]
For each outcome area, I created a scale using principal components analysis, taking
the first factor. The scree plots shown in Figure A.6 show that with the exception of the
“Amtrak” set of dependent variables, a large portion of the variance in each issue area is
accounted for by the first factor.
Figure A.6: Scree Plots for Five Issue Areas
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A.16.3 Results
The tables below show the effects of each treatment on each outcome scale, in each wave.
The effects are all on the diagonal – op-eds affect their target issue areas and (usually) not
the off-issue areas. This pattern holds in all three waves.
Table A.26: Newspapers Wave 1
Amtrak Climate Flat Tax Veterans Wallstreet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Amtrak Op-Ed 0.719∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.059 0.084 −0.047
(0.072) (0.102) (0.080) (0.077) (0.090)
Climate Op-Ed 0.090 0.561∗∗∗ 0.043 0.021 0.003
(0.067) (0.104) (0.079) (0.078) (0.091)
Flat Tax Op-Ed 0.128∗ 0.186∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.100 −0.034
(0.066) (0.103) (0.086) (0.078) (0.092)
Veterans Op-Ed 0.092 0.0002 −0.055 0.887∗∗∗ −0.149∗
(0.068) (0.102) (0.081) (0.077) (0.089)
Wallstreet Op-Ed 0.043 0.091 0.133∗ −0.146∗ 1.026∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.102) (0.079) (0.078) (0.091)
Constant (Control) −0.178 −0.144 −0.132 −0.156 −0.136
(0.046) (0.070) (0.056) (0.054) (0.062)
Wave Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1
N 3,567 3,567 3,567 3,567 3,567
R2 0.041 0.011 0.036 0.058 0.061
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
222
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Table A.27: Newspapers Wave 2
Amtrak Climate Flat Tax Veterans Wallstreet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Amtrak Op-Ed 0.367∗∗∗ −0.004 0.050 0.100 −0.087
(0.074) (0.115) (0.088) (0.087) (0.103)
Climate Op-Ed 0.010 0.291∗∗ 0.165∗ 0.170∗∗ −0.064
(0.072) (0.114) (0.087) (0.085) (0.102)
Flat Tax Op-Ed 0.004 0.082 0.403∗∗∗ 0.113 −0.055
(0.071) (0.115) (0.094) (0.087) (0.103)
Veterans Op-Ed 0.040 −0.042 −0.004 0.511∗∗∗ −0.148
(0.072) (0.113) (0.090) (0.084) (0.102)
Wallstreet Op-Ed −0.075 −0.057 0.055 −0.065 0.451∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.112) (0.089) (0.086) (0.102)
Constant (Control) −0.162 −0.120 −0.179 −0.251 −0.017
(0.050) (0.078) (0.062) (0.059) (0.073)
Wave Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 2
N 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989
R2 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.015
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
223
APPENDIX A. STUDY MANIFEST
Table A.28: Newspapers Wave 3
Amtrak Climate Flat Tax Veterans Wallstreet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Amtrak Op-Ed 0.299∗∗∗ 0.028 0.007 0.146 −0.066
(0.082) (0.128) (0.095) (0.097) (0.109)
Climate Op-Ed 0.017 0.175 0.117 0.240∗∗ −0.067
(0.082) (0.128) (0.098) (0.102) (0.112)
Flat Tax Op-Ed 0.039 −0.007 0.322∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗ −0.016
(0.080) (0.132) (0.103) (0.099) (0.112)
Veterans Op-Ed 0.045 −0.084 −0.069 0.561∗∗∗ −0.065
(0.083) (0.127) (0.099) (0.097) (0.111)
Wallstreet Op-Ed −0.026 −0.046 −0.043 −0.020 0.481∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.124) (0.099) (0.096) (0.110)
Constant (Control) −0.137 −0.089 −0.175 −0.269 −0.066
(0.056) (0.086) (0.066) (0.069) (0.076)
Wave Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1
N 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448
R2 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.015
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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A.17 Study 20: Death Penalty
Peffley and Hurwitz (2007) present the results of a question wording experiment on support
for capital punishment. The original study considered subgroup differences by respondent
racial category, but I will present the unconditional results of both the original and repli-
cation experiments below.
A.17.1 Original Study
Sample: 1,142 White and Black Adult Americans.
Dates of data collection: October 19, 2000 – March 1, 2001.
Treatments:
• Control: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
• African Americans: Some people say [FBI statistics show] that the death penalty
is unfair because most of the people who are executed are African Americans. Do you
favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
• Innocent: Some people say [FBI statistics show] that the death penalty is unfair
because too many innocent people are being executed. Do you favor or oppose the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
Outcomes
• Favor Death Penalty: The response options were Strongly Oppose, Somewhat
Oppose, Somewhat favor, Strongly Favor. The dependent variable was recoded 1 if
the respondent chose Somewhat favor or Strongly favor. The original dataset was
not available, but a tabulation by treatment condition and race was printed in the
original article. Separate tabulations by the [Some people say]/[FBI statistics show]
manipulations were not included, so I collapse over that margin in the analysis of the
original experiment and in the replication, although the replication did include that
manipulation.
A.17.2 Replication Study
Sample: 1,575 Mechanical Turk respondents.
Dates of data collection: March 2015.
Treatments: I used the identical treatments as in the original.
Outcomes: I used the identically worded outcome questions.
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A.17.3 Results
In both the original and the replication, the Innocent treatment decreased support for the
death penalty.





African Americans 0.069 −0.303∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096)





∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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B Reanalysis and Replication of Lord, Ross, and
Lepper (1979)
I embedded a replication of Lord, Ross, and Lepper’s original 1979 design in the Capital
Punishment study (Study 1) presented in Chapter 2. In this appendix, I present the original
results and replication to show how remarkably well the original patterns of evidence are
reproduced, nearly 40 years later and with a qualitatively different subject pool.
The central critique of the original study lies in the interpretation of results. In my view,
the observed correlation between subjects’ initial views and responses was inappropriately
taken as evidence of polarization.
Other scholars have conducted replications of Lord, Ross, and Lepper as well (Pyszczyn-
ski, Greenberg and Holt 1985; Miller et al. 1993; Kuhn and Lao 1996; Munro and Ditto
1997; Corner, Whitmarsh and Xenias 2012). Those replications focused on a separate issue
with the original study, the measurement strategy. Rather than asking subjects to report
their own opinion change, subsequent efforts have taken the difference in measured levels
of support before and after the experiment (e.g., Miller et al. 1993). No replication using
this direct measure of change has found evidence of attitude polarization.
B.0.1 Hypotheses
Lord et al. (1979) was designed to evaluate two hypotheses using a within-subjects compar-
ison of attitudes before and after encountering mixed evidence.
According to the authors, the biased assimilation hypothesis predicts that “individuals
will dismiss and discount empirical evidence that contradicts their initial views but will
derive support from evidence, of no greater probativeness, that seems consistent with their
views” (p. 2099). The measure of biased assimilation is the observed correlation between
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initial attitudes and evaluations of evidence. Strictly speaking, however, this operational-
ization of biased assimilation does not measure the extent to which subjects incorporate
new and possibly discordant facts into their base of knowledge (as would be implied by the
term “assimilation”). This distinction is important because, in principle, individuals can
update their beliefs even if they rate the evidence (or the source of the evidence) as being
of low quality.
The attitude polarization hypothesis predicts that mixed evidence makes attitudes and
beliefs more extreme: “Our thesis is that belief polarization will increase, rather than
decrease or remain unchanged, when mixed or inconclusive findings are assimilated by pro-
ponents of opposite viewpoints” (Lord et al. 1979, p. 2099). This prediction concerns
treatment effect heterogeneity: mixed evidence should have a positive effect for propo-
nents and a negative effect for opponents. While not stated explicitly in counterfactual
language, initial beliefs are supposed to have a causal impact on subjects’ responses to new
information, that is, initial beliefs are hypothesized to moderate the effect of information
on attitudes. This proposition is not adequately tested by this design, as subjects’ initial
beliefs are not randomly assigned.
B.0.2 Design of Lord et al. (1979)
1. An in-class survey was administered to 151 undergraduates that included three items
on capital punishment: attitudes toward the death penalty, beliefs about its deterrent
effect, and whether the relevant research supported their views.
2. A subset of 48 of the 151 was selected to participate in further research. Half of
the 48 were in favor of capital punishment and the other half opposed; these subjects
were selected because their answers to the three capital punishment survey items were
internally consistent and showed a pattern of strong belief in the initial attitude.
3. Subjects were pseudo-randomly1 assigned to one of four conditions using a 2x2 fac-
torial design. The first factor was the order in which the fabricated evidence was
presented: either pro- or anti-capital punishment came first. The second factor was
the research method of the fabricated evidence: either time series or cross-sectional
analysis was presented first.
1It appears that groups of four or more subjects were (cluster-) assigned to conditions by session, and
that session conditions followed an alternating pattern. This procedure is pseudo-random insofar as subjects
are not randomly assigned to sessions, nor are sessions randomly assigned to conditions.
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4. Subjects were given a “results card” with a research finding and then asked to rate
the changes in their beliefs about capital punishment and its deterrent effect on scales
from -8 to 8.
5. Subjects were then given a “criticism card” in which the research method was de-
scribed and methodological critiques were made. Subjects then were asked to evaluate
how well the study had been done and how convincing they found the evidence on
scales from -8 to 8.
6. Subjects wrote essays explaining their answers.
7. Subjects rated the changes in their beliefs about capital punishment and its deterrent
effects once again.
8. Subjects then repeated steps 4-7, this time with evidence from the other point of view
and using the other research design.
Some features of the design are worth emphasizing. First, the “running record” mea-
surement strategy may have introduced systematic biases: by the end of the entire protocol,
subjects had given their attitudes toward capital punishment five times, plus written an es-
say explaining their views. Repeated measurement itself may cause subjects to evaluate,
re-evaluate, and possibly change their positions (Houston and Fazio 1989). Second, changes
in attitudes toward capital punishment were obtained by asking subjects if and how their
opinions changed in response to the two sets of evidence, rather than asking what their
attitudes were post-evidence. The distinction between the self-reported measure of change
and the “directly assessed” measure is a potential methodological weakness discussed at
length in the original article and in subsequent replications (Lord et al. 1979, fn. 1; Miller
et al. 1993, p. 562).
Finally, this study employed a within-subjects, rather than between-subjects, design for
estimating the causal effect of mixed evidence on attitudes. Although the study did em-
ploy random assignment (the presentation order and research paradigm of the fabricated
evidence), the treatment itself (mixed evidence) was not randomly assigned to some sub-
jects but not others. Treatment effects are defined as the difference between two potential
outcomes (Rubin 1974): subjects’ attitudes in the absence of new information (control)
and attitudes after encountering new evidence (treatment). This design implicitly assumes
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that subjects’ potential outcomes do not change over time and are unaffected by the mea-
surement strategy – specifically, that untreated potential outcomes can be measured using
a pre-test and that treated potential outcomes are observed during the post-test. Rather
than make these assumptions, a between-subjects design compares treatment groups that
are randomly assigned to reveal one potential outcome or the other.
B.0.3 Results of Lord et al. (1979)
In the Lord et al. study, the order in which the anti- and pro-deterrence evidence was pre-
sented had no discernible impact on the difference between evaluations of the two studies.
Likewise, the evaluations of the studies were insensitive to the design of the fabricated evi-
dence (either time-series or cross-sectional analysis) – subjects did not display a preference
for one mode of inquiry over the other.
The results supported the biased assimilation hypothesis. Table B.1 shows subjects’
mean evaluations of the studies’ quality and persuasiveness. Proponents found the pro-
deterrence study to be better conducted (difference = 3.1) and more convincing (difference
= 3.2) than the anti-deterrence study. Opponents held the opposite opinion, finding the anti-
deterrence study to be of higher quality (difference = -1.8) and more persuasive (difference
= -2.2). Using t-tests, the authors found all four of these differences to be statistically
significant at p < 0.01 or better. These results show a clear correlation between initial
attitudes and evaluations of evidence.
Table B.2 presents the evidence the authors offer in support of attitude polarization:
After seeing both sets of evidence, proponents reported moving an average of 1.5 scale
points in the pro-capital-punishment direction and opponents reported having moved an
average of 1.7 scale points in the anti-capital-punishment direction. A similar pattern
holds for beliefs about the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment, which move in opposite
directions for proponents (1.4) and opponents (-1.8). T-tests reveal that these differences are
all significant at p < 0.001. These results show a clear correlation between initial positions
and self-reported changes in beliefs and attitudes, which the original authors interpret as
evidence of the attitude polarization hypothesis. Note, however, that the “Results only”
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Table B.1: Biased Assimilation Results of Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979)
Study Proponents (N = 24) Opponents (N = 24)
Mean ratings of how well the two




Mean ratings of how convincing the two studies were





panel of Table B.2 also includes evidence that does not support this hypothesis – proponents
and opponents appeared to move in parallel after just reading the “results card” of each
study.
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Table B.2: Attitude Polarization Results of Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979)
Initial Attitudes
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B.0.4 Previous Replications
To date, there have been at least seven published replications of the Lord et al. (1979)
design. A summary of these replications and their findings with respect to biased assim-
ilation and attitude polarization is presented in Table B.3. All replications find evidence
of biased assimilation, i.e., a positive correlation between initial attitudes and subsequent
evaluations of evidence. Five of the replications gathered a self-reported measure of change;
all five found the same pattern of attitude polarization as the original article (although one,
Miller et al. 1993, found no significant polarization when examining attitudes on affirma-
tive action). Five of the replications included the so-called “direct measure” of attitude
change by asking participants for their post-evidence attitudes and comparing them to the
pre-evidence attitude. None of these replications found evidence of attitude polarization
using the direct measure.
Table B.3: Studies of Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization
Attitude Polarization






Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979 Capital Punishment 48 Yes Yes –
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Holt 1985 Test of social sensitivity 40 Yes – No
Houston and Fazio 1989 Capital Punishment 102 Yes – –
Plous 1991 Technological Breakdowns 215 Yes Yes –
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd 1993 Capital Punishment, 337 Yes Yes No
Affirmative Action 109 Yes No –
Kuhn and Lao 1996 Capital Punishment 228 Yes Yes No
Munro and Ditto 1997 Homosexuality 174 Yes Yes No
Corner, Whitmarsh, and Xenias 2012 Climate Change 173 Yes Yes No
The present study 2016 Capital Punishment 670 Yes Yes No
In sum, the empirical evidence on biased assimilation and attitude polarization leads
to a split decision. As a descriptive fact, biased assimilation seems to take place. There is
clear evidence of a correlation between prior beliefs and evaluations of evidence. Attitude
polarization, however, receives limited support in these replications. Leaving aside the
difficulty of drawing causal inferences from the pre-post design, the conclusions are highly
dependent on the measurement strategies. Which measurement is appropriate is a matter
of dispute: Kuhn and Lao (1996) prefer the direct measure, as it may be free of a demand
effect in which subjects feel compelled to report some change in beliefs even when there
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is none. Ross (2012) prefers the self-reported measure, as it may refer to an individual’s
subjective assessment of how the information affected his or her beliefs.
I sympathize with those who criticize the self-reported change measure. Other scholars
have suggested that individuals may not possess the necessary insight into their own cogni-
tive mechanisms to be reliable guides to changes in their attitudes (Goethals and Reckman
1973; Nisbett and Ross 1980). That being said, the “direct measure” suffers from other
biases, most notably regression to the mean – those with extreme attitudes may appear
to moderate in the face of new evidence when no such change has occurred. Fortunately,
experimental design employed in my replication obviates the need to take a strong stand
on which is the better measure of “true” opinion change: the choice of measurement does
not lead to substantively different conclusions when the experiment is analyzed according
to the randomly assigned treatment groups.
B.0.5 Replication Study
I first present the results of a within-subjects analysis in the Pro Con condition of Study 1
only, corresponding to the original Lord et al. design. Table B.4 is presented in the same
format as Table B.1 for ease of comparison. As in the original study, proponents ranked
the Pro study as better conducted (difference = 3.24) and more convincing (difference =
4.10) than the Con study. Among opponents, the opposite pattern holds. The difference
in mean quality rankings was -2.81 and the difference in mean persuasiveness ratings was
-2.22. The pattern of biased assimilation observed among these online participants in 2014
is substantively identical to the pattern observed among Stanford undergraduates in the
late 1970s. The point estimates only differ by an average of about 0.5 scale points, which
is well within sampling variability.2
Table B.5 presents the average self-reported changes in attitudes and beliefs for both
proponents and opponents of capital punishment. After reading only the results page, pro-
ponents reported average attitude change of 3.08 scale points in the pro direction, while
2I do not present standard errors in these tables for continuity of presentation, but they range between
0.40 and 0.55.
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Table B.4: Replication: Biased Assimilation
Study Proponents (N = 50) Opponents (N = 68)
Mean ratings of how well the two




Mean ratings of how convincing the two studies were





opponents reported moving 3.09 scale points in the con direction. The same pattern holds
for beliefs about deterrent efficacy (proponents 2.76; opponents -3.17). The second panel
of Table B.5 shows the mean attitudes and beliefs after reading the study details and criti-
cism. Again, proponents reported higher support for capital punishment after encountering
evidence, and vice versa for opponents. The signs on the “combined” rows all match those
in the original study (see Table B.2), though the magnitudes of the changes are two to three
times as large. This difference may have as much to do with the measurement technology
(my subjects reported their answers using online “sliders” whereas the Stanford subjects
used pen and paper) as with differences across subjects and contexts.
Finally, in keeping with earlier replications (Kuhn and Lao 1996; Miller et al. 1993),
I also measured attitude change using the so-called direct measure. In the pre-survey,
subjects responded to 7-point attitude and belief questions (T1). At the very end of the
main survey, after subjects had been exposed to both sets of evidence, they responded to
the same attitude and belief items again (T2). The difference between them (T2 − T1)
forms the direct measure of attitude change. Table B.6 displays mean responses for both
periods and their difference for proponents and opponents. Mixed evidence does not appear
to produce polarized attitudes either for proponents (difference = 0.04, s.e. = 0.13) or for
opponents (difference = 0.06, s.e. = 0.07). Contrary to earlier replications, the direct
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Table B.5: Replication: Attitude Polarization (self-reported measure)
Initial Attitudes
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measure actually provides suggestive evidence of attitude moderation on the beliefs about
deterrent efficacy. Proponents believe in deterrence 0.22 scale points less, and opponents
0.62 scale points more. Note, of course, that this apparent difference could easily be due to
regression to the mean and be unrelated to exposure to mixed evidence.
Table B.6: Replication: Attitude Polarization (direct measure)
Proponents (N = 50) Opponents (N = 68)
T1 T2 T2−T1 T1 T2 T2−T1
Attitudes toward CP 5.90 5.94 0.04 1.81 1.87 0.06
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07)
Beliefs about Efficacy 5.44 5.22 -0.22 1.94 2.56 0.62
(0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Subjects in Pro Con condition only.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The within-subjects analysis of the Pro Con condition again leads to an impasse. The
attitude polarization hypothesis is strongly supported by the self-reported change measure
and is roundly rejected by the direct measure.
The replication was successful insofar as it was able to reproduce the results of the orig-
inal authors using the self-reported measure and also the results of subsequent scholars who
preferred the direct measure. However, the original study and the replications constitute
weak evidence for (or against) attitude polarization. This weakness stems from inadequate
experimental design, as is illustrated by the contrast between the results of Study 1 and
this appendix.
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C Reanalysis of two Vaccine Correction Experi-
ments
In the main text, I referred to a pair of survey experiments that showed evidence of a back-
lash effect of pro-vaccine messages among people who are predisposed to mistrust vaccines.
The finding that “anti-vaxxers” report lower intention-to-vaccinate when treated with pro-
vaccine information (compared with those in a control condition) was documented in Nyhan
et al. (2014) and replicated in Nyhan and Reifler (2015). To my knowledge, this represents
the only example of a backlash effect measured in a randomized survey experiment.
These backlash effects notwithstanding, the treatments also had correctly-signed effects
on other vaccine-related attitudes among the group that is pre-disposed to “resist” pro-
vaccine information. In Nyhan et al. (2014), the correction decreases the belief that vaccines
cause autism among this group, and in Nyhan and Reifler (2015) it decreased the belief that
vaccines are unsafe or cause the flu.
C.1 Reanalysis of Nyhan et al. 2014
Nyhan et al. (2014) tested the effects of four different interventions (relative to control)
separately for subgroups of the experimental sample defined by terciles of a vaccine atti-
tudes scale measured pre-treatment. In Tables C.1 and C.2 I present my reanalysis of the
experiment focusing on only the “correction” intervention. Whereas the original analysis
estimated treatment effects using an ordered logit specification, I use OLS with a control
for the vaccine attitudes scale to improve precision. Table C.1 shows the “backlash” effect:
the correction reduces intention-to-vaccinate among those in the bottom tercile of the vac-
cine attitudes scale but does not appear to alter the intention-to-vaccinate among others.
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Table C.2, however, we see that the correction has the intended negative effect on the belief
that vaccines cause autism.
Table C.1: Nyhan and Reifler (2014) Reanalysis: Intention to Vaccinate
Intention to vaccinate
Bottom Tercile Middle Tercile Top Tercile
Autism Correction −0.645∗∗∗ −0.093 0.068
(0.179) (0.122) (0.070)
Pre-treatment Vaccine Attitude Scale 1.846∗∗∗ 0.041 0.028
(0.185) (0.310) (0.079)
Constant −0.298 5.708 5.780
(0.600) (1.180) (0.348)
N 270 202 235
R2 0.388 0.004 0.008
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table C.2: Nyhan and Reifler (2014) Reanalysis: Autism
Vaccines Cause Autism
Bottom Tercile Middle Tercile Top Tercile
Autism Correction −0.237∗ −0.260 −0.288∗∗
(0.122) (0.192) (0.138)
Pre-treatment Vaccine Attitude Scale −0.599∗∗∗ −1.235∗∗ −1.038∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.616) (0.233)
Constant 5.078 7.287 6.598
(0.403) (2.354) (1.038)
N 267 200 231
R2 0.123 0.066 0.140
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
C.2 Reanalysis of Nyhan and Reifler 2015
In Nyhan and Reifler (2015), a correction of vaccine misperceptions decreased intention-to-
vaccinate among a subgroup who expressed “high” concern about vaccines. The original
article uses an ordered probit specification, but I will analyze the data with OLS. An
estimate of this unintended “backfire” effect is presented in the second column of Table C.3.
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The estimates presented in the fourth and sixth columns of the table, however, show that
this group updated in the direction of the correction on beliefs that vaccines are unsafe and
that vaccines cause the flu.
Table C.3: Nyhan and Reifler (2015) Reanalysis
Vac. Intention Vac. Unsafe Vac. Gives Flu
Correction 0.176 −0.841∗ −0.215∗∗ −0.093 −0.330∗∗∗ −0.468∗
(0.297) (0.441) (0.086) (0.208) (0.115) (0.254)
Pre-treatment Concern −0.172 −0.049 0.364∗∗∗ 0.398∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.119
(0.210) (0.452) (0.056) (0.219) (0.071) (0.249)
Constant 4.070 3.440 0.847 0.709 1.007 2.313
(0.522) (1.973) (0.111) (0.971) (0.174) (1.199)
Concern low high low high low high
N 511 147 512 146 511 147
R2 0.005 0.045 0.171 0.056 0.162 0.057
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
C.2.1 Discussion of Vaccine Experiments
The negative effect of corrections on anti-vaccine respondents’ self-reported intention to
vaccinate is robust: it holds up under ordered logit/probit and OLS specifications and
replicates across two samples. The p-values on these negative effects are very small and
would survive most multiple comparisons corrections. This backlash effect is not in dispute.
A puzzle, however, arises from the fact that in addition to this backlash on intention-to-
vaccinate, anti-vaccine respondents also update their attitudes in the direction of evidence
on other dimensions of vaccine attitudes. It could be that survey questions that ask respon-
dents to predict their own future behavior are especially sensitive to motivated reasoning
processes. It could be that subjects’ attitudes towards vaccines are at least two-dimensional,
and that decreasing the misperception that vaccines cause autism does not, in turn, increase
the probability that subjects will vaccinate their children.
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